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On Maritime Threats to Canada¹

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Oceans and navies have pre-occupied mankind for at least two thousand years. They have played key roles in the economic prosperity, peace and security of most states, especially littoral ones. This has certainly been the case for Canada, its founding states, France and Britain, and its neighbour to the south, the United States. Canada, in its short history, owes a lot of its past and present prosperity to ocean resource exploitation and seaborne trade. Canada's evolution has in the past been threatened and shaped, directly or indirectly by military force or the threat thereof, and other threats, at home and far afield. Threats to Canada's economic prosperity, peace and security, military and other, continue to exist; they exist in all environments, including at sea.

There are several factors which influence the nature and size of a state's required naval forces. The most important of these is the threat, both present and, especially, future. This paper examines the maritime threats that challenge Canada's national interests and drive the need for a capable and effective Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).

Canada's National Interests

Like most states, Canada basically has two national interests: to prosper economically; and to live in peace and security. These interests are intertwined. Often, a country will be challenged to prosper economically if it does not enjoy peace and security, and vice versa.

Threats in General

All threats, in one way or another, affect a state's ability to prosper economically or to live in peace and security.² In a perfect world, nothing would stand in the way of a state pursuing its national interests. Unfortunately, the world is far from perfect. There are natural phenomena and human activities which work against the intertwined pursuits of economic prosperity and peace and security. Natural phenomena and human activity which cause damage to property or endanger human life and freedom and economic activity are, in many circles and especially military ones, called threats. Some threats, such as disease, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, drought and climate change, are natural and some, such as pollution, crime, terrorism,³ cyber-warfare and armed conflict, are human. Some have a great impact on the economy, some have a great impact on peace and security, and some affect both in varying degrees. Some threats affect people directly and some affect them indirectly. Some human threats are accidental, but most are intentional. Some

human threats are military in nature; some are non-military. Military threats play out in all environments – on land, in the air, in space and at sea. Human, intentional threats, especially military ones, have the greatest impact on a state's national interests.

Responses to Threats in General

Governments ordinarily take steps to minimize or eliminate threats and develop contingencies for dealing with threats before they arise. While methods vary among states and governments, there are some common patterns. Most governments employ civilian health and emergency services to deal with the threat and impact of disease and natural disasters; police forces and justice systems to deal with crime; and military forces to deal with external armed aggression.⁴ While military forces can be, and sometimes are, used to assist civilian agencies and police forces when they deal with out-of-the-ordinary or overwhelming circumstances, military forces are mandated and equipped to focus on dealing with the threat posed by other states' military forces. Normally, the principal purpose of a state's armed forces is to defend a state and its people against external military aggression.

Human Threats in General

The human threats to the intertwined national interests of economic prosperity and peace and security, those for which armed forces and police forces are normally raised, can be categorized and summarized as follows.

Inter-state Tension and Conflict

Despite the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the optimism of the 1990s, tensions continue to exist between states. These tensions are rooted in: geostrategic power and influence struggles; a sense of sympathy or responsibility (genuine and legitimate or not) for ethnic, linguistic, or religious diasporas living in neighbouring countries; and economic competition for limited natural resources including water, food, minerals and energy. Some observers feel these tensions are on the rise.⁵ These tensions lead to an inability (or unwillingness) to respect the sovereignty and interests of other states. They can cause potential antagonists to spend large sums of money on warfighting capabilities, sometimes including nuclear weapons. Unresolved tensions between states can lead to state-on-state coercion and state-sponsored or supported terrorism. These tensions can, as it has so often happened in the past, degenerate into inter-state conflict. Such tensions and conflicts can affect peace and security and economic prosperity beyond the states in question.

