A little light on what's going on!

Starshell

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WHO'S RESPONSIBLE?

WITH THE MULTI-NATIONAL NATURE OF MERCHANT SHIPPING, WHO'S ON THE HOOK WHEN THERE'S A DISASTER AT SEA?

pages 10-15


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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SECRETARY / COMMUNICATIONS:
David Soule • 613-837-4026 • executivedirector-nac@outlook.com

STARSHELL EDITOR
Carmel Ecker • 250-661-1269 • starshell@shaw.ca

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From the Editor

Carmel Ecker

Seeing the broader picture

What a jam-packed issue this is! Our writers have given you plenty to ponder as you wait for the winter cold to give way to the vibrant colours of early spring.

Where last issue was dominated by internal NAC happenings, this issue we look at the broader picture, both nationally and internationally.

Dr. Aldo Chircop, professor of Law at the Schulich School of Law and an expert on marine and environmental law, enlightens us about the quandry of who is responsible for cleaning up and paying for marine environmental diasters due to shipping accidents. While not specifically a navy issue, this maritime challenge is in line with NAC's aim to eliminate maritime blindness among Canadians. As a country that is surrounded by water on three sides, what happens in that environment is of critical importance to us. The collapse of the Atlantic Cod fishery in the 1990s is just one example of how ignoring what is happening in the ocean can have disastrous impacts on our economy and society.

On a national level, this issue features two briefing notes produced by NAC's new Naval Affairs Program. These relate to Canada's shipbuilding challenges and shine a light on why the process takes so long and costs so much. While learning about the machinations that affect the procurement process may not make us feel any better about long delays and budget over-runs, understanding it may give us pause next time we think of cursing anyone in government for "bad news" in the delivery of much-needed new ships. People in government are working within a cumbersome system that, as you will learn from the briefing notes, is designed to ensure that no detail is overlooked and the government is protected from litigation.

Putting on my writer's hat this issue, I had the pleasure of interviewing Dr. Richard Gimblett about his recent Meritorious Service Cross. Dr. Gimlett has left an indelible mark on the Canadian Navy, both during his 26 years as an officer and in his civilian career that followed. He was involved in the completion of the centennial naval monument, the introduction of a distinctive naval ensign and the writing of Leadmark 2020, among other things. And despite being retired, he's not done yet. We can expect a lot more on Canadian naval history from Dr. Gimblett.

And, of course, there's lots more in this issue. Enjoy!

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In this Edition



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From the Bridge

Bill Conconi, National President

A new season but old challenges remain

March brings the promise of spring, new growth and change. For the Royal Canadian Navy, this change has already begun with the release of the General and Flag Officers' appointments.

Of particular note this year will be the retirement of Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd as Commander RCN. We extend our sincere appreciation for his leadership and many contributions to our navy. With an upcoming move back to the West Coast for his retirement, we hope he will be able to join in NAC activities on a regular basis.

Notable promotions and appointments include:

- Rear-Admiral Art McDonald will be promoted to Vice-Admiral and will replace VAdm Lloyd later this spring.
- Commodore Chris Sutherland will be promoted to Rear-Admiral and will be appointed as Deputy Commander of the RCN, replacing RAdm McDonald.
- Commodore Simon Page will also be promoted to Rear-Admiral and take on the challenging role of Chief of Staff to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel).
- Commodore Steve Waddell is to be promoted to Rear-Admiral and will be appointed to a new position as the Vice Commander of the US Second Fleet in Norfolk, VA.

Congratulations to all on these promotions and appointments.

As our navy positions and prepares itself for the future, so too must NAC. As an organization we are evolving and in that process we face a number challenges, particularly with respect to attracting new members. As older members "time out" or become unable to participate fully in our events, we are challenged to find newer members who support the aims of our organization. We are not alone in this as many associations see declining membership. As an example, we note with regret the disbandment of the Atlantic Chiefs' and Petty Officers' Association.

Our branches do an excellent job of organizing luncheons, speaker evenings and tours, and periodic conferences. But we need to go beyond our current branch structure to become a truly national association that is seen to be relevant in educating Canadians on the continuing need for the RCN and to be relevant in attracting new members who can continue to carry out that task.

We have taken many steps already. Our members made significant contributions to the development of Canada's Defence Policy, helping to shape the navy of tomorrow. Our Naval Affairs program continues to develop additional resources and discussion papers for the future. I urge you to check out the Naval Affairs section of our website (www.navalassoc.ca/naval-affairs/about-naval-affairs/) to see what has been accomplished and I invite you to contribute your thoughts and expertise to this important work. Our next step will be to get the word out. Work on an extensive communications plan is underway.

Informing the public also increases our relevance and will help us to expand our membership base. It will also build public confidence in our navy. This is important work, and we cannot leave it to a few individuals. Our branches will have a key role in this work and it remains important that we support each other and enjoy our camaraderie.

Yours Aye,
Bill

VAdm Ron Lloyd, Commander RCN, is retiring this year.

RAdm Art McDonald will be promoted to Vice Admiral and become Commander RCN.

Cmdre Chris Sutherland; promoted to Rear-Admiral and appointed Deputy Commander of the RCN.

Cmdre Simon Page; promoted to Rear-Admiral and appointed Chief of Staff to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel).

Cmdre Steve Waddell; promoted to Rear-Admiral and appointed Vice Commander of the US Second Fleet in Norfolk, VA.

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The Front Desk

David Soule, Executive Director

A sustainable navy: there is work to do!

The past couple of months have been good news for the Royal Canadian Navy: the warship design for the RCN's future Canadian Surface Combatant has been awarded, the build of the Joint Support Ship (JSS) has been advanced, the interim fleet auxiliary Asterix is back at sea, AOPS will be introduced into the fleet in the coming months, the Commander RCN has said that the Victoria class modernization program will get underway, and the Cyclone helicopter fleet has completed its first deployments. And yes, I know I have missed some other positive navy news…

All this good news is tempered by the fact that the RCN is facing personnel issues that are complex and difficult to address. Many of you would probably say this is an old problem, but it remains a problem nonetheless, and no number of ships and submarines will ensure we have a viable navy if we cannot recruit and retain personnel. I would also add that there is no guarantee that what the government has approved will actually happen. In terms of future ships and submarines, these builds can be slowed down or fewer numbers ordered or programs cancelled.

So while there is good news about, there are no guarantees on the future shape and size of the navy—I include fleet numbers, fleet make-up and personnel to man and support operations, etc. As a result, I believe our mission to inform Canadians about the need for a navy (and a coast guard) will be required now, in the near future and over the long term. All to say, there is work to do!

Starshell

As you are aware, we are distributing the publication electronically. I do need your feedback on whether or not the formats we are using meet your needs and if you know of better ways to electronically publish and present *Starshell*. I have received very little feedback, (some good advice received from a couple of folks) and feedback is important. As a subscriber to several electronic newspapers and journals, all are not equal and several leave much to be desired in terms of their layout and ease of use on an electronic device.

NAC Awards

The annual canvassing for NAC awards nominations is underway. While this activity is coordinated by the individual branch executive, you, the member, can play a role in recognizing those in your branch who deserve recognition by bringing their names forward to your branch executive. The administration process and description of what these awards are for is described in the NAC Administration Manual and is well-known by your branch executive. NAC Medallion and other award nominations that require national level approval/review are to be submitted to me by May 31, 2019. I hope we will be able to award some of these at the upcoming October NOABC 100th anniversary celebration in Vancouver.

I will also be updating the medallion award web page list for 2017 and 2018 in the coming week or so. I have been told that some names are missing from earlier lists so if you have been awarded a medallion, please take a look at the web page and make sure your name is there. If it isn't, let me know: www.navalassoc.ca/national/nac-awards/.

Endowment Fund grant applications

Grant applications are due to me by the end of May 2019. While this activity is normally coordinated by your branch executive, they may not be aware that some deserving activity in your local area is worthy of consideration for a grant. The guidance as to what kind of activities are eligible is described in the NAC Administration Manual and on the website. Your branch will have someone who coordinates these applications.

While the funds allocated for some of these activities seem small, they often allow for some very useful work to get done, such as enhancing a display in a local museum, providing scholarship funding and other leadership building activities for sea cadets, or for a project that promotes naval awareness in your local community, to name a few worthy causes. As with the medallion awards, it would be great to announce and present as many of these grants as we can at the October meeting in Vancouver.

Membership

We are working diligently to see how best to implement a national-level membership registration system that would allow a member to pay dues to national and the branch, receive a tax receipt automatically, register for national events, donate to various NAC charities, and more importantly use modern online payment methods for our banking. Ideally, this should take some of the administrative burden off the branches. Branches who wish to use their current online registration system would continue to do so or migrate to the national system. The other advantage is that some model systems function as a website and allow for emailing "products" such as NAC News

and branch newsletters. In effect, the plan is to work toward a "one-stop-shop" system for administration.

Naval Affairs

I encourage all of you to visit the Naval Affairs pages on the NAC website: www.navalassoc.ca/naval-affairs/about-naval-affairs/. There is a lot of new and relevant older information that branches and NAC members can use to support our mission. One new item is the Niobe Papers. These are research papers of topical maritime-related interest. In addition, we continue to build on the briefing notes.

NAC Communication Strategy

We are just about to release our communication strategy, subject to a couple of final editorial checks. This will be followed up with a plan to execute the strategy. I think you will find this provides the scope of the audience we are targeting in regard to maritime awareness and the focus we need to support, among other things, our Naval Affairs Program. From my perspective, the plan should give every member an idea of what they can do to help make this work.

NOABC 100th Anniversary/NAC Special Meeting Oct. 2-6, 2019 in Vancouver

As most of you are aware, this will be a very special event and I encourage you to keep checking the NAC and NOABC website for updates. NAC News will also provide reminders and program updates right up until the event happens. The NOABC team has been hard at work to develop an interesting program that all can enjoy. The NAC Special Meeting will allow for all members to discuss items that are of interest. I am really looking forward to meeting some of you there for what should be a grand event!

NAC AGM 2019

As was the case last year, the NAC AGM will be held via electronic means using GoToMeeting software. The current plan is to hold the AGM in early to mid-June 2019. More details will be forthcoming shortly. You can expect the agenda and items requiring a vote to be similar to last year's AGM. The NOABC special meeting will allow for other items to be discussed and voted on as necessary.

NAC Banking

In the coming months we will be moving to an accounting system that will allow for electronic transfer of funds, etc. For day-to-day activity I will be responsible, with King Wan providing necessary oversight. This should improve how we do business on a national level (fewer cheques and letters back-and-forth, etc.). I am also hoping to include an online ability to purchase kit shop items. This is taking longer than expected to implement, but we want to make sure everything works correctly from the start.

Hopefully, this edition of *Starshell* provides a bit of escape for what many of you have found to be a long and hard winter. As always, let me know if something piques your interest or becomes a bee in your bonnet so *Starshell* can continue to serve your needs.

As you go about your life, find some time to have a good laugh, enjoy the company of fellow members, and perhaps recruit at least one new person to the fold.

NAC member awarded Meritorious Service Cross

By Carmel Ecker, Editor

Dr. Richard Gimblett's fingerprints are on many parts of Canada's naval history and his contributions were recognized this past year when the long-time NAC member was awarded the Meritorious Service Cross (civil division).

"I'm honoured and I'm humbled and I was really quite surprised by it because it's a fairly prestigious award," said Gimblett in a recent phone interview.

But the award isn't so surprising when you examine Gimblett's contributions to the understanding of Canada's naval history and its use in naval strategy for the future.

Gimblett started his career as a naval officer in 1982, serving in *HMC Ships Kootenay*, *Gatineau*, *Preserver* and *Protecteur* before his expertise in naval history took him ashore in 1991. There, he fulfilled a number of advisory roles including appointments as an analyst for the Directorate of Maritime Strategy, a researcher and writer for the Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), Acting Director Navy DHH and most recently as the Command Historian for the RCN.

He "collected a couple of degrees" during his time in the navy, finishing his formal education with a doctorate in Canadian Naval History.

The list of papers, articles, books and reports he's written or edited during his career takes up a whopping four pages of his CV and includes "Leadmark, the Navy Strategy for 2020," for which he was the lead writer.

"I shaped many of the ideas in it based on my analysis of naval operations to that point, and having looked at the way we had done naval operations in the past, especially since the Gulf War," says Gimblett. "We turned many of the factors in there into a strategy—the fundamental elements of a Canadian naval strategy."

Though his writing has been prolific, most of it will never be read by the general public, he says. "I'm not a story historian. I look at operations, policies, institutions. I'm a boring historian," he says with a laugh. "It's just not the sort of stuff that people go for. It's of more use to the navy in understanding their past."

His expertise focuses primarily on the post-Cold War era—a time he considers largely ignored by most naval historians.

"I say this tongue in cheek; I'm the only Canadian naval historian who has written nothing on the Second World War. Everybody else does the Second World War, which leaves the rest open to me."

His career as a historian within the navy started when he co-authored the official history of the Gulf War. Having served in *HMCS Protecteur* as a Combat Officer during the Gulf War, he had first hand experience in the conflict as well as an ability to see the broader historical context. That project took three years to complete.

That and his other post-Cold War naval research prompted his MSC citation to deem him "Canada's premier post-Cold War naval historian."