Intra-state Tension and Conflict

Tensions continue to exist within states. This can be rooted in: (1) an inability to live together owing to ethnic, linguistic, religious, socio-economic and/or ideological differences; (2) unfair, unregulated or aggressive competition for limited natural resources including water, food, minerals and energy⁶; and (3) an inability (or unwillingness) to share wealth. These challenges often lead

to an inability (or unwillingness) to share political power. Some observers feel these tensions are on the rise. Unresolved tensions within a country can, as has so often happened in the past, lead to social unrest, emigration, civil strife, lawlessness, piracy, terrorism and civil war. Such tensions and conflict, which give rise to failing and failed states, can affect peace and security and economic prosperity beyond the borders of the state in question. Failing and failed states sometimes provide safe havens for international terrorist groups. Some observers feel the number of failing and failed states are on the rise.

Criminal Activity

Independent of inter- and intra-state tensions and conflicts, there has been and always will be crime, organized and not, national and transnational, essentially involving for-profit trafficking of stolen and/or prohibited goods and services. This includes, but is not limited to, cigarettes, alcohol, drugs, arms, money and human beings. As mentioned previously, countering the threat and impact of crime is normally the responsibility of police forces and justice systems. A state's military forces, especially its land forces, are normally not involved in this area, except under exceptional circumstances.⁷

Military Threats in General

In terms of threats of a military (or quasi-military) nature, one needs to consider both the capability⁸ and the intent⁹ of a potential adversary. There are several different scenarios in this regard. Military capability takes time to develop¹⁰ and is relatively easy to assess and quantify.¹¹ Military intent is more difficult to assess and quantify, and the intent of a capable state can develop or change in a very short period of time, much more quickly than capability can develop or change. If a state has no military capability, it clearly represents no military threat.¹² If a state has significant military capability but no aggressive intent, it may represent an unlikely or negligible threat.¹³ If a state has significant military capability and an unclear or aggressive intent, it represents a serious or likely threat. Assessing military intent is not always easy. Again, there are several scenarios in this regard. Clearly, past actions can be tangible harbingers of future actions; in such scenarios, intent and the resultant threat are easier to assess. A more difficult scenario is one in which there has been no past aggressive action but there is much or increasing aggressive rhetoric.

Managing Military Threats

While not normally talked about in such terms, the science and art of assessing the nature, potential impact and means of countering military threats is part and parcel of classic risk theory and management. Risk is commonly spoken of as a situation involving exposure to danger. Risk theory considers risk and its likelihood (or chance) in an uncertain world.¹⁴ Risk management is the “process of evaluating the chance of loss or harm and then taking steps to combat the potential risk.” Risk-managing military threats, or protecting the state and its people against the possibility of external military aggression, is the principal business of politicians and military professionals.¹⁵

Response to Military Threats

National governments, including Canada's, assume a responsibility¹⁶ to defend their citizens and sovereign territory, especially from external military aggression. To do so, governments must acquire and maintain an ability to counter military threats. Most normally do so by raising and maintaining standing military forces and by collaborating and cooperating, militarily and otherwise, with liked-minded, allied states. Most normally focus first on the ability to defend their territorial sovereignty and then, if sovereignty and territory are not under immediate threat, on the ability to address peace and security problems abroad so that these problems do not one day adversely affect peace, security and economic prosperity at home.

Canada maintains a standing military force of 68,000 regular force soldiers, air personnel and sailors.¹⁷ This military force is designed to provide for the defence of Canada and of North America, and to contribute to international peace and security. The force is principally designed to counter military threats. Since the end of the Second World War, Canada has sought to reduce the threat of external military aggression through membership and strong support of the United Nations (UN)¹⁸ and military alliances. When not otherwise busy countering military threats, military force can also assist in countering non-military threats. While capable of some independent military action, Canada relies heavily on military alliances with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States.

There is much debate as to the economic rationale and benefit of large investments in a state's military forces. Canada currently spends about 1% of its Gross Domestic Product on military spending. Some say this is more than adequate. Some say this is not enough.¹⁹ Some say Canada relies too much on the protective umbrella of the United States.²⁰

Canadians' Perceptions of Military Threats

While threats, especially military ones, affect all states and peoples, they are not felt the same by all. Many people around the world, including many Canadians, hoped that the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s would have ushered the beginning of a new era of increased peace and security and reduced military spending. It is not clear if this has been the case.²¹ Since 1989, there has been a seemingly increasing number of crisis and conflicts which has troubled global peace and security,²² and has involved the regular use of military force.