The books most familiar to the general public would be the two Naval Centennial coffee table books he edited: "Naval Service of Canada: The Centennial Story", which is available online in the DHH section of the navy's website; and "Citizen Sailors: Chronicles of Canada's naval reserve", which he co-edited with Michael Hadley.

Despite recently retiring, Gimblett's list of current research and writing projects is long and includes the second half of the Cold War, a period he says has very little written about it from a naval perspective.

"This is my time at sea; the 70s and 80s is when I was living in the old steam destroyers and tankers," he says. "So I'm curious about the nature of the work we were doing."

Research and writing aside, Gimblett has also contributed to some highly visible projects that celebrate Canada's naval history. He was involved with several initiatives during the navy's centennial year, including the introduction of a distinctive naval ensign.

At the time, the Canadian government

Dr. Richard Gimblett receives the Meritorious Service Cross (civil division) from Governor General Julie Payette.

had reintroduced the executive curl and reinstated the "Royal" prefix for all three military branches.

Then Commander Royal Canadian Navy, VAdm Paul Maddison asked Gimblett what else they might suggest since the government was in the mood to invest in the naval identity.

"I said, 'Well, the flags are flying on the wrong end of the ship,'" Gimblett recalls. At the time, the maple leaf was flying at the stern, making Canada one of the few countries that used their national flag as an ensign.

VAdm Maddison liked the idea and pushed for a distinct Canadian naval ensign.

"It was not popular among senior leadership other than VAdm Maddison, but now that we've got it, wildly popular!" says Gimblett with a chuckle.

Gimblett was also responsible for overseeing the completion of the Canadian Naval Monument in Ottawa, which had been started by Capt(N) John Pickford, the Director of the Canadian Naval Centennial.

Working with the National Capital Commission (NCC), Capt(N) Pickford and his staff oversaw the design and development of the monument. Construction began in 2010, but wasn't yet complete when the centennial project shut down in early 2011.

As the Acting Director of Navy History and Heritage, Gimblett was asked to see the project through, which he did until it was unveiled in 2012. But there were a few things left undone due to a slight shortage of funding, so when a little more money was found as part of Canada 150 to see through the few finishing touches, Gimblett served as an advisor to the NCC.

Looking back on his long career with the navy as a serving officer and a civilian, Gimblett is proud of what he's contributed.

"The finishing off of the monument, bringing in the distinctive Canadian naval ensign and the work that I did on the operations analysis for the navy, I'm proud of those," he says. "And I'm really chuffed someone thought enough about it to write me up for the award. It's an honour."

Dr. Richard Gimblett's Meritorious Service Cross citation reads:

Dr. Richard Gimblett, MSC, CD, RCN, is recognized internationally as our country's premier post-Cold War naval historian. His research and advice contributed significantly to the creation of a national monument to the Royal Canadian Navy in Ottawa and to the re-introduction of the Canadian Naval Ensign for warships and other designated vessels. His analysis of past operations and partnerships has influenced the strategic direction of the navy's involvement in world maritime security.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

Ship casualties and the marine environment

By Aldo Chircop, JSD

International shipping is vital to trade. Over 80 percent of global trade by volume, and more than 70 per cent of its value, is carried by over 50,000 vessels, according to the UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport in 2017. Many states rely on marine transportation for their exports and imports and generally to fuel their economic development. Over the years, shipping has become safer and more environmentally sustainable, largely because of the international conventions and subsidiary rules adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized UN agency based in London, England. While ship collisions and accidents on board ships continue to occur, a report in the 2017 Allianz Safety and Shipping Review shows major casualties resulting in catastrophic environmental impacts are declining year after year. But when they happen, what is the expected response and who is responsible? Let us consider this question in steps.

The Master

The master, as the professional mariner in command, is the person who is ultimately responsible for decisions concerning the safe navigation of the ship. Difficult decisions may have to be made, possibly under commercial and head office pressure. An example of errors in judgement is the case of the *Amoco Cadiz*, a modern tanker that grounded on the coast of Brittany in 1978 and caused massive pollution and economic losses. A formal investigation found that the captain made the mistake of wasting precious time attempting to contact head office in a different time zone before contracting a salvor to assist. The ship had lost its ability to steer and was unable to keep a safe distance from the coast in a gale. The master has the authority necessary to contract essential services for the safety of the ship and to request assistance as needed.

Salvors

A professional salvor is likely to be the first on the scene to assist a vessel in need of assistance. Salvage is a contract-based professional service and now governed by the International Convention on Salvage, 1989 (ISC 89).

One of the most common contract forms is the Lloyds' Open Form—'No cure, no pay'. Historically, the salvor was entitled to the salvage reward if their efforts produced a cure and the vessel was taken to a safe place for the owner to retake possession. Prior to ISC 89, in the case of a major casualty where the damage to the property was extensive and valuable cargo was lost or spilled, the salvor risked not getting a reward at all, despite best efforts! The convention remedied this by providing special compensation for the salvor who manages to prevent or mitigate environmental damage when the potential reward would otherwise be low.

The salvage arbitration process determines the level of the reward, the cost of which is absorbed by the ship owner's policy issued by a mutual protection and indemnity association, so called P&I Club. Special compensation is intended to provide an incentive for salvors to take on difficult salvage cases. The procedure and compensation have been further improved through cooperation between international associations representing ship owners, salvors and insur-

The Amoco Cadiz grounded on the coast of Brittany in 1978, causing massive pollution and economic losses.

ance interests and the introduction of a supplementary accounting clause.

Port of Refuge

The vessel in need of assistance may require a port of refuge or to be taken to a place of safety following salvage. At this point, the master and salvor will have to communicate with coastal state authorities to seek permission to enter port or sheltered waters. In most cases, authorities permit temporary entry into port or other sheltered waters to enable the ship to stabilise its condition. This is not an easy decision because, while a port is desirable, a damaged vessel could potentially pose a risk to port operations. Moreover, if the ship is losing cargo—say it is leaking oil—it poses a threat to the environment. There have been instances of a fire on board the ship and no port or coastal state authority can be expected to permit the vessel near coastal settlements.

In recent years there has been a discernible increase in instances where coastal state authorities denied refuge to ships in need of assistance. The coastal state has a customary duty to assist, but it also has a right to protect itself and if the risk of providing refuge is high, it has a right to self-protection. In some instances, this concern has led to a 'not in my backyard' (NIMBY) attitude. In 1999 the tanker *Castor* was refused refuge by seven Mediterranean states and sailed for a month in a risky condition before it was finally granted refuge and was not lost. Shortly afterwards, the *Erika* and *Prestige*, aging tankers in trouble in stormy weather and leaking cargo, were denied refuge and became casualties, causing major pollution and economic loss. Both states were criticized for not providing refuge and potentially averting the subsequent losses.

How can the risk of providing refuge to a ship in distress be mitigated? Simply scuttling the vessel, although practiced on occasion in the past, is not a solution as it produces other problems, not the least of which is the deliberate pollution of the marine environment. Although several instances of ships in distress have concerned aging substandard ships, the reality is that even the most modern and best crewed vessels can suffer mishaps in what is a dangerous working environment. The *Amoco Cadiz* was a five-year old tanker with an experienced captain when it was lost.

In recent years there has been a discernible increase in instances where coastal state authorities denied refuge to ships in need of assistance.

Decision-making framework

The IMO has stepped in and adopted guidelines to assist communication and decision-making using a risk-based assessment framework to help depoliticize and remove emotion in such difficult decisions. Many states have endorsed this framework, but there have been recent instances where refuge was denied to ships without apparent consideration of the framework. It was reported that authorities in Japan and South Korea in 2013 did not follow the IMO Guidelines with respect to the *Maritime Maisie*. The 11-year old 44,404 dwt chemical tanker was under tow for three months after a collision in the Sea of Japan while needing a place of refuge. Admittedly, the guidelines are not binding, but they were adopted by consensus and reflect best practice. South Korea eventually provided refuge in March of 2014.

The worst case scenario is a casualty in which life may be lost together with the ship and cargo. The 1992 collision of the tanker *Nagasaki Spirit* and container vessel *Ocean Blessing* and the ensuing fire in the Strait of Malacca resulted in the loss of all but two members of the crews of both ships. The environmental and economic impact can be substantial as was evident in the case of the *Prestige* where losses were suffered in Spain, France and Portugal even though the vessel broke up 260 kilometres from the Spanish coast. The 63,272 tonnes of heavy fuel oil spilled impacted fisheries, aquaculture and tourism businesses in Spain and France, necessitating extensive clean up and preventive measures. Further preventive measures were required in Portugal. Spain claimed losses of over $1 billion, France $100 million and Portugal $4 million.

Liability

The claims of Spain, Portugal and France were compensated in part under an international legal regime under two conventions.

The first is the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (CLC), which establishes the shipowner (and its insurer) as the first level of liability. The ship owner's liability is strict and limited. There is no need to prove intent or negligence and the extent of liability is determined by a formula based on tonnage.

The second is the International Convention on the Establishment of an Oil Pollution Fund, 1971 (IOPCF) and represents the cargo owner's share. There have been several funds over the years. The fund collects levies on imported oil in member states. The IOPCF compensation is applicable when the limit of the ship owner's CLC liability is insufficient or unable to address the claims. The liability of the IOPCF is not unlimited and its ability to cover claims for a large spill may require further contributions by member states.

Both conventions apply to persistent oil only, so light fuel oils are not covered. The IOPC funds are administered by a small international organization carrying the same name and now based at the IMO in London. In Canada we have an additional domestic fund, first established in 1972, and now known as the Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund, which is governed by the Marine Liability Act. Most importantly, the Canadian fund provides compensation for spills from all types of oil, including mystery spills.

Continued on page 14

The process of advancing oil spill claims is complex. Typically, the claims are instituted in a domestic court that has admiralty jurisdiction. Claims against the ship owner, insurer, director of the IOPCF—and in Canada also the administrator of SSOPF—are joined. Claims are ascertained and the respective degrees of liability apportioned by the court. There may be other separate actions against other actors, such as classification societies, and they may occur in foreign courts, but these are separate from the compensation process under the CLC and IOPCF conventions. There are strict criteria for compensation that claims must satisfy and they must be properly evidenced. For example, the preventive and clean-up measures must be reasonable given the nature, location and other circumstances of the spill. Claims for environmental damage must relate to actual costs incurred to clean and restore and possibly monitor environmental loss, but cannot be abstract value claims to environmental damage based purely on mathematical models.

In the case of the *Prestige*, none of the claims advanced by Spain, France and Portugal were fully compensated. The IOPCF assessed the claims of Spain at €300.2 million (USD $351 million) for the government's claim and €3.9 million (USD $4.6 million) for other claims. The actual payments made to date are less and Spain is pursuing further judicial recourse. In the case of France, the government's claim was assessed at €42.2 million (USD $53 million) and individual claims at €19 million (USD $22 million). Like Spain, France has not agreed with this assessment and is continuing judicial action. Portugal agreed with an assessment of €2.2 million (USD $2.6 million) and discontinued court proceedings.

Are there other courses of action in the event an injured state does not receive sufficient compensation to meet all losses?

In both the *Erika* and *Prestige* cases, the available compensation was insufficient to cover all losses. Spain's attempt to proceed against the classification society of the *Prestige*, the American Bureau of Shipping, in a U.S. court failed. Courts have tended to consider these non-profit organizations as providing an essential community service. In some scenarios, seafarers, as the visible human face of the casualty, have been criminalized. In the case of the *Prestige*, the master, who did everything a professional mariner could be expected to do in such situations and was one of the last persons to be rescued from the stricken vessel, was subjected to criminal prosecution.

Ship registration

Identifying other persons who could possibly be held responsible can be an arduous process. A ship engaged in international trade is registered in one state but may be owned by interests in other states. More than 70 per cent of the world's commercial fleet is registered under foreign flags, and many of these are open registers, known also as flags of convenience.

In 2017, the three largest registers—Panama, Liberia, Marshall Islands—were all open registers, whereas the three largest beneficial owners were Greece, Japan and China, according to the UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport in 2017.

For a ship owner, economics play a major role in ship registration. Open registers permit foreign ownership, crewing of ships by non-nationals, have lower taxes, and provide for easy flagging and reflagging. The ship itself is divided into shares that may be held by different persons located in various countries. And the owner might not even operate the ship, especially if it is chartered or is run by a management company. Although, in theory, every ship has a unique IMO identification number and a documentary trail, in practice it may be difficult to identify the precise owners. At times, this system has enabled countries under a Security Council embargo to circumvent the embargo.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, flag states

A ship engaged in international trade is registered in one state but may be owned by interests in other states. More than 70 precent of the world's commercial fleet is registered under foreign flags.

have a legal duty to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over their ships. In reality, not all states are parties to all the key IMO safety, security and environmental conventions, and may not have capable maritime administrations to discharge this duty effectively. But even those that are parties to most conventions and have a capable maritime administration are not necessarily responsible for the ships registered under their flags. National ship registers enjoy sovereign immunity. In the case of the *Erika*, judicial proceedings in a French court against the Malta Maritime Authority, which registered the substandard vessel, failed because of the sovereign immunity enjoyed by a foreign government authority.

That many ships are registered under open registers does not in and of itself mean that such ships are substandard, nor does it necessarily mean that shipping is less safe because of such registration. The most modern tanker fleet is registered under the Liberian flag. The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control 2017 report includes several open registers as low risk vessels among the 86.70 per cent of ships on the white list. These include The Bahamas, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands and Panama, among others. The grey list, which accounts for 5.78 per cent of ships inspected, includes the US flag. It is also true that the black list, accounting for 6.72 per cent of inspected ships, include a few open registers (e.g., Belize, Cook Islands, Vanuatu). The fact is that accidents and ship losses have decreased over the years also due in part to vigorous port state inspections, but there continue to be slippages in substandard shipping and maritime fraud.

The need to compensate losses resulting from ship casualties while ensuring that there continues to be sufficient responsible shipping to carry maritime trade is a delicate balancing act. Lord Denning famously stated the harsh reality of the limitation of liability in shipping: "…there is not much justice in this rule; but limitation of liability is not a matter of justice. It is a rule of public policy which has its origins in history and its justification in convenience." And that sums up the liability regimes in international shipping. In the interests of maritime trade, public policy has dictated certain protections for those that take on the risk to ensure that there is sufficient shipping for global trade.

Aldo Chircop received a Doctorate in the Science of Law (JSD) from Dalhousie University. He is Professor of Law at the Schulich School of Law and a member of the Nova Scotia Bar. He was formerly Chair in Marine Environment Protection at the IMO's World Maritime University in Malmö, Sweden and held directorships of the Marine Affairs Program and Marine & Environmental Law Institute at Dalhousie, and International Ocean Institute and the Mediterranean Institute in Malta. His current research program includes comparative Arctic policy, the international regulation of international shipping and navigation in the Arctic, and comparative Canadian-Russian regulation of shipping in the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route respectively. Professor Chircop is a member of the International Working Group on the Arctic and Antarctic of the Comité Maritime International. Professor Chircop has co-authored or co-edited over 20 books and 80 articles and book chapters. Professor Chircop has received awards in book publication, teaching and distinguished service to graduate studies at Dalhousie.

The complexities of naval procurement

By Dave Perry

Canada's process for procuring defence equipment involves multiple government departments, is long and is extremely complicated. The Department of National Defence (DND) guideline on its internal process alone runs to 265 pages. The following Briefing Note depicts only the major activities involved in Canada's process for buying equipment for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and makes many simplifications and generalizations for the sake of brevity.

The RCN's projects follow the same basic process as the other military services,[1] with the exception of the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS), Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC), and Joint Support Ship (JSS) projects. These fall under Canada's National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), and are therefore subject to a few small, but meaningful, differences outlined below.

The key characteristic that distinguishes the RCN's equipment projects from those of the wider DND and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is that the RCN has a relatively small number of projects—25 projects out of a defence-wide total of 234, or 11 per cent—with significant costs. Naval project budgets range from roughly $70 to $80 billion, between 34 and 55 per cent of the defence-wide total. Thus, the RCN has relatively few projects, but a disproportionate share of the most costly ones.

The five stages of a Canadian defence procurement process are:

1. Identification
2. Options Analysis
3. Definition
4. Implementation
5. Close-Out

Identification

In the Identification stage, a capability deficiency is identified by a project sponsor in DND/the CAF. During this stage, potential funding sources are identified, the strategic context within which the potential project exists is described, a project brief is written, and the high level mandatory requirements are outlined. At this point, a Project Complexity and Risk Assessment is undertaken and ranks the potential project on a four-point scale where a four indicates the most complicated and risky projects. If the proposal to address the capability deficiency is approved by the Defence Capability Board, it officially becomes a project.

In recent years, an identified funding source was required to move from the Identification stage into Options Analysis, unless the project was identified as a "key" initiative. The approval by government of *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* in 2017, at least for a time, identified those projects with funding that could make this transition.

In the future, new projects moving from Identification to Options Analysis, or projects in Identification with cost increases since the publication of *Strong, Secure Engaged*, must complete an investment plan change proposal to identify a source of funds within DND's investment plan before moving to the next phase.

Options Analysis

At the beginning of the Options Analysis stage, all projects with budgets over $100 million (and some others) must have their high level mandatory requirements reviewed by the Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition (IRPDA). During this stage the statement of operational requirement is developed, options for addressing the capability gap identified, including an assessment of the costs and benefits of options. Initial engagements with industry will sometimes occur, and policy coverage, if required, is secured. This sometimes, but not always, requires a memorandum to cabinet. A business case analysis is completed, and the preferred option is briefed for approval at the Defence Capabilities Board at the end of this phase, followed by another review by IRPDA.

In Options Analysis, the project is presented to a Senior Review Board, and from this point forward it is briefed to that board annually. The risk and complexity assessment is also refreshed. At this stage the project is reviewed by an interdepartmental governance team, including representatives from Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), the department responsible for conducting the actual procurement activity and negotiating contracts.

A key part of the procurement process from this point forward is interdepartmental meetings coordinated by the Defence Procurement Strategy Secretariat at PSPC, chaired by varying levels of senior executives depending on a project's cost. This secretariat function is provided in part by the National Shipbuilding Secretariat for the RCN's three NSS projects. All projects with budgets over $20 million are reviewed for the potential application of the Industrial Technological Benefits Policy, and those over $100 million must comply with this policy, resulting in engagement with officials from Innovation Science and Economic Development Canada.

Definition

At the end of Options Analysis the project is briefed to the Program Management Board for approval to enter the Definition phase, and onward for recommended approval to the Investment Management Review Committee for approval if aspects of the project exceed the $50 million budget threshold. Once approved at this board, a Corporate

Submission outlining the project and its plans in detail must then be prepared to secure expenditure authority, usually from either the Minister of National Defence or the Treasury Board. The Minister can approve a project if its assessed complexity and risk falls within DND's capacity to manage projects, which is assessed on the same four-point scale noted earlier. Currently, DND's assessed capacity is a three, so the Minister can approve projects with an assessed risk and complexity of three or lower.

The AOPS, CSC and JSS projects are somewhat distinct from many other capital projects in that they all received conditional expenditure authority in the Definition phase, which has required multiple Treasury Board approvals for that phase of the project's life. In contrast, many projects receive a single approval.

Implementation

When expenditure authority is granted, this marks the transition from determining what should be done to mitigate a capability deficiency, to determining how the preferred option will be implemented. This approval also means that the project is assigned 'Vote 5' Capital Funding, special financial authority used when capital expenditures exceed $5 million, some of which is used to create a dedicated DND project management office, which determines substantive requirements, cost and schedule estimates.

During the Definition phase the procurement strategy is developed and executed, including the release of any tender documents and evaluation of bids (if applicable). At the end of Definition phase—once a procurement strategy has been executed—the project must again secure approval from the same governance bodies required to enter Definition, to proceed to the Implementation phase. In this phase, PSPC must obtain contracting approval to sign the contract from the Treasury Board.

As equipment is delivered, the project eventually reaches an Initial Operational Capability; in project management terms, this is the milestone reached when the capability provided by the project can be used operationally on a sustained basis.

The next meaningful milestone is Full Operational Capability, which is the when all project deliverables have been delivered.

Close-Out

At this point, the project moves to the Close-Out stage, which ends when all administrative project activities are officially completed. All told, the current average timeline for a major DND project is 16 years, with the time to completion increasing with a project's complexity and risk. Many variables, including political decisions, the project budget, and the alignment, or lack thereof, of inter-departmental actors when decisions or approvals are needed can add or subtract years to a project's life. The RCN's three NSS projects, amongst the most risky and complex at DND, have experienced all of these factors in addition to the complication of being part of an industrial strategy to revitalize Canada's shipbuilding industry. The shipbuilding projects can therefore be expected to take longer than other RCN projects.

Footnotes

1. It is the same for non-service parts of DND too like CJOC, the intelligence groups, information management, etc.

A bibliography is available at www.navalas-soc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/biblio-Procurement.pdf

NAVAL SHIPBUILDING IN CANADA

Why does it take so long and cost so much?

HMCS Harry DeWolf under construction. Photo by Waye Mason, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=68915143

If you follow the news, and have read Briefing Note #6 about the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), you'll know that Canada is in the midst of building new ships—"recapitalizing the fleet"—for the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard. And you'll also know that it takes a long time from the announcement that a ship will be built to the actual operation of the ship, and the costs always go up.

Why do the costs go up during the project? And why does it take so long?

Before we begin, let us note that these two issues are not unique to Canada (or to the navy). Virtually every country will experience cost increases and delays in its procurement processes. Let's talk about cost first, but the two questions are related.

One of the main reasons for cost increases is that the initial number the government announces is just an estimate. It seems like it should be easy to put a price on a ship and stick to it. But it isn't. In his 2012 article "Estimating the Costs of Naval Ships," in the Canadian Naval Review, David Peer wrote, "Initial cost estimates for a purpose-designed ship typically quote an error of ±40%, so the risk of under-or over-predicting cost with early estimates is significant."[1]

Getting good data to make an accurate estimate of cost is difficult. There is almost no Canadian data because no major warships have been built in Canada for more than 20 years.[2] And getting information from outside Canada can be problematic. For one thing, not everyone wants to share information on their costs, and for another, the ships won't be exactly the same so the costs will differ. As well, costs for labour, materials and technology will be different. So the government makes an educated estimate of the cost at first. We should not be surprised that this cost changes over time. As decisions are made about the ship, a more formal budget is developed. And this budget will include more than the cost of the ship itself. It will include things like long-term maintenance and/or service contracts for the ship, which often represent significant costs. As well,

factors that were used to come up with an estimate will change over time. For example, interest rates go up and down, steel prices vary, foreign exchange rates varies and this is relevant because many components come from outside country. This means that the timing of purchases will affect the price.

There are a number of other considerations that affect the cost. The design and build of naval ships is extremely complicated and involves many naval designers, engineers and technicians from a variety of manufacturers. So it's not just a matter of getting one quote from one company. There are often many companies involved, and to ask all of them how much they would charge for theoretical equipment in a theoretical ship would be a long and painful process. Weight is often seen as the easiest attribute upon which to base an initial design cost. You don't need to know the exact capabilities or characteristics at this point—just the size—and you can use other existing ships for this basic element.

According to naval engineer, David Peer in his 2012 CNR article, "Historical information from a known design and cost data for selected major systems and equipment can provide first approximations of ship cost for a series of concept designs that meet the capability requirement."

The problem with this method of determining costs is that the hull is often not the most expensive element of a ship. In the United Kingdom, for example, "systems represent the biggest percentage of the price of a warship—70 per cent compared to 30 per cent for the hull."[4]

The numbers may be somewhat different in other countries, but the trend is similar. The technology inside the ship has a major effect on the price and the government won't necessarily know what technology it will acquire when it estimates cost.

Instead of trying to find existing naval ships to estimate costs, why not look at commercial cargo ships? Unfortunately, that's problematic. Commercial ships are very different. They function with small crews and their focus is to maximize cargo space. Naval ships have much larger crews—although that may change as technology relating to unmanned vessels is developed—and have much more complicated propulsion, communication and weapon systems. Warships are also built to different standards of "survivability" than commercial cargo ships —they're warships after all. This makes warships heavier and denser than cargo ships.[5]

Another possible consideration related to cost is where to build the ship. The government must decide if it wants to design and build a ship in Canada, or if it wants to buy a ship "off-the-shelf" (i.e. an existing ship). The Canadian government no longer has the ability to design ships—the navy's design offices were closed years ago—so designs could come from industry inside or outside the country. Some people argue that because of labour costs and lack of efficiencies of scale, Canada could get ships faster and for less money if it bought them or had

Continued on page 18

them built elsewhere. This has been a recurring debate but many would argue that it is a false debate.[6] Most states with mature navies build their own naval ships and have some sort of strategic alliance with domestic shipbuilders. France buys its ships from The Naval Group/DCNs, Germany gets its ships from B&V, the UK from BAE, and even in the United States, where the yards are private, there are specialties.

The majority of Canada's allies believe that to protect their long-term national security interests, they must have the capability to construct, sustain, repair and upgrade their naval vessels. Thus, they tend to sole source their naval and coast guard acquisitions to their national shipbuilding industry with no competition. In addition to these sovereignty concerns, governments want to promote local industry and create jobs.

Based on the advice of the navy and coast guard the government has to decide on the capabilities of the platform and that will affect the cost. There is a tendency, of course, to want the latest and most impressive technology because the ships in the RCN and CCG areoften used for up to 40 years and you want them to be as modern as possible right from the start. Technology choices affect the cost.