Most Canadians do not sense a near-and-present military threat to Canada. While Russia has recently resumed probes of North American airspace²³ and has carried out a flag-waving at the North Pole,²⁴ Canadians do not seem to view these activities as truly threatening to national sovereignty. There are likely several reasons for this sense of relative security. First, most living Canadians have never experienced the threat of military attack, invasion or occupation here in Canada. Second, Canada, surrounded by three of the world's oceans, is relatively well insulated from direct military threat. Third, Canada lives under the umbrella of the most powerful state on Earth. These three facts likely cause most Canadians not to be as concerned with military threats as many people are in other parts of the world. In the end, the likelihood of a conventional military attack on Canada, especially given its proximity to the United States, is very low.

Also, the fear of an attack on our North American neighbour or our own homeland by a nuclear armed adversary, which was prevalent during the Cold War, was, until recently, felt to be a thing

of the past. The sense of relief, post-1989, was welcomed and palpable. Today, unfortunately, several more states have acquired or are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons and some are attempting to acquire increasingly long-range, autonomous and precise delivery systems. Despite our best hopes and wishes, the possibility and threat of a nuclear attack still exist.

Canadians do sense the threat of terrorism, especially that practised by Islamic jihadists, both at home and abroad. At home and in allied countries, the threat is considered non-military and is principally handled by police forces and the justice system, with assistance of the military as appropriate. In terrorist havens abroad, the threat is considered military and allied states, along with Canada, have been countering it with military force.

Canadians do sometimes sense non-military threats to Canada. These threats are mostly economic and criminal in nature. These threats rarely command the public's attention in a significant and persistent manner. Many of these threats exist just beyond Canada's land borders. They exist at sea. The most tangible ones are illegal migration,²⁵ illegal fishing,²⁶ drug trafficking,²⁷ pollution²⁸ and climate change. The less tangible ones are ocean estate and sea-access²⁹ disputes and piracy.

The Challenge and Impact of Accurately Predicting the Future Threat

We live in an unpredictable world. Events happen and continue to happen in unpredictable and surprising manners. Few Canadians saw or predicted: the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall; the 1990 invasion of Kuwait; the 1992 collapse of Somalia; the collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars that occurred there in the early 1990s; the 2001 use of hijacked civilian aircraft to conduct a coordinated terrorist attack against the United States; the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq; the 2008 financial crisis; the 2008 rise of piracy off the Horn of Africa; the Arab spring which commenced in Tunisia in 2010; the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and the resultant nuclear catastrophe; the 2011 NATO-led military intervention in Libya³⁰; and the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. Humans are not very good at predicting the future.

This lack of predictability presents a serious peace and security conundrum. Optimum military forces, which take years and in some instances decades to design and procure, can only be properly identified if the future threat has been correctly predicted.³¹

Who, in the late 1990s, would have predicted that Canada would fight a 10-year anti-terrorist-oriented land campaign in Afghanistan in the new millennium? What lessons has Canada learned (or re-learned) from the pre-Afghanistan, budget-related decisions in the 1990s to cut the Canadian Army's explosive ordnance disposal capability, dispose of Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, dispose of battle tanks, and acquire less expensive unarmoured, commercial-pattern land vehicles. These capabilities were all urgently re-acquired or adjusted during the casualty-heavy Afghan campaign. Predicting the future is not easy. What does this enduring reality mean in the context of lengthy and costly procurement of complex defence capabilities such as warships and submarines?