Delays and costs are related. Usually, the costs go up if there are delays. This is because prices of raw materials and/or labour costs have increased. The original budget is also affected by inflation, which, for the defence industry, is higher than in society at large.[7] As the government makes decisions about design, builder and capabilities, the value of the budget it has allocated to the project erodes. Unfortunately, "[t]he time value of money is often ignored in the discussion, but every year a project budget sits unused, it buys less."[8]

Now that you have a sense about why the costs increase, let us examine why building a ship takes so long. The procurement process in Canada is a slow one. To start, the government must be persuaded that there is a capability gap, or that ships are at/near the end of their useful life. Then the government must decide what capabilities it wants, put out a request for proposals for ship designs, carefully assess the bids, and then negotiate with the winning bidder to make sure all the ducks are in a row. There can be a design study, a feasibility study, a preliminary design, a contract design and finally a detailed design. Only after this can you start to build the ship.[9]

A slow procurement process isn't necessarily a bad thing—Canadians want to know that their tax dollars are being well-spent—but it means that there are many hoops to jump through before the government will select a design, a builder and the capabilities. We are talking about a lot of money and the government is keen to make sure that opportunities for disputes and law suits from losing bids, for example, are reduced as much as possible. This slows everything down. As Peer notes, getting a new ship is not like buying a car. "Unlike buying a car, the time it takes to buy a warship must include all design activities as well as construction. If you had to wait for your car to be designed and then built, car buying would also be a long process."[10]

In addition to building new ships for the navy and coast guard, one of the reasons for the National Shipbuilding Strategy—originally called the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy—was to end the boom-and-bust cycle that has characterized Canadian shipbuilding. In this cycle, the government would order a ship and the shipyards would be busy for a while, then there wouldn't be another ship ordered for years, sometimes decades, and the shipyards would lose workers and capability. Part of the idea behind the NSPS/NSS was to implement a project that ensured ships were continuously being built over a long period. But before that could be done, Canadian shipbuilders had to modernize their facilities. That took time. The shipyards are now modernized and henceforth the building process can proceed

Another thing that has been problematic for the smooth unfolding of the NSS has been the shortage of personnel. As noted, Canada hasn't had a major naval shipbuilding project for 20 years, so there were few people left who knew how to manage a project this big. It takes time to hire people, and they can only get experience over time. As well, the shipyards had to hire and train personnel to build the ships. This was a major concern at the start of the process. Warships are extremely complicated entities. It requires meticulous work to get them right. A warship needs to be able to float, move and fight. Basic as they are, all these elements must be taken into account when building a ship.

Floating involves consideration of hull strength, balance of the ship, and making sure that the hull is secure. To move a ship you need to think about the propulsion system—how will it move? And fighting, the raison d'être of a warship, involves incorporating a vast array of sensors, communication and weapon systems.

On top of that, you have to consider the safety and comfort of the crew.

You may have heard talk about "Canadianization" of ships. What does that mean? This is one of the reasons why some people object to buying naval ships "off-the-shelf." Canada has unique legislative rules and geographic and demographic circumstances that affect its warships. These include matters inside the ship as well as outside. For example, inside the ship, Canada has certain power supply standards and settings. Canada has rules about the space provided for crew members and policies about the accommodation of women on board ships, and these rules may differ from other countries. Canada has strict rules about the security of weapons on board ships, and this has to be accommodated. As well, there has to be both heat and air-conditioning in Canadian ships, something navies based in more temperate climates don't need to consider. On the outside of the ship, Canadianization may mean adapting ships so they can operate in a cold, unforgiving climate. The waters around Canada can be rough, and there may be ice—if not in the water, then forming on a ship in cold weather. As well, Canada has rules about how waste water is to be handled and

these rules may differ from other countries. These are the sorts of things that need to be considered when constructing/adopting a ship for Canadian use. Making sure that a design incorporates Canadian requirements lengthens the process.

Conclusions

This briefing note has illustrated why shipbuilding takes so long and why it never seems to cost what was originally promised. Building ships takes time because they are complex. The costs increase because the original number is an estimate that is adjusted as the process unfolds.

I'll end with two positive thoughts. First, as noted at the beginning of this briefing note, cost increases and delays are not unique to Canada—check the procurement process in other countries and you'll see the same trends. The second positive thought is that, as the NSS proceeds, the personnel will gain experience, the government will get better at estimating costs, and the shipyards will get better at building ships.[11]

Footnotes

1. David Peer, "Estimating the Costs of Naval Ships," Canadian Naval Review (CNR), Vol. 8, No. 2 (2012), p. 5.
2. This does not count the eight Orca-class patrol vessels built (on time and on budget!) for the RCN, 2005-2008. It also doesn't include the 12 Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels built in the 1990s. See David Peer, "The Orca Project: A Procurement Success," CNR, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013), p. 29-31.
4. Timothy Choi, "The Costs of 21stCentury Shipbuilding: Lessons for Canada from the Littoral Combat Ship Program," CNR, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2013), p.25. He says the reverse is true for commercial ships—80 per cent of the cost for the hull, versus 20 per cent for systems.
5. See Ibid., p. 27.
6. See, for example, Eric Lerhe, "Fleet-Replacement and the 'Build at Home' Premium: Is It Too Expensive to Build Warships in Canada?" Vimy Paper #32, Conference of Defence Associations Institute (CDAI), July 2016.
7. See Mark V. Arena, Irving Blickstein, Obaid Younossi and Clifford A. Grammich, "Why has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen?" RAND Monograph 484 (Santa Fe, California: RAND Corporation, 2006).
8. Peer, "Estimating the Costs of Naval Ships," p. 7.
9. David Peer, "Realistic Timeframes for Designing and Building Ships," CNR, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2013), p. 5.
10. Ibid., p. 5.
11. The first ship of each class tends to take the longest and cost the most per unit. For a discussion of this see Howard Moyst and Biman Das, "Factors Affecting Ship Design and Construction Lead Time and Cost," Journal of Ship Production, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2005), pp. 186-194.

IMPRESSIONS OF THE MV ASTERIX

By Robin Allen

When *MV Asterix* arrived in Victoria, B.C. in mid-December 2018, more than 40 NAC-VI members were given the opportunity to tour the ship. We were also welcomed to sail with the vessel overnight and two of us took up the offer.

As an old AOR sailor—CO *HMCS Preserver* 1992-1994— I was keen to see the new ship and what it offered.

I was impressed before I even stepped on board, knowing that the ship, in its first year of operation had already transited 51,062 nautical miles during the year, conducted over 132 liquid and solid RAS operations and spent only 15 days in a Canadian home port. This was an amazing accomplishment in the first year of a new concept ship.

Her odyssey began in early January, 2018 with her acceptance by the government after embarking the navy crew and conducting the requisite trials, training and certifications. Operations commenced immediately with her first transit south to the Caribbean, conducting numerous Replenishment at Sea (RAS) operations with Canadian and USN ships. Continuing west through the Panama Canal she proceeded to the Hawaiian operating areas for RIMPAC, the largest maritime exercise conducted anywhere, participating with the maritime forces of Canada (*HMC Ships Vancouver* and *Ottawa*), the U.S. and many other Pan-Pacific nations. Following RIMPAC, she continued west and joined *HMCS Calgary* to participate in maritime operations and exercises in Australian waters, the South China Sea, East China Sea, Korean and Japanese operating areas. Departing the West Pacific, she transited east, with *Calgary* in company to arrive in Victoria.

Background

The genesis of the ship resulted from the lack of adequate federal government and DND funding to replace the Provider and Protecteur Class AORs before they reached the end of their useful lives. The RCN no longer had a RAS capability and the requisite RAS skills had commenced to atrophy. Stop gap measures ensued by renting Naval Supply ships from Spain and Chile for two 40 day periods to retain skills, but this was not the answer. The bottom line was that the RCN's 12 combat ships were now fettered and their operational flexibility minimized.

With the JSS Project to eventually provide two ships moving slowly, an emergency plan was required. The resulting plan was Project Resolve, an innovative way to provide the capability—by private industry, with no risk to government—by December 2017. The Project Resolve contract was eventually approved by the Harper government at the end of November 2015 and was awarded to a pan-consortium consisting of Chantier Davie Canada, Aecon Pictou Shipyard and NavTech, the conversion designer. The owner of the concept ship is Federal Fleet Services who purchased a commercial containership, the MS Asterix, which was launched in Germany in 2010.

Prior to design, Federal Fleet Services and partners interviewed hundreds of personnel who had served and operated in RCN AORs to determine what improvements could be incorporated into a new design. The takeaway from this and ongoing construction of AORs in shipyards around the globe, resulted in an innovative design, the results of which will be discussed later. To meet the short timelines, the container ship was used as the base of the ship and commencing May 2016 was cut down to just above the keel, forward of the engine room, and forward to the bow section. A double hull AOR was then constructed from modules for fuel, water and ballast tanks, container storage areas, workshops, storage

areas, hospital services, vehicle storage, RAS stations and accommodation.

The result in December 2017 was a ship 182.5 metres length, 25.2 metres beam, full load displacement of 26,000 tonnes, powered by a MAN diesel with a fixed pitch propeller capable of 22 knots, built to commercial standards, on time and budget, a feat not seen often in DND procurement.

Manning and Navigation

The *MV Asterix* is first and foremost a commercial ship, and it's run and regulated as such. It is the result of an innovative concept: utilizing both a civilian and military component to optimize resupply operations at minimum expenditure. The civilian component of 36 personnel (both male and female) basically operates and maintains the ship and is divided into approximately three parts:

- Navigation and Deck services
- Engineering services
- Hotel services

Members operate on a six months per year cycle spending approximately 42 days on and 42 days off with some overlap of personnel to provide continuity. The control and navigation of the ship underway is provided by the Master, three Second Officers—one responsible for the overall navigation plan—along with a helmsman/lookout when required.

The second officers stand a one in three watch system and manning of the bridge is normally one officer and a helmsman in busy waters or just the officer in quiet times using auto pilot. During two ship RAS operations, the bridge would be augmented with two naval communications personnel—one per wing—with the Master on one wing and the OIC of the Naval Replenishment Unit (NRU) on the other, and with a Second Officer and helmsmen at the centre line console. All civilian personnel carry a ship's phone and can be called at any time to rectify problems as they occur, which negates the requirement for a ship's broadcast, except for emergency purposes. Compared to naval practice, this manning is considerably less.

The operations and monitoring of the ship as a whole from the bridge is aided by two systems that are common to the frigate fleet and arctic patrol vessels. The first is the integrated navigation and tactical system integrating the electronic chart, S and two X band radars with target acquisition, ships log, gyro and wind anemometer, ships head, AIS (satellite input of all ships at sea and data) and GPS system.

The second system, the integrated platform management system (IPMS) monitors and controls the propulsion systems—main engine, tunnel bow thruster, and fold down azimuth thruster—electrical units, auxiliaries, and damage control systems. The IPMS also provides an on-board training system, battle damage control system, digital CCTV system—monitors all compartments—and condition-based maintenance system. These systems are incorporated in one console, and easily accessible by the Second Officer, located near the centerline of the ship with seats for the Second Officer and the Helmsman. Another seat for the Master is located further aft. A second console, for redundancy purposes, is located on the port side of the bridge. The bridge itself is enclosed, is massive, and extends over the side of the ship, providing a magnificent view forward for RAS operations and for berthing.

Engineering Department

The engineering spaces in the aft section of the ship are the only major part of the ship that is original. The main engine space, occupied by a MAN B&W diesel engine driving a fixed propeller producing 16,600 kW of power resulting in ship speeds up to 22 knots. The system is very nimble, providing the demanded revolutions within seconds. A machinery control room, fitted with the IPMS, can be manned or the system run from the bridge. For berthing or bow control, a tunnel bow thruster is provided, and for redundancy—a get home capability at low speed if the main power plant failed—and dynamic positioning purposes, a fold down azimuth thruster is located about 60 metres aft of the bow. For electrical production and redundancy, five diesel-generator sets are provided, producing enough power for a city of 10,000. The original electrical control and distribution system was utilized. Two reverse osmosis systems are fitted, producing 50 cubic metres of purified water per day. Once again, the small size of the engineering department (12 personnel), who are responsible for operating and maintaining all these systems, is remarkable.

Deck Department

The small deck department includes the bridge officers mentioned above, and, under the First Officer, the remainder, who are responsible for all the deck equipment: anchor and cable, all lines and winches for berthing, all upper deck areas, two 30 ton gyro stabilized cranes, container stowage and associated system, through deck (located under upper deck and extending from bow aft to area under hangers) and associated fittings for securing stores, all fuel and water transfer pumps, all RAS equipment and associated winches, and all boats and davits with the exception of the two navy RHIBs and davits.

The First Officer is responsible for all fuel transfers and operates the enclosed RASCO station located above the four RAS stations. The two forward stations provide both solid or fuel transfer and the aft two stations provide fuel, distillate and aviation. This equipment is supplied by the firm Hepburn, based in Ontario, which supplies navies worldwide. The RASCO is co-manned with up to four navy station operators if a two ship solid and fuel transfer is conducted. The dump area at each station is manned by navy personnel. To reduce maintenance, all RAS winches, tensioners and valves are located below decks. Deck personnel man the two fast rescue boats, each launched by one person. The RHIBs are manned and launched by navy personnel, using a larger team. Also, the department provides the latest fire-fighting and damage control services using both remote control and attack teams augmented by the management and control system.

Hotel Department

This department of 12 personnel provides for all meal production, allocation of accommodation spaces, and the cleaning of the entire after house (six decks),

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including; the galley, main cafeteria, four lounges, multi-media training room, equipment training room, five offices, 36 cabins for the civilian crew, and all passageways. Hotel personnel work 12 hour shifts each day. All spaces and passage ways are designed and constructed of easy to clean surfaces. The galley is manned by four personnel and can provide 500 high class meals a day. The 36 civilian and 40 navy crew are fed in one well-appointed cafeteria. The galley is state of the art, maximizing efficiency and maintaining the highest sanitation standards. The scullery is manned by two personnel—one per watch.

Naval Replenishment Unit (NRU)

This unit is currently composed of 40 personnel, which can be expanded to 114 when required. The NRU provides personnel for: command and administration, sustained underway replenishment (four RAS teams), aviation (when helicopters are embarked), medical and dental services to support the NRU and personnel from other military units and ships, and communications support. They man and operate four 50 cal. machine gun mountings used for low intensity self-defence.

The NRU is headed by an OIC who has the powers of a commanding officer. He provides the liaison with the ship's Master to ensure a seamless provision of services to the fleet. The NRU is established on a Home Port system with the two crews alternating every six months, with some overlap to provide continuity. The Home Port does not determine where the ship will actually operate. When not embarked, personnel conduct pre-deployment readiness training, other career courses, post-*MV Asterix* employment ashore, annual leave, or sea duty as required in other ships.

The NRU spaces include offices, a tempest certified communications room for crypto security, a tempest certified operations room (not currently utilized at direction of the government), a five-person hospital ward, a surgical facility with one bed, an X-Ray compartment, and a dental facility. The NRU have been provided with lounges appointed with bar seating and equipment for provision of coffee, milk, juices and snacks from the galley, comfortable seating, laptop work stations and TV monitors that are connected to the world by satellite.

For a video about MV Asterix's participation in Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2018, visit www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSROncbYdEk

Aviation Capability

The aviation capability of Asterix is far superior to our previous AORs. The flight deck and hangar space is capable of landing not only the CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopter but also the Canadian CH-147F Chinook heavy lift helicopter. The deck is certified by Transport Canada for civilian helicopters, and by the Air Force for the cyclone helicopter for daylight landing. For the Cyclone, this will be extended to day/night flight operations, and will hopefully be followed by Air Force certification for the Chinook. The ship has two large hangars to house two helicopters with folded blades. The aviation spaces are well designed, providing maintenance shops, administrative offices, changing facilities for crew, and a tempest certified crew briefing room. The FLYCO space is located high above the flight deck with a magnificent view of landing operations and is kitted out with the latest equipment. The latest remote firefighting capability has been installed, reducing the requirement for a large firefighting crew. The aviation capability provides flexibility for enhanced support for maritime task group operations, joint force operations, and humanitarian/disaster relief operations better than ever before. It is believed that the forthcoming JSS will support two Cyclone aircraft.

Design Enhancements

One main design enhancement encompasses a new method of loading, unloading and storing dry and refrigerated stores, ammunition and vehicles. In place of the large holds in the old AORs, the stores are loaded in containers ashore, lifted by the ship's 30 tonne cranes, and loaded into a large container bay forward in an enclosed house. This area holds 38 containers, 14 of which can be refrigerated. The stacked containers can all be accessed and unloaded with pallets moved in an elevator linking all decks to the through deck and upper deck. Eight more containers can be stored above the container bay and eight more on deck aft of the bay.

Another enhancement is the provision of a through deck (next deck below upper deck) linking the container bay right aft to the hanger. Fork lifts can move pallets from forward to aft to the helicopter hanger via an elevator in preparation for Vertrep operations. For solid transfers to alongside ships, stores can be moved from the container bay directly to the RAS stations. The large size of the ship (beam 25.2 metres) provides space for store rooms on both sides of the through deck. The through deck can be used to carry military trucks and other equipment of equal size and weight. A small number of Light Armoured Vehicles can be secured on deck. Two landing craft can be secured on deck, but are not currently available. The landing craft should be provided soonest to enhance the ship's capability to land stores from off shore. (I found this essential in *Preserver* off Somalia when out size stores were not suitable for Vertrep because they might damage the aircraft).

Opposite the small hospital complex, along the through deck, a large space is available for the fitting out of two 60 person hospital wards. Alternately, this space can be converted to berth a Special Forces Company (approximately 120 souls), with their equipment containerized.

In the aft section of the ship is the largest gymnasium and associated training equipment space imaginable at sea.

The space can be alternatively used to house in excess of 100 personnel in a humanitarian/disaster relief crisis operation (such as *Provider's* "boat people" in the 1990s). Additionally, a large space currently fitted for crew use and training contains a dozen computer terminals, a large monitor, and working space. This space can be used as an NGO office during a humanitarian operation.

To provide an efficient method to quickly run electrical cable and pipes throughout the ship and to ease future retro-fits of new equipment, a fore and aft "tween-deck" (a half-deck below the through deck) provides easy access.

Because of the attrition of RAS skills during the absence of an AOR, Federal Fleet Services has created an individual distance learning package and a RAS operator simulator to increase knowledge prior to at sea operations to ensure safe and damage-free operation.

To provide accommodation, 150 cabin modules (mostly single, but with a few doubles) were procured from a cruise ship supplier fully provisioned with a heated floor bathroom (sink, toilet, and shower) bed with drawers, WIFI, television, satellite cable, desk and telephone (VOIP), and two lockers for clothing. They are high quality and easy to clean.

The large tempest certified operations room, fitted with a LAN and computer terminals provides the capability for an embarked Joint Force HQ when needed (*Preserver* had to use the Senior Officer's cabin dining room during the Somalia operation for the embarked Joint Staff for a four week period until their "digs" were ready ashore).

For connectivity with fleet units and ashore, Asterix is fitted with four satellite communications terminals. The navy's SHINCOM 3100 system, integrating tactical, administrative, voice and data communications is also fitted. The all-digital secure voice system (SVS) interfaces, controls and manages every aspect of internal and external communications. The system architecture ensures continuity of communications in adverse conditions with multiple levels of built-in redundancy and internal battery backup. Additionally, the navy's newest digital integrated voice/data switching system that supports communications and radio room automation is also fitted, providing the complex voice, video and data communications needs of present and future joint/allied missions.

The ship's design included the requirement for anti-missile defence and is fitted for, but not with the AOR Phalanx close in weapons systems. The systems, even though available, (removed from *Preserver* and *Protecteur*) were not supplied by the government.

Lastly, a Canadian designed and produced state-of-the-art solid waste management system has been installed, reducing trash to non-toxic vapour. This innovative system was developed under a separate DND project. Waste disposal is an increasing problem for ships. Many ports require garbage to be double-bagged and segregated, a labour intensive process during long periods underway. Asterix solves this problem for warships being supported. This is another of this ground-breaking ship's labour savers. Additionally, a changing and drying room for wet RAS clothing was provided with ventilated lockers and a hot air rack to dry footwear.

Conclusions

The consortium of Federal Fleet Services, Davie Ship Yard and the design agency have produced a first class AOR to meet navy requirements. Innovative thought and improvements incorporated from lessons learned from past AOR sailors and engineers, have improved capabilities considerably over the previous Protecteur Class. The containerized system for stores and the movement of stores within the ship is much better than the old AOR class. The manning concept of melding a civilian component operating under commercial standards and regulations, with a Naval Replenishment Unit has produced both efficient and cost-effective manning of an AOR, saving millions of dollars per year. Asterix is the Canadian version of the Royal Navy RFAs, the Norwegian Navy supply ship, and the USN USNS ships.

With much of the RAS gear system below decks, along with the pumps and valves, reduces annual maintenance costs considerably. The concept has also increased the operational utilization of an AOR, as shown by Asterix's 340 days deployed in the West Atlantic and East and West Pacific in 2018, and fuelling and/or storing over 138 Canadian and allied ships.

It should also be noted that this ship has four RAS stations, allowing for simultaneous transfer of solid and fuel, whereas the yet-to-be-built Protecteur Class (JSS) has only two RAS stations to pass fuel or solid stores to two alongside ships.

The aviation capability to operate and house two maritime Cyclone helicopters or two Chinook heavy lift helicopters or a mix of the two provides a flexibility not attainable with the old AORs or the future JSS. This capability and the extra space in the ship, provides the flexibility to task the Resolve Class to include the movement and landing of a company of special forces and their equipment, or the effective support for either humanitarian or disaster relief operations abroad. The ship can also be used to embark a Joint Force HQ in support of Canadian or allied operations ashore. If Asterix was tasked to complement a task group going in harm's way, it would have to be fitted with close in weapons systems and the NFU would have to be augmented accordingly.

Four AORs have always been our naval force development requirement, providing at least one operational ship on each coast at all times. To support our 12 combat capable ships for national, CAN-US and multi-national operations in peacetime and crisis, it is even more important to provide force multipliers. AOR capabilities provide this in spades. Their absence reduces the navy's capability immensely. Naval leadership and all advocates of our navy should strongly support the immediate purchase, for the other coast, of a second Resolve Class AOR, incorporating lessons learned from Asterix, to augment the two JSS when they finally commission. Waiting until the mid or later-2020s for the next AOR should not be an option.

Hamilton, A Unique Naval Heritage Site

By Robert Williamson CD, CDR, RCNR Ret'd

When *HMCS Haida*, Canada's last surviving Second World War Tribal Class destroyer, was officially proclaimed the Ceremonial Flagship of the Royal Canadian Navy last spring, it's host, naval reserve division HMCS Star, shone brightly.

To the uninformed, this may have seemed like a lone highlight in the Hamilton, Ontario-based unit. But Star has had a surprising amount of notable naval history.

Star's heritage can be traced back to her namesake, one of Upper Canada's oldest warships, launched in 1813 at Kingston. She served in Commodore Yeo's Lake Ontario Squadron, which played a major role in the defence of our budding Canadian nationhood. *HMS Star* sailed third in line with Yeo's flagship *HMS Wolfe*.

But the flagship anomaly does not end there. Most of the present generation attending the flagship ceremony would not realize that they were witnessing the return of a flagship status to Hamilton. From 1951 to 1968, this outstanding naval reserve port facility was the headquarters of COND (Commanding Officer Naval Divisions) and GLTC (Great Lakes Training Centre). This brought a cadre of career Senior Officers, naval personnel and ships to Hamilton, giving it a naval persona usually attributed to Halifax and Esquimalt.

One of those officers was LCdr Archie Hodge, a veteran submarine hunter of the Battle of the Atlantic. Upon his retirement from the RCN in 1968, and not wishing to leave the Hamilton area, he transferred to the Canadian Coast Guard at the Canada Centre for Inland Waters, driving the C.C.G. research vessel, *Porte Dauphine*. Thus, in 1971, Hodge was assigned to a Royal Ontario Museum project in search of two 1813 warships, *US Ships Hamilton* and *Scourge*, sunk while trying to evade the British squadron during a violent thunderstorm at the western end of Lake Ontario.

In a ceremony last spring, HMCS Haida was proclaimed the Ceremonial Flagship of the Royal Canadian Navy. Photo courtesy HMCS Star

Searching for the two heavily gunned ships 160 years later, even with their approximate location known, was like looking for a needle in a haystack. The search ended unsuccessfully in the autumn of 1973. When the scientists disembarked, Captain Hodge turned for home. Having spent the war years searching for submarines in the North Atlantic, Hodge employed his sonar one last time. His veteran instincts paid off and the world's best preserved 1812 era shipwrecks were found! For his role in discovering these beautifully preserved War of 1812 relics, Archie Hodge was made a Fellow in the Royal Geographic Society.

A few years later, in 1980, Alderman William McCulloch, a retired Naval Reserve Officer from HMCS Star, convinced the City of Hamilton to acquire these archaeological treasures from the province, envisioning them as a "World Class" tourist attraction. A Hamilton & Scourge Foundation was created to promote the story of these 1813 archeological treasures. A memorial garden with 53 headstones was established in Hamilton's waterfront Confederation Park. These ceremonial graves preserve the names of the lost seamen. The memorial garden overlooks the water vista of these priceless artifacts. They lie on the lake bed, now designated as a naval National Historic Site of Canada (NHSC). You can find more information, including videos and photos at the *Hamilton & Scourge* website: www.hamilton-scourge.hamilton.ca.

In addition to the National Historic Sites of *HMCS Haida* and the 1813 warships, *USS Hamilton & Scourge*, there is yet another naval artifact at HMCS Star that can be found nowhere else in Canada. It is a giant ship's bell of the Royal Sovereign Class British Dreadnought, *HMS Ramillies*. It, too, represents a significant piece of our Canadian naval heritage. With its 15-inch guns, it served an important role in protecting Halifax convoys from

German surface raiders in the early stages of the Battle of the Atlantic before the German submarine force attained significant strength. *Ramillies*' massive fire-power was also used in the D-Day invasions of Normandy and southern France. Consequently, the bell made an ideal Second World War naval memorial for Star's 75th Anniversary of the Royal Canadian Navy in 1985.

You may wonder how such a unique artifact found its way to HMCS Star over a thousand miles from the Atlantic Ocean.

It all began in 1947 when a local sea cadet officer, LCdr Moffat, was placed in charge of a sea cadet exchange program to England aboard the aircraft carrier *HMCS Warrior*. While in Portsmouth, the cadets were billeted in *HMS Ramillies*, a decommissioned British battleship. The ship was due to be scrapped and the astute Moffat purchased the bell as salvage and arranged for the next visiting Canadian warship to transport it back to Halifax. He then transported it to his cottage in Ontario where it must have been quite a conversation piece. When LCdr Moffat passed away, the bell was presented to HMCS Star on permanent loan, provided that it could be suitably displayed in his memory. The bell sat ignominiously through a series of administrative changes waiting for an active heritage patron.