A state's defence policy, and the difficult capability (and equipment) choices that flow from it, should be based on a clear assessment of the threat of military aggression, at home and abroad, both present and future.³² The most important threat to assess is the future one; unfortunately, it is also the most difficult to predict.³³ An unclear or debatable assessment of future threats³⁴ does not facilitate difficult military capability and equipment choices.³⁵

States Which Represent a Potential Military Threat to Canada

The news when this article was originally published in 2017 has put the spotlight on two states which pose the greatest military threat to the national interests of Canada, and of other states. These military threats are not new. They did not suddenly appear. They have been around, percolating and building for quite some time.

At the top of the list is Russia. Not only does it have significant military and cyber capabilities, which are on the rise, but it has been inclined to use them of late. It has been active militarily on the periphery of its borders. Many peripheral states are worried about Russia's next moves. While Moscow has not verbally threatened North America with armed force, it does have the ability to do so, and has developed a willingness to conduct cyber attacks of North American information servers.

Next is North Korea. It possesses significant military capability and is actively pursuing nuclear³⁶ and long-range missile capabilities.³⁷ In recent years it has had active skirmishes with South Korea.³⁸ Above and beyond its military capability, North Korea has of late gleefully embarked on a course of bellicose rhetoric. North Korea poses a real and existential threat to South Korea and is now threatening the continental United States (and by extension Canada).

While not attracting as much media attention, there are other potential military threats that should concern Canada.

China's military capability is well known. It is building and modernizing.³⁹ There is much debate as to China's intentions beyond its land borders, particularly the trajectory of China's naval expansion and strategy.⁴⁰ To date, China has ignored international criticism of its controversial actions in the South China Sea. In 2106, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, at which China chose not to represent itself, found China's South China Sea actions to be unlawful.⁴¹

Iran continues to pose a military threat in the Middle East. Its current military capabilities are perhaps not of the gravest concern, but it has and continues to use them to influential effect.⁴² It is no secret that Iran has long wished for the destruction of Israel.⁴³ There have been and continue to be grave concerns that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems.⁴⁴ The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action⁴⁵ was to delay Iran's march towards a nuclear-weapon capability but even when all parties abided by the nuclear agreement, Iran continued to be accused of sponsoring extra-territorial terrorism.⁴⁶

These states possess impactful military capabilities and have demonstrated through their actions or their rhetoric, aggressive intent towards other states. While not directly threatening Canada at this time, any further offensive military action by any of these states would likely have an impact on Canada's prosperity and peace and security interests and likely warrant a Canadian response.

Evolving Naval Threats

Against this background, Canada needs modern, balanced and capable armed forces, which include naval forces. Such forces must be designed to counter existing threat weapons, now and into the future. Unfortunately, a potential adversary's weapons, and the platforms that launch them, are in continuous evolution.

There continues to be no end to mankind's motivation and ability to discover, develop and/or deploy new weapons and launch platforms. Weapons, and some of their launch platforms, are

increasingly faster, stealthier,⁴⁷ longer-range and/or more effective. This is especially true of naval platforms and weapons being developed and introduced by Russia and China.

In the maritime environment, the proliferation and improvements in submarines,⁴⁸ mines, anti-ship torpedoes,⁴⁹ anti-ship missiles,⁵⁰ and cruise and ballistic missiles in particular, represent increasing potential to do harm, directly or indirectly, to North America and to the naval forces designed to counter them. Such evolving threats should not be discounted,⁵¹ and preventive and/or protective defence measures need to be considered and implemented.⁵²

The Risk (or Threat) of Reliance on Others

While Canada has been a strong proponent of the UN and NATO, these organizations have been challenged at varying times in their willingness and ability to provide the rule of law and safeguards which contribute to global and Canadian peace and security.

The UN can only take substantive action when the UN Security Council sees fit. With the five permanent members of the Security Council, which includes Russia and China, wielding a veto, it is not always assured that measures necessary for promoting international justice, peace and security will be agreed to.⁵³

NATO decision-making is based on consensus, and NATO action is highly dependent on the leadership of the United States, which may at times be at odds with the alliance. It cannot always be assured that measures necessary for promoting international peace and security and mutual defence will be agreed to.⁵⁴

Assessing the Military Threat and the Likely Use of Military Force

In addition to the need for clear alignment with foreign policy, to be balanced a state's defence policy should be based on a rational assessment of the threat of military aggression, at home and abroad, both present and future.

As noted earlier, it continues to be difficult to predict the future. In April 1992, Defence Minister Marcel Masse wrote: "The whirlwind of contemporary events is having a major impact on Canada's security interests. Today, the number of certainties is far outweighed by the number of uncertainties." Is it any different today?

The government of Canada has not been in the habit of publishing official, whole-of-government assessments of present and future threats. It tends to leave the task to the defence planners who depend on such assessments as a primary input for their policy and equipment recommendations. An equivocal or unclear or debatable assessment of the future threat makes it difficult for defence planners to garner whole-of-government and pan-party support for difficult military equipment choices.

So what are the current views and positions of the government of Canada on the following? Russia's recent extra-territorial activities?⁵⁵ Russia's future intentions vis-à-vis former Warsaw Pact states and other neighbouring states?⁵⁶ China's ongoing activities in the South China Sea? North Korea's long-range missile and nuclear weapons intentions? The ever-present military tensions, internal and external, in the Middle East? The expansion of the Islamic extremism into Africa? Is there any chance that the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Royal Canadian Navy, might one day be asked to respond to any one of these evolving issues?

Regrettably, the only sure way to determine whether enough is being spent on defence and security is when the country's defence and security is put to the test. In the meantime, defence is like insurance: (1) you have to pay for it up front; (2) you don't know when you will ever have to use it; and (3) you can't purchase it after the fact. So how much is Canada willing to risk, and how much is it willing to pay for insurance against that risk?

A capable and effective navy cannot be stood up quickly when a need arises. For it to be capable and effective, it must be able to enter into harm's way and have a reasonable chance of success and survivability against current and future threats. For it to be of use when needed, it must exist before a difficult-to-predict situation manifests itself.

Does Canada truly know what the geopolitical situation will look like in 10, 25 or 50 years from now? Do the UN, NATO and the United States need more or less military support from Canada? Is it in Canada's national interest to reduce, maintain or increase its military and naval capabilities?

Conclusion

Canada's national interests of economic prosperity and peace and security are intertwined. Looking forward, the oceans will likely continue to play a key and increasing role in Canada's prosperity and security. There remain important threats to Canada's national interests, including maritime ones. It is difficult to predict the nature and extent of future threats, including maritime ones, but there will be threats and Canada must not rely exclusively on others to protect and further its national interests. Future Canadian governments will likely one day need to send Canadian naval and maritime air forces into harm's way. Without the establishment and continuous maintenance of ready-to-deploy, ready-to-act, capable and effective Canadian naval and maritime air forces, which are purposely designed to operate against current and future threats in Canadian and far-away waters, the maritime-related elements of Canada's national interests will be at risk.

Because of the nature of today's threat and the difficulty in predicting tomorrow's threat, Canada continues to need a modern, balanced, multi-purpose, flexible, combat-capable navy moving forward. A capable and effective navy is ultimately all about preventing and deterring costly conflict and war.

Notes

1. This paper was originally written for the Naval Association of Canada in 2017. It has been modified slightly since then.
2. Some threats affect human safety, but this paper is focused on those threats which affect economic prosperity and peace and security. While safety and security are often used interchangeably, this paper makes the following distinction. Safety is used when the danger, risk or injury is non-intentional or accidental e.g., natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes; accidents; illness and disease, including that which results from air, water and soil toxification. Security is used when the danger or threat is human and intentional i.e. criminality, including crimes against property and persons, terrorism and armed conflict.
3. There is no commonly agreed upon definition of terrorism. Generally, terrorism refers to an act of violence destined to coerce a change in a group's attitude, behaviour or policy. Terrorism

is normally carried out by individuals or by a group of individuals. Sometimes terrorism is not limited by geographic boundaries. Sometimes terrorism is sponsored or supported by the government of a state. Sometimes terrorism is treated as crime by the state in which it occurs. Sometimes it is treated as armed conflict, especially when it originates in another state.