When I was appointed Executive Officer of HMCS Star in 1982, I found the bell buried under a collection of closet detritus in my assigned office. After researching its history, I realized that HMCS Star had in its possession an exceptional naval memorial to both the first and second World Wars. I had it dedicated and mounted as such. Not only that, but I discovered that one of Star's former officers, Lt Robert Morris, RCNR, was one of the sea cadets involved in the 1947 exchange program billeted in *HMS Ramillies*. Today, at age 91, he is a long-serving member of our local naval association and probably the last surviving member of that memorable cadet exchange. That probably makes him a charter member of Hamilton's naval heritage.

I believe that Star's 1813-14 namesake, the *Haida* Flagship, the *Ramillies* Naval Memorial, the *Hamilton* & *Scourge* National Historic Site, the original COND headquarters building and the former Great Lakes Training Centre, all make Hamilton an impressive naval heritage site engendering an honorable maritime awareness in our Canadian Society.

LCdr Archie Hodge, who found the wrecks of USS Hamilton and USS Scourge. Photo Courtesy Toronto Star Archives

USS Scourge in its final resting place. Photo courtesy Hamilton & Scourge Foundation

Donald Connolly's painting, entitled "Finale", captures the violent end of Lt Robert Hampton Gray, Canada's last Victoria Cross winner, and his target, the Japanese destroyer Amakusa.

A PLACE FOR HAMMY GRAY

Many know of Lt. Robert Hampton Gray, VC, DSC, RCNVR—a hero recognized not only by Canadians, but also by the nation he fought against in the Second World War.

Raised in Nelson, B.C., he was attending UBC at the outbreak of the war. He joined the RCNVR as an Ordinary Seaman and was selected for flying training. On gaining his wings he was commissioned as a sub-lieutenant and sent for training in carrier operations in the UK. He served in several theatres of war and was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for fearlessly pressing home air attacks on the German Battleship *Tirpitz*.

Sadly, on Aug. 9, 1945, while leading air attacks on Japanese naval ships in Onagawa Bay—sinking the destroyer *Amakusa*—his plane was hit by anti-aircraft fire and crashed into the bay where his remains lie to this day.

Hammy, as his fellow pilots called him, was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, making him the most highly decorated Canadian Navy hero in the Second World War as well as the only British Columbia pilot to receive the honour.

In 1989, in a unique gesture of respect and reconciliation, a memorial was erected to Hammy overlooking Onagawa Bay. It is the only memorial ever erected to a former enemy on Japanese soil. Visiting Canadian Navy ships always send a contingent to conduct a ceremony there. While recognizing the huge honour signified by the Onagawa memorial and other markers here in Canada,

former navy man Joe Buczkowski felt strongly that we must erect a memorial to Hammy here in Victoria so that young Canadians in the future may also know of Hammy Gray's bravery and sacrifice.

Initial planning is for a memorial cairn in black marble with etchings of Hammy and his Corsair aircraft. His story will be told in lettering on bronze plaques.

The memorial will be set in a landscaped area of quiet reflection at a newly designed entrance to the British Columbia Aviation Museum in Sidney, B.C.

We need to raise $25,000 to make this plan a reality. The Naval Association of Canada (NAC) Endowment Fund has donated $2,500 and the local branch, NAC-VI, has agreed to accept donations on behalf of the project.

The citation for Lt Gray's VC, gazetted on November 13, 1945 read:

ADMIRALTY WHITEHALL, 13TH NOVEMBER 1945.
THE KING HAS BEEN GRACIOUSLY PLEASED TO APPROVE THE AWARD OF THE VICTORIA CROSS FOR VALOUR TO:
THE LATE TEMPORARY LIEUTENANT ROBERT HAMPTON GRAY, R.C.N.V.R.,
FOR GREAT VALOUR IN LEADING AN ATTACK ON A JAPANESE DESTROYER IN ONAGAWA WAN, ON 9 AUGUST 1945. IN THE FACE OF FIRE FROM SHORE BATTERIES AND A HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF FIRE FROM SOME FIVE WARSHIPS LIEUTENANT GRAY PRESSED HOME HIS ATTACK, FLYING VERY LOW IN ORDER TO ENSURE SUCCESS, AND, ALTHOUGH HE WAS HIT AND HIS AIRCRAFT WAS IN FLAMES, HE OBTAINED AT LEAST ONE DIRECT HIT, SINKING THE DESTROYER. LIEUTENANT GRAY HAS CONSISTENTLY SHOWN A BRILLIANT FIGHTING SPIRIT AND MOST INSPIRING LEADERSHIP.

Please send your donation to:
Naval Association of Canada, Vancouver Island
Box 5221, Victoria, B.C. V8R 6N4
Make your cheque payable to: Naval Assn of Canada – VI
On the memo line write "Lt Gray Project". Provide a return address for your receipt.

The Three Sisters

By Capt. J.G.R. (Rod) Hutcheson, RCN (ret'd)



HMCS Eastore

In a previous article, "Unsung Hero" [*Starshell*, Summer 2018], I examined the life and times of *HMCS/CNAV Eastore* (510GT, 176 ft). In the course of researching that subject, I came across a number of references indicating that she had two sister ships of the FS (Freight and Supply) class, *Laymore* and *Westore*. The available information relating to these two vessels contain a number of anomalies that I put aside for further examination when I had the time. This brief article is an attempt to clarify the record.

The history of *Laymore* has been well documented elsewhere, including on the website www.forposterityssake.ca, from her commissioning in Halifax in June 1945 and transfer to the west coast as a CNAV in 1946 to her ultimate demise on the B.C. coast some 70 years later. However, her birthplace is variously given as either the Kewaunee, Wisconsin Shipyard or the FMG Bay Shipbuilding Company of Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin. Knowing that *Eastore* had been built in the Brunswick Marine Shipyard in Georgia, it seemed to me unusual that her sister ship would be constructed in Wisconsin. My doubts were reinforced by Don Gorham's flikr account, which lists her birthplace as Brunswick, Georgia.

So I turned to Tim Colton's website on "U.S. Shipbuilding History, Shipbuilding Records", which shows that all six ships of the FS class from the Kewaunee yard and all fourteen from FMG built during the war years were delivered to the USCG or the USN and none to Canada. In fact, no other U.S. shipyard building this class of vessel during the Second World War sent any to Canada, with the sole exception of Brunswick Marine. The shipbuilding history of that yard is also included in Colton's website. It shows that only three FS 510-tonners were ever built there and all were completed in late 1944/early 1945. They were:

- Hull No.139, designated FS 552, delivered to Canada in November 1944 and becoming *HMCS Eastore*;
- Hull No.140, designated FS 553, delivered to the U.S. Army in January 1945 and ultimately sold in 1965;
- Hull No.141, designated FS 554, shown as "Disposition unknown".

The only feasable conclusion appears to be that the three sister ships (*Eastore, Laymore* and *Westore*) were all built more or less simultaneously in the Brunswick Marine shipyard with:

- FS 552 becoming *HMCS/CNAV Eastore*, which I have documented as noted above
- FS 554 becoming *HMCS/CNAV Laymore* whose long life in Canada is well recorded (see "For Posterity's Sake" et. al.)
- FS 553 intended to be *HMCS Westore*, but was, in fact, retained by the U.S. Army.

Westore (designate) is noteworthy for the nearly complete absence of recorded information about her history. It's clear that orders must have been placed by Canada with, or perhaps an offer received from, U.S. authorities for all three vessels. Two were delivered—*Eastore* and *Laymore*—with the third being preassigned her name (*Westore*), pendant (Z58) and radio call sign (CGGD) by the RCN in anticipation of her joining

the fleet. Although these have lingered on in some records to this day, it appears that her order was cancelled late in construction. As a result, *Westore* (designate) was retained by the U.S. Army as FS 553 where she served until 1964 before being sold.

The bare bones of the life of FS 553 beyond 1964 can be tracked using her IMO number 6511398. She was first bought by the Caribbean Shipping Company in 1964 and rechristened as *Sonic II*. A mere two years later she was sold to the Florida-Panama Lines, becoming *Tauros*, where she seems to have remained until 1979 when she was again sold to an organization called Yankee Endeavor. There she was rebuilt and renamed *Taurus*, evidently retained for 21 years—in what role I do not know—before changing hands once again in 1998 at 53 years of age. She promptly reappeared with a new name, *Apemagu*, and flying the Honduran flag. This turned out to be a fatal move.

FS 553 had no sooner become *Apemagu* when a Reuters report of Aug. 19, 1998 records that: "On Aug. 7, [customs] agents found 1,100 pounds of cocaine on the Honduran freighter *Apemagu* at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."

FS 553, Westore (designate), just before being sunk to become Wickstrom Reef.
Photo courtesy of MCAC Artificial Reef Fund

She was evidently confiscated, put on the block and sold for the final time to Florida Sportsman magazine founder and editor Karl Wickstrom and the Martin County Anglers Club for the purpose of creating an artificial reef. On Jan. 21, 2003, *Westore* (designate), now renamed *Wickstrom Reef*, took her final voyage to the bottom of the sea as a haven for marine life. This event is well documented on the website of the MCAC Artificial Reef Fund together with before and after photos showing her last moments and final resting place.

Hopefully this brings closure to the life stories of the three sisters, which were separated at birth or shortly thereafter, never to meet again. Gone but not forgotten.

Returning home. What was accomplished?

Athabaskan has been away from home, protecting the sovereignty of South Korea for 10 months. There's time for just one more wager and some reflection on whether anything was accomplished.

Finally, we were ordered back to Canada. We would sail alone; I chose the shortest route. It takes the great-circle north up the Japanese coast, east across the Pacific with a fuelling stop at the U.S. naval base on Adak Island. Then the final run for home: west of the Queen Charlottes, into Juan de Fuca, then past the Fisgard lighthouse at the entrance to Esquimalt. We could make it in eight days.

I urged the crew to bet on our time-of-arrival at the lighthouse, 4,600 miles away. I gave a four-minute bracket with the mid point at zero and 120 seconds either side. The canteen sold tickets for two dollars each; the navigator and I could not bet. The winner would be the holder of the "second" when the Fisgard light bore 050 degrees on the bridge gyro-compass as Lieut. Lier read it. We were in the habit of betting on all sorts of things, such as how many 40mm shots it might take for Leading Seaman Londvik to sink 'that' floating mine. (He hit it first shot and a junior cook won $40).

We arrived at Adak Island on plan. I hurried alongside the fuelling wharf. A sign at the end of the pier read, "Adak National Forest", the next line read, "A Girl Under Every Tree". An arrow pointed up a steep hill that appeared barren of vegetation. I said for everyone to be back in two hours. I went myself, not of course because of the girl thing, but for the exercise. At the top of the incredibly steep, rocky, hill were 20 evergreen trees in neat rows. The tallest tree was 18 inches. Some trees. Some girls! The U.S. Navy people who ran the lonely depot asked us to give a wave and blow a kiss to their country as we sailed down Juan de Fuca.

One day after leaving Adak a sailor got sick. Doctor Bruce Ramsay said he had a dangerous appendicitis. I had not lost a man in 10 months of the war; we were too close to home to have it happen now—and the sailor's welfare counted too! I told Eric Revfrem to put on the third boiler and altered the course for Prince Rupert. Ramsay wrote out his diagnosis, Chief Sharpe put it into morse and cracked it out to the naval radio station at Aldergrove, B.C.

I had not lost a man in 10 months of the war; we were too close to home to have it happen now—and the sailor's welfare counted too!

The wind was astern and soon the log showed 32 knots.

We landed our sick man without putting a wire onto the jetty. Stu Peacock and his men just handed him over in a stretcher to the ambulance crew. He lived. We now had to make speed down the west coast of the Charlottes and Vancouver Island if we were to be within the brackets of the raffle time; we had added 160 miles to the planned trip. There would be enough fuel.

I did a lot of fiddling with the revolutions going down Juan de Fuca and especially between Albert Head and the lighthouse. The Chief Yeoman called out the seconds over the speaker system as we neared Fisgard lighthouse; Minus 32 ..... Minus 12 ... Minus 3 ... Minus 2. As he said, "Minus 2" Dick Lier yelled, "Stop". We were two seconds early. The winner was the foc's'cle Petty Officer, Nick Lazurak, who picked up $440.

The wharf was crowded, a band was playing. Fire boats squirted water, ships sounded their sirens. We were home. I made a final alongside and did it well.

I found Stephanie in the crowd; three small boys were beside her and a bundle was in her arms. My little boys barely knew who I was. My new daughter smiled as we saw each other for the first time. Stephanie was laughing. Maybe I was crying.

On the 5th July 1995, a reunion was held in Esquimalt, 45 years after the day we sailed for Korea. There were 225 of us in the above picture. There were 76 at the reunion. Not bad, noting that 56

Christmas day in 1950 was warm and sunny in Sasebo, Japan. So we took our picture. I am in the second row, centre. The XO, Stu Peacock on my right; engineer Eric Revfrem is on my left; Dick Leir is on Eric's left. Bob Groskurth and Doc. Ramsay are on Leir 's left. The Korean sailor in the front row is Lieut. Kim 's signalman and was with us for ten months.

had died in the interval.

Amongst those with whom I became reacquainted were:

Stewart Peacock, my able Number One, the 'Jimmy' who insisted on leading the landing parties we put ashore. He organized training courses that got most of the crew promoted one rank during our tour. He became a professional educator.