4. The response to some threats is not always clear cut. For instance, many governments are struggling with how best to respond to the evolving threat of terrorism and the new and rapidly expanding threat of cyber-warfare. Responses to these threats may vary depending on the circumstances. For instance, terrorism on national soil will normally be handled by police forces but countering terrorism abroad may be handled by intelligence services and military forces. In the case of cyber-warfare, some threats will be acted upon by police or law enforcement services and others may be acted upon by non-police forces.
5. Gilles Bertrand, Anna Michalski and Lucio R. Pench, *European Futures: Five Possible Scenarios for 2010*, European Commission, 2001, p. 57.
6. While not yet generating equivalent tensions, pollution of the living environment, deforestation and climate change may one day do so.
7. Many states provide their (land-centric) police forces with reasonable capabilities and resources to execute their law-enforcement mandate. Many states do not have laws which permit their military forces, especially land forces, to become engaged in law-enforcement activities on a routine basis.
8. Capability can be defined as “[t]he ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance.” A capability normally requires a cogent combination of equipment, personnel, doctrine, training and support to be effective and efficient. Without equipment, however, there is no *de facto* military capability. US Department of Defense, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, March 2017, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf.
9. Intent is synonymous with aim or plan. *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines commander’s intent as “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state ...” and hostile intent as “the threat of imminent use of force against ... persons or property.”
10. It takes years, and in many instances decades, to research, develop, design, build and deploy the equipment which is at the heart of most modern, military capabilities.
11. Several organizations, private and governmental, spend considerable time and resources gathering intelligence, via sophisticated and not-so sophisticated means, about country-specific and world-wide military capabilities. See Global Firepower, 2016 World Military Strength Rankings, available at <http://www.globalfirepower.com/>; and CIA, *World Factbook*, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.
12. Costa Rica, for instance, has no armed forces, and consequently represents no military threat to its neighbours. For more information, see Army-technology.com, *The World’s Biggest Countries Without Armed Forces*, available at <http://www.army-technology.com/features/featurethe-worlds-biggest-countries-without-armed-forces-4514110/>.
13. Some suggest capability in and of itself is no indication of intent. There are indeed examples of this being true. For instance, Japan’s Self-Defence Forces, which were established after the Second World War, have much military capability, but there have been no instances of aggressive military intent or action on their part, and indeed the Self-Defence Forces are constitutionally mandated only for defence.