Dick Lier, the navigator, said he only became a real navigator during the time in Korea, as he was in a Japanese prison camp from the time he was a junior midshipman and missed a few courses! (I knew that.)

Petty Officer Andre Pilon. He was the senior Roman Catholic on board—we were manned by west coasters—and I got him to read an RC prayer at our "non-denominational" fo'c'sle services, at which the captain was usually the parson. He is still called Padre Pilon by his ex-shipmates! He is a millionaire contractor.

Able Seaman John Rogers. He was our best thrower of a heaving line, able to put the end on the other ship at incredible distances. He was now a judge in the B.C. courts.

Able Seaman Robert Elvidge, who was swept over the side during a gale and I went to the trouble of rescuing him, even though he had disobeyed orders to stay off the open deck. He had become an airline pilot.

Able Seaman Ernie Dalton, who was very good at attaching explosives to mines without killing himself. He was now a building contractor.

It was a fine gathering. Stag. Just like onboard for 10 months. We "Spliced the Mainbrace" at the party with Navy rum.

At the end of each month in Korea I rendered my monthly Report of Proceedings as required by the Navy. The opening line was always, "Sir, I have the honour to submit …," and my closing line was always, "Sir, I have the honour to be your obedient servant, Robert Welland."

I followed the advice given me years before by Commandeer Ken Adams, "How will they know how deserving we are if we don't tell them?" I was acutely aware, once a month, that in describing myself as "an obedient servant" was a

Continued on page 35

By the KING'S Order the name of
Commander Robert Phillip Welland, D.S.C., R.C.N.,
H.M.C.S. Athabaskan,
was published in the London Gazette on
13. July. 1951.
as mentioned in a Despatch for distinguished service.
I am charged to record
His Majesty's high appreciation.

First Lord of the Admiralty

A year after returning from Korea, I was serving in Halifax. Vincent Massey, the Governor General, held an investiture at Nova Scotia's Government House. When he presented my DSC (for Korea) he remembered doing the same thing in 1940 at Canada House in London. Gillie was not quite two, Chris was four, Tony was six, Mike was eight, Stephanie was beautiful.

20 Daily Colonist Victoria, B.C., Sun., Aug. 5, 1951

Christenings Aboa

A triple christening aboard H.M.C.S. Athabaskan took place on Sunday a few days before sailing for service in Korean waters. Particularly interesting was the fact that two of the little principals were children of the ship's commanding officers. Pictured above are Cmdr. R. P. Welland who brought the Athabaskan back from Korea recently with his wife and 4½-month-old daughter, Gillian who was christened. Gillian's brothers are Michael, aged 7 years; Tony, 4½ years, and Christopher. Cmdr. Welland has recently been appointed chief of staff, Pacific Coast.

Soon after arriving home we held a christening ceremony on board. Gillian has her name engraved on the ship's bell. (Athabaskan returned to Korea for a second tour soon after this event)

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fiction that would have made a genuine obedient servant blush. I was closer to being a mutinous son-of-a bitch, but as the report went directly to Ottawa, this double-speak would be easily rationalized in those corridors.

I was given the following prizes for doing what I was paid to do:

- The American president awarded me their Legion of Merit, degree of officer
- The King (George VI) awarded me the Distinguished Service Cross (for the second time) and also a Mention in Dispatches (also for the second time).
- The president of Korea, Syngman Rhee, awarded me a Korean medal, but I was not allowed to accept it for some diplomatic reason that was never explained to me. Perhaps the old Headman of the Kokunsan Gunto recommended the award because I had been so charming whilst "Twisting him"? Or maybe his granddaughter did it?

I still have opinions about my part in the Korean War and Canada's participation. From a professional aspect, it demanded my attention, particularly the navigation and pilotage. During the period I was there, six destroyers or sloops ran aground. The causes were out-of-date charting combined with the careless use of echo-sounders and radar. While there was virtually no opposition at sea, there was a constant threat of the Chinese Navy getting into the fray. They had a base at Darien only a hundred miles away and a sneak attack was a possibility, especially as they were distributing mines to the Koreans. The Chinese Air Force had excellent planes flown by Russians; they were only minutes away at jet speed.

The American Intelligence reported they thought little of Chinese capability and consequently made grave errors. Our invasion at Wonsan was a shambles because the harbour was mined, and noone knew that. (I discovered the sea-mining on the West Coast). This same 'Intelligence Service' knew nothing of the Chinese Army's intention to invade Korea with a million men and then surprise and slaughter 25,000 U.S. troops.

In WWII we trusted the "Intelligence" people. In Korea we could not. This put unnecessary strain on everyone at sea. Every single day, I niggled the crew about readiness, springing little exercises at odd times of the day and night.

The Canadian newspapers arrived in the ship about two weeks after their printing. I can't remember a single edition that didn't contain erudite articles on the utter foolishness of Canada taking part in the "Korean Police Action". No doubt they made amusing reading if you were sitting with your feet up in Etobicoke, but if you happened to be a sailor off the Korean coast for 10 months straight, with a wife and kids in Canada, the entertainment value was zero. Our National Government was hopeless at countering nay-sayers; even I spent time thinking the whole thing was a stupid waste of my time and money.

Perhaps it was worthwhile. If our side had not defended the South when the North invaded, all of Korea would now be "North". At present, 50 years after the events I describe, South Korea is a highly successful, wealthy country, whereas the North is hopelessly backward and begging for food.

Learning War

Challenges to Sea Power in an Age of Fiscal Austerity and Political Uncertainty

By Trent Hone, Naval Institute Press (2018)



Reviewed by Gord Forbes

The subtitle of this book, "The evolution of fighting doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945", aptly bounds the time and intent of the author. Trent Hone has combined his knowledge of the USN in the early twentieth century and leadership in the field of complexity science applied to organizational design to try and make sense of the challenges of developing a modern navy.

If you understand terms like "complex adaptive systems" and "heuristics" you will have no problem understanding this book. If you don't understand these terms, you will soon learn how and why they are used. All you need to do is read the Introduction carefully.

Instead of trying to cover all aspects of naval warfare, the author concentrates on naval gunnery to carry his message. The state of gunnery in 1898, at the time of the war with Spain, was relatively poor, according to the author. Battles were fought at short ranges of 3,000 yards, even by the biggest battleships, and hitting percentages were very low. It was after this war when a number of men arose who were revolutionary in their view of the navy.

In the following years several important initiatives were started that would revolutionize how officers were trained, promoted and used. Training and learning became a career-long habit. The importance of the Naval War College grew as a way of instilling improvements in tactics and strategy. Officers were promoted on merit rather than seniority. Those with innovative ideas were encouraged to pursue such ideas.

It was due to the willingness of these officers to adopt technological advances such as fire control systems that improvements in gunnery were made. The launch of *HMS Dreadnought* in 1906 as the first all big-gun battleship forced all other navies to invest in this new style of ship. The US Navy was no different. *USS Nevada*, laid down in 1912 and completed in 1916, was the first battleship to be designed to engage at more than 10,000 yards using the newest types of guns and fire control apparatus. (As an aside, *USS Nevada* will be remembered as the only battleship that tried to escape Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.) These types of improvements continued up until World War II.

The evolution of officers' education and technical improvements also forced an improvement to the study and trial of tactics and strategy. New doctrines were analyzed at institutions such as the Naval War College and trialed at fleet problems at sea on an annual basis. This led to improvements in tactics, control of large units of ships and later the integration of aircraft carriers in the battle fleet. Nonetheless, by the beginning of World War II tacticians in Japan and the U.S. still expected to fight one big fleet action between combined fleets for control of the Pacific. This continued to be the Japanese doctrine until it was too late to change. The US, as a result of early battles, learned that this was not how the war was going to be fought.

The second part of this book concentrates on two groups of World War II battles wherein the USN adapted its doctrine to the new reality. The first battles considered were the various encounters around Guadalcanal in late 1942. These were basically ad hoc battles fought with destroyers, cruisers and battleships. Most of the battles were fought at night, which the USN had

tried to shy away from before the war.

Even though the USN suffered several losses in these battles, they learned a lot of valuable lessons and developed a number of important innovations. One of these innovations was the Combat Information Centre (CIC), first conceived by the destroyer *USS Fletcher*, but soon adopted by the rest of the fleet with the encouragement of Admiral Chester Nimitz.

Nonetheless, many of the rest of the lessons learned contradicted the doctrine that had been developed before the war. New doctrines had to be developed "on the fly" as the war progressed.

The second battle studied was Leyte Gulf, where many of the new innovations in technology and doctrine were the keys to victory in this large set of battles. The author's analysis is quite a revelation from the traditional view.

There was one small section of the book that particularly intrigued me. In it, the author compares the efforts at improvement and innovation by the USN to those of the Royal Navy (RN) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during the pre-war period. In it, he contends that the IJN was too fixated on its success at the Battle of Tsushima in 1904. In the case of the RN, he contends that this fleet was too busy being the world's ocean police to have the time or inclination to make the same effort as the USN. I wondered if this situation is present today in the USN.

This book is a good companion to "America's First General Staff", about the General Board of the US Navy, a book that was reviewed in the Winter 2018 edition of *Starshell*. It covers much the same era and shows the other half of the USN's evolution that was influenced by the General Board and its studies.

In my opinion, this book should be read by both the Canadian Navy's operational and engineering staff when they serve in such roles as maritime requirements or doctrinal development. As a small navy, the RCN has the ability to be more innovative. We have done it in the past and we can continue to do it. This book is a good primer on how this can be done.

Progressives in Navy Blue

Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and The Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity

By Scott Mobley, Naval Institute Press (2018)



Reviewed by George Forward

Scott Mobley has produced a tome with a rather narrow scope, which, despite the arcane nature of the topic indicated by the title, has far-reaching and lasting effects. How could it not? After all, it is the story of the foundation of the modern U.S. Navy, the most powerful armed force on the globe.

Mobley concentrates on the radical changes felt within the USN between the years of 1873 and 1898. In the span of two decades, this instrument of American foreign policy transformed from an institution that existed primarily to police and promote U.S. commercial activities abroad to an instrument of national defence and all that entailed. Interestingly, at the very time that the United States was essentially building an empire, a consequence of the Spanish-American War, the navy was transitioning away from "imperial policing".

To understand this irony, Mobley takes us through the transformation of the officer's corps during this period, a transformation at least as radical as the move from sail to steam or that which emerged from a focus on seamanship and gunnery to one of fleet tactics and projection of power.

He also writes of the massive reorganization of the naval structure. This final piece encompassed everything from procurement to manning and so we see emerge an organization that remade itself not based on function or historical role, not governed by ship design or limitations but rather, born of the new and emerging ideals of strategy and mechanism.

Peppered with conclusions based on somewhat little-known history, to his credit, Mobley disentangles an extremely complicated intra-political snarl and provides the reader with a ready resource to understand many of the issues that plagued American naval planners and chiefs during these two hectic decades. Imagine, if you will, new and emerging technologies together with a total transformation of the curricula of the Naval Academy coupled with a country just emerging onto the world stage and demanding the instrument with which to project its power. Heady stuff!

Mobley starts his work by setting the scene. He writes about how the "Culture of the Quarterdeck" pervaded naval thinking and practice in the 1870s; how gunnery and seamanship was a priority and how fleet operations or strategy was relegated to the few commanders who read something other than a seamanship manual. He starts his study in 1873, the year that marks the birth of the U.S. Naval Institute, the organization that provided a "… vital forum for innovation, sparking an explosion of interaction and discourse among naval professionals."

The other end of the timeline is—no surprise—the war with Spain that ironically presents America with the need for an "imperial navy", but one born of domestic defence. In other words, America had to step back from its previous "imperial" roles and commercial focus to establish fleets of defence to then mature that strategy to project it even further into a new and broader imperial role.

It was particularly stunning to me, a student of history, to realize that strategy—defined as a specific body of knowledge, skills and practices exercised by commanders and their staffs—was absent and even discouraged within the U.S. Navy prior to the 1870s. Yet, scarcely 20 years later, strategy formed such an essential element of professional identity for naval officers that it would colour and influence decisions made, ships launched and wars fought from then to now.

Following on from the initial chapters where Mobley traces the evolution of officers in tandem with technology from "mariner-warriors" to "warrior-engineers", the book then embarks on a series of chapters that address the further influence of intelligence, the Naval War College and the inevitable push back in a delightful chapter focussing on the navy's culture wars. Having it laid out how Mahan, Taylor and Luce had to fight tooth and nail not only for survival of the War College, but also for validity in their thinking reminds us how lassitude and resource competition lurks around every corner, threatening to kill even the most glaringly obvious need for change. Mobley finishes with how, in the span of three short years between 1894 and 1897, this groundswell of change had so cemented itself within the USN that the emerging ideal of progressivism survived even the Cold War.

Mobley concludes his work by summing up the prevalent theme that strategy and mechanism—two altogether foreign concepts just a few years before—changed the USN irrevocably. By the mid-1890s, strategic ideas and institutions had emerged as the dominant force in naval policy and that an ideology of progress was to be the USN's mantra going far forward into the future. Great national wealth was to ensure the arena of innovation within which naval planners could operate. But the forward-thinking and far-reaching ideas produced were a direct result of an armed force that was as progressive in its thinking as it was respectful of its past.