14. “Risk, then, is exposure to a proposition of which one is uncertain.” See Glyn A. Holton, “Defining Risk,” 2004, available at <https://www.glynholton.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/10/risk.pdf>.
15. In liberal democracies where the military is subservient to civilian rule, civilian bureaucrats who work in defence and foreign affairs ministries and central management offices (for example, in Canada, the Prime Minister’s Office) usually exercise greater influence in risk managing military threats than military professionals.
16. Some would call it an obligation. See Study.com, *National Government: Definition, Responsibilities & Powers*, available at <http://study.com/academy/lesson/national-government-definition-responsibilities-powers.html>.
17. “The Regular Force personnel strength is currently about 2,000 personnel below its authorized strength of 68,000.” As per the Department of National Defence Report on Plans and Priorities 2017-18, available at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2017-spending-and-human-resources.page>; and Statistics Canada’s Perspectives, Jungwee Park, “A Profile of the Canadian Forces,” July 2008, available at <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75-001-x/2008107/pdf/10657-eng.pdf>.
18. “The purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to ...” United Nations Charter, Chapter 1, Article 1.
19. Including the Naval Association of Canada.
20. See, for example, “Strong, Proud and Free-riding,” *The Economist*, 12 September 2015, available at <http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21664208-canadians-see-themselves-global-benefactors-fact-they-have-been-pinching>.
21. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “World Military Spending: Increases in the USA and Europe, Decreases in Oil-exporting Countries,” 24 April 2107 available at <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2017/world-military-spending-increases-usa-and-europe>.
22. See UNHCR, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement,” available at <http://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.html>; and International Rescue Organization, “Crisis Watch,” available at <http://crisiswatch.webflow.io/>.
23. Lee Berthiaume, “Canadian Fighter Jets Intercept Russian Bombers in Arctic,” CBC, 19 September 2014; and Canadian Press, “Canada Intercepts Russian Bombers off Coast,” 21 April 2017.
24. C.J. Chivers, “Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed,” *The New York Times*, 2 August 2007.
25. For example, Keith Fraser, “Trial Begins for Four Men Accused of Smuggling 492 Tamils into Canada,” *Vancouver Sun*, 19 October 2016, available at <http://vancouver.sun.com/news/local-news/trial-begins-for-four-men-accused-of-smuggling-492-tamils-into-canada>.
26. For example, see “The Turbot War,” available at <http://britishseafishing.co.uk/the-turbot-war/>.
27. For example, see Curt Anderson, “U.S. Coast Guard, Royal Canadian Navy Seize \$715 Million of Cocaine,” *The Toronto Sun*, 15 December 2016, available at <http://www.torontosun.com/2016/12/15/us-coast-guard-royal-canadian-navy-seize-715-million-of-cocaine>.
28. For example, see Environment Canada, “Number of Marine Pollution Spills from Identified

- Vessels,” available at <https://www.ec.gc.ca/indicateurs-indicators/default.asp?lang=en&n=8D7B3A02-1>.
29. The United States often speaks of ‘freedom of navigation’ issues.
 30. NATO *Operation United Protector* was commanded by Royal Canadian Air Force General Charles Bouchard.
 31. Herein lies the biggest challenge confronting political leaders and defence planners. The more certain the prediction of the future threat, the more confidently less-balanced, single-purpose military capabilities can be pursued. The less certain the prediction of the future threat, the less risky it is to pursue more balanced, general-purpose military capabilities. Given the difficulty of correctly predicting the future, the latter course of action has always been advisable.
 32. The Naval Association of Canada (NAC) agrees with the North American threat assessment which was captured in the September 2016 House of Commons Committee on National Defence and Security “Report on NORAD and Aerial Readiness.”
 33. The most important aspect of any defence policy is the forward-looking one. This aspect is critical to ensuring the right military forces are developed.
 34. In 2008, the Canadian Armed Forces’ Chief of Force Development suggested in *The Future Security Environment 2008-2030*: “Although asymmetric warfare is presently the prevalent security threat, the possibility of state-on-state conflict cannot be dismissed. National aspirations, regional instabilities, and the desire to challenge the balance of power, which currently favours the United States, are all potential triggers for states to wage war on each other. Conflict is also likely to emerge in regions of instability, in failed or fragile states, or between states that feel a need to assert/reassert state power at the expense of regional – if not world – peace. Islamist terrorist attacks are a significant threat in the maritime South-East Asia and Oceania regions, as well as South-Central Asia. Consequently, the possibility of inter-state armed confrontation means that the CF [Canadian Forces] needs to be prepared to address the full spectrum of conflict, not just asymmetric threats.”
 35. The government will eventually need to espouse, publicly or privately, its own assessment of future threats, and weave the implications into both defence and foreign policy. Several significant and negative security environment changes have occurred since the publication of Canada’s last defence policy document.
 36. See, for example, “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme: How Advanced Is It?” BBC, 6 January 2017.
 37. See, for example, “North Korea Crisis: North ‘Test-fires Ballistic Missile,’” BBC, 28 April 2107; Foster Klug, “North Korea Says new Long-range Missile can Carry Heavy Nuke,” The Associated Press via *The Globe and Mail*, 14 May 2017.
 38. South Korean Navy Ship *Cheonan* was sunk on 26 March 2010 by a torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine, killing 46 sailors. And North Korea bombed South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island, 23 November 2010.
 39. See, for example, Reuters, “China Launches First Home-built Aircraft Carrier amid South China Sea Tension,” 26 April 2017.
 40. See, for example, James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, *Chinese Naval Strategy in the Twenty First Century: The Turn to Mahan*, London, Routledge, 2008.
 41. See the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s case information concerning the South China Sea Arbitration, available at <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/>; and “Tribunal Rejects Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea,” *The New York Times*, 12 July 2016.