It was particularly stunning to me, a student of history, to realize that strategy...was absent and even discouraged within the U.S. Navy prior to the 1870s.

Mobley's treatment of a very complicated and multi-layered topic is admirable and very readable to those that are truly interested. I caution, however, that this is no easy read without a little bit of existent background in naval theory and at least a passing knowledge of the evolution of sail to steam in the final decades of the 1800s. The narrow scope and very detailed examination of not only a nation's emerging values and national strategy, but also the nature of such thinkers as Mahan and Luce demand further study. The reader runs the risk of getting lost occasionally in some of the minutiae of American-defined concepts that as Canadians, we can relate to, but rarely equate. I thoroughly enjoyed this book despite it demanding uninterrupted time.

This book's value lies in its well-researched text that gives the reader a useful reference into the foundations of the present USN and an appreciation for an unrealized and thoroughly alternative history if some innovative and somewhat radical officers had merely toed the line. Recommended for the naval historian at heart.

Captain E.G. Forward, RCN, currently serves as the Director of Military Pay and Allowances Processing. He is the author of several historical novels of Newfoundland and Labrador.

The Kissing Sailor

The Mystery Behind the Photo That Ended World War II

By Lawrence Verria & George Galdorisi, Naval Institute Press (2018)



Reviewed by Gord Forbes

Well this is quite a bit different from your normal book being reviewed for *Starshell*. It does relate to an important historical event. It does feature a few sailors. It does delve into a mystery. But a significant historical drama it is not.

This story is about a picture taken by a famous photojournalist for *Life* Magazine on V-J Day, Aug. 14, 1945 of a sailor kissing a young woman dressed in a nurse's uniform. It was published in the Aug. 27 edition of *Life*, but not on the front page as some people assumed. It became one of the most iconic pictures of the Second World War.

Although the announcement by President Harry Truman of the official end to the war was not made until 7 p.m. that evening, the picture was taken about 2 p.m. in anticipation of the Japanese surrender. People had gathered in Times Square starting in late morning to watch the scrolling headline on the New York Times building which kept flashing "V-J, V-J, V-J". The two people in the picture were total strangers who did not even say a word to each other before, during or after the kiss. A total of five pictures were taken of the couple; four by the photojournalist, and one by a Navy Lieutenant.

Unfortunately, while this historic picture was being taken, nobody bothered to find out who the kissing couple were. Thus, a mystery was created.

It was not until 1980 that *Life* tried to unravel the mystery. To their surprise, hundreds of ex-sailors and nurses responded that they were one of the people in the picture. After a short review of the candidates, *Life* gave up and ended the contest. However, over the next few years, three men and three women emerged as the most likely candidates. One nurse and one ex-sailor became the most vociferous in their demand that they were the ones. They gained a wide audience and many agreed that they were the ones. But other claims had legitimacy as well. The result was several studies by recognized experts in such fields as photographic analysis and forensic physiology. This book explores the results of these studies, claims and why, ultimately, the authors issue their findings and identify the ex-sailor and the woman (who was not a nurse) who were actually the subjects of the famous picture.

Unfortunately, while this historic picture was being taken, nobody bothered to find out who the kissing couple were. Thus, a mystery was created.

The authors may be considered a strange pair for such a project. Lawrence Verria is a high school social studies teacher. George Galdorisi is a retired US Navy Captain who was a naval aviator. But together, they have produced a well-researched and very readable book about an iconic subject. It is worth a read.

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Last Post

Compiled by Pat D. C. Barnhouse
'Starshell' Obituaries Editor

Kindly forward all obituaries to Pat at 535 Kenwood Avenue, Ottawa, ON K2A 0L7 or by email to pat.barnhouse@sympatico.ca

NAC MEMBERS

Cdr Gerald Arthur BEAMENT, KStJ, CD, RCN(Ret'd)**
NAC-O, 87 in Ottawa 17/11/18. Jn'd RMC 09/50, RCN(R) Cdt 03/51 and RCN Cdt(S) 11/53. Prom A/S/Lt(S) 06/54 thence *Ontario* 06/54, *Naden* 11/54 and *Royal Roads* 06/55. Prom S/Lt(S) 09/55 fll'd by *Stadacona* 07/55. Prom Lt(S) 06/56 fll'd by *Buckingham* 09/56, *Griffon* 12/57, *Hochelaga* 09/59 and *Niagara* (Exch USN) 07/62. Prom LCdr 12/63 thence *Provider* 07/65 and CFSAL 07/69. Prom Cdr 03/74 fll'd by CFB Borden 05/73 and NDHQ (ADM(PER) and CPS) 04/74. Ret'd 05/86. Bronze Medallion ('82). (*Citizen*)

Cdr Philip George BISSELL, CD, RCN(Ret'd)**
NAC-VI, 92 in Victoria 12/01/19. Jn'd RCN as OS in '44, fll'd by selection for Upperyardman Trg. Prom A/S/Lt 05/49 and S/Lt same day, thence *Sioux* (Korea) 04/51. Prom Lt 12/51 fll'd by *Niobe* (Long "G" Cse.) 08/53, *Stadacona* 01/55 and *St. Laurent* 06/57. Prom LCdr 01/10/59 thence *Stadacona* 12/59, *Niobe* 11/60, *Micmac* (XO) 08/64, *Qu'Appelle* (XO) 02/64, FOPC 07/65 and *Chaudiere* (i/c) in '67. Prom Cdr 05/09/72 fll'd by CDLS(W) 09/72 and CFFS Esquimalt 07/74. Ret'd 07/10/77. President NAC-VI Br. 1989-90. Bronze ('91) and Silver ('95) Medallions. (RNDM).

Lt Brooke Shaw CAMPBELL, CD, RCN(R)(Ret'd)
NOABC, 76 in Vancouver 02/09/18. Jn'd UNTD as Cdt at *Discovery* in 1960 and prom RCN(R) S/Lt in 1962 and Lt 07/64. Ret'd in '76. Silver ('08) and Gold ('15) Medallions. (WC)

Capt John R. "Jack" COLGAN, USN(Ret'd)
NAC-O, 86 in Virginia Beach VA USA 12/10/17. Naval aviator, srv'd 33 years, 5,000+ flight hrs., 750 deck landings, deployed Mediterranean, Atlantic, Pacific and Vietnam, CO Naval Air Reserve Unit Norfolk, CO VF-43, SA to CNP and US Naval Attache Ottawa. (JN, *The Virginian Pilot*)

S/Lt Reginald William KOWALCHUK, RCN(R)
Toronto Br., 76 in Mississauga, ON 18/10/18. Jn'd UNTD as Cdt at *Chippawa* in 1962, prom RCN(R) A/S/Lt 09/62 and S/Lt same date. Rls'd in '63. Bronze ('91) and Silver ('05) Medallions. (WC)

LCdr(S) Douglas George MEREDITH, CD, RCN(Ret'd)
NAC-O, 95 in Ottawa26/12/18. Srv'd RCNVR WWII. Jn'd RCN(R) at *Carleton* 20/11/47 as Lt(S) (sen. 06/03/47). Tsf'd to RCN as Lt(S) (sen. 08/03/47, thence NSHQ (USN for Courses) 01/50, *Nootka* (Korea) 11/51, *Stadacona* 02/53 and *Shearwater* 07/54. Prom LCdr(S) 08/03/55 fll'd by *Patriot* 02/56, *Niagara* 10/56, *Bytown* 07/59, *Cape Scott* 07/62 and CFHQ 08/64. Ret'd in '66. (*Citizen*)

Cdr John Robert Silverio PIRQUET, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
NAC-VI, 78 in Victoria 08/12/18. Jn'd RCN as Cdt at *Venture* 08/09/58, tsf'd to *Royal Roads* 09/59 and RMC 09/61. Prom S/Lt 05/63, thence *Stadacona* 06/63, *Qu'Appelle* 01/64, *St.Croix* 12/64 and *Saguenay* 05/65. Rls'd mid '66, reenrolled 11/10/67 and prom Lt 10/67 fll'd by *Gatineau* 01/70 and CDLS(L) (RNEC Dagger Cse.) 04/72. Prom LCdr 04/73, thence *Columbia* 08/73, *Qu'Appelle* 02/74, NDHQ 08/75, EX DUTY UK (Bath) 07/76, CDLS(L) 07/79 and NDHQ 02/80. Prom Cdr 08/81 fll'd by CFB Esquimalt 07/83 and MARCOM HQ 08/85. Ret'd 15/10/87. (KB, RNDM)

Lt(P) George Edward PUMPLE, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
Calgary Br., 90 in Calgary 23/11/18. Srv'd RCEME 1944-45, jn'd RCAF as Flt Cdt 1948 and srv'd till 1954. Jn'd RCN as Lt(P) 04/54 at *Prevost*, thence *Cornwallis* in '54, *Shearwater* (VT-40, VU-32 and VS-881) starting in'54, *Malahat* (VC-992) in '59, *Naden* (VU-33 XO) in '61, *Malahat* (VC-992 in '64, *Naden* (VU-33) in '64, *Shearwater* in '64, *York* (RCAF Borden ATC Cse.), in '65, *Shearwater* (Snr ATC Officer) in '65, MARCOM HQ in '66, *Bonaventure* (COD Plt) in '67, *Shearwater* in '69 and CFB Halifax in '73. Ret'd 06/73. Calgary Br. President 1985-86; Bronze Medallion ('90). (MB, Canada's Naval Aviators)

OTHERS

Capt Douglas BENN, CD, RCN(Ret'd)**
Former Member NAC-O, 89 in Ottawa 17/01/19. Jn'd RN as Tech Apprentice, selected for officer training, attending RNEC for applications and dagger courses. Prom Lt(E) 04/52 and RCN Exchange (NDHQ) 05/56. Tsf'd to RCN in '58. Prom LCdr 01/01/60, Cdr 01/07/66 and Capt 01/06/74. Srv'd *HM Ships Devonshire, Gambia, Liverpool, Implacable, Indomitable*

*Note: * indicates bar to the medal*

"All these were honoured in their generations,
and were the glory of their times.
There be of them, that have left a name behind them,
that their praises might be reported."

– Apocrypha, Ecclesiasticus 44

and *Arc Royal*; *Ottawa*, *Naden*, CFHQ, NDC, CFSRU(A), MARCOM HQ and 3CFQAR(i/c). Ret'd 13/11/82.

CPO1 Donald C. AWREY, CD*, RCN(R)(Ret'd)
85 in Ottawa 01/12/18. Srv'd RCN circa 1950-55 in *Magnificent* and *Portage*. Jn'd RCN(R) at *Carleton* in '61 and srv'd 20 years, retiring in '81. (*Citizen*)

CPO2 Donald Forbes BAKER, CD, RCN(Ret'd)**
86 in Windsor, NS 13/11/18. Jn'd RCN as OS 98/50, prom LS 03/54, PO2 03/56, PO1 12/65 and CPO2 06/71, Srv'd *Magnificent*, *LaHulloise*, *Lauzon*, *Huron*, *Cape Scott*, *Yukon*, *Ottawa*, *Margaree*, *Annapolis*, CFB Halifax, CFB Toronto, 73 CDN SVC BN and 303 CFTSD. Ret'd 04/82. (SR, *Chronicle Herald*)

LCol(PLT)(Ret'd(Donald Glenn COOK, CD*
83 in Ottawa 26/10/18. Jn'd UNTD as Cdt at *Cataraqui* 09/53, qual "P" and prom RCN(R) A/S/Lt(P) 07/56. Tsf'd RCN as S/Lt(P) 02/57, prom Lt(P) 07/58, LCdr 07/66 and LCol(PLT) 01/74. Srv'd RCAF Stn's for flt trg, *Shearwater* (VT-40, VS-880, HS-50, VX-10), *Bonaventure*, *Niagara* (USN Exch.), NDHQ, USNPGS, CFSC (Course 8), CFB Summerside and CFB Shearwater. Ret'd 01/83. (*Citizen*, Canada's Naval Aviators)

CPO1 Henry George EINERSON, MSM, CD, RCN(Ret'd)
In Halifax 08/12/18. Srv'd 20 years, including Korean tour. (SR, *Chronicle Herald*).

CPO1[CWO] Irving Morris FAIRBAIRN, MMM, CD, RCN(Ret'd)**
80 in Dartmouth,NS 28/11/18. Jn'd RCN as OS 08/55, prom LS 09/64, PO2 04/70, PO1 03/74. CPO2 02/79 and CPO1 06/88. Srv'd *Shearwater*, *Preserver*, *Iroquois*, *Huron* and CFB Winnipeg. Ret'd 12/93. (SR, *Chronicle Herald*)

LCdr Malcolm George FITZGERALD, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
80 in Saint John, NB 20/11/18. Jn'd RCN as OS 05/56, prom LS 07/59, PO2 09/64, PO1 10/69 and CPO2 11/73. CFR'd as Lt 12/74 and prom LCdr 06/83. Srv'd, inter alia, CFFS(Hfx), CFS Mill Cove, Fleet School Pacific, NEU(P), *Restigouche* and NDHQ (TRUMP Project). Ret'd 19/84. (ctda@yahoogroups.com)

Lt(MN) Marjorie Aileen FRASER