42. See, for example, Asharq Al-Awsat, “U.S.-Iranian Skirmishes in Strait of Hormuz,” 10 January 2017.
43. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Iranian Regime on Israel’s Right to Exist,” *The Atlantic*, 9 March 2015.
44. See the Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Overview of Iran,” available at <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/>.
45. “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen with Time,” *The New York Times*, 14 July 2015; “Everything You Want to Know about the Iranian Nuclear Deal,” *The Economist*, 5 April 2015.
46. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Defeating the Iranian Threat Network: Options for Countering Iranian Proxies,” 29 November 2016; “Iran Rejects Mattis Claim About Sponsoring Terror,” *Newsweek*, 1 April 2017.
47. This means the weapon is more difficult to detect and to counter. For instance, a modern anti-ship missile has a very small radar cross-section, making it difficult to be detected by the targeted ship’s radar, and will wait until the very last moment before turning on its terminal guidance radar, making it difficult to counter.
48. “Since the end of the Cold War, the total number of active submarines in the world has fallen, largely as a result of large-scale decommissioning of former Soviet vessels. However, the number of countries operating submarines has increased, due largely to ongoing regional tensions.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Submarine Proliferation Resource Collection, available at see <http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/submarine-proliferation-overview/>.
49. Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s New Missile-Torpedo May Curb U.S. Submarine Power,” *The National Interest*, 16 August 2016.
50. It was reported that on 9 October 2016, shore-launched anti-ship missiles, possibly Chinese-made C802s, were fired towards US Navy ships in international waters off Yemen’s west coast. While no ships were hit, the USN apparently deployed countermeasures consisting of Standard Missiles (SM-2) and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), and NULKA off-board jammers. The 9 October incident was preceded by a successful 1 October C-802 missile attack against a United Arab Emirates high-speed catamaran which was transiting the Bab Al Mandeb Strait.
51. Because something has yet to happen does not mean it won’t happen. As noted earlier, it is difficult to predict what might happen tomorrow.
52. The Naval Association of Canada believes the Royal Canadian Navy, subject to difficult equipment choices, has an important role to play against all of these evolving threats.
53. For example, Russia’s veto of action being taken in Syria in the wake of a chemical weapon attack against civilians. For example, see Edith M. Lederer, “Russia Vetoes UN Resolution to Condemn Syria Chemical Attack: Russia now has a lot to Prove,” *The National Post*, 13 April 2017.
54. “It would have been so easy, but Donald Trump could not bring himself to do it. On May 25th, in a 900-word speech made in front of a monument to 9/11 at NATO’s new headquarters in Brussels, the president failed to mention the alliance’s Article 5 – the bedrock commitment to regard an attack on one member country as an attack on all.” See “Donald Trump Fails to Endorse NATO’s Mutual Defence Pledge,” *The Economist*, 26 May 2017.
55. Including, the events in Georgia in 2005; planting of a Russian flag on the sea-floor at the North Pole in 2007; annexation of Crimea in 2014; Russia’s attitude and conduct in the aftermath of the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 in 2014; interference in Ukraine in 2015; engagement in Syria since 2015; long-range bomber flights near Canadian northern

airspace in 2017, etc.

56. Further encroachment/interference in Ukraine, coercion and/or encroachment in Baltic states, in Poland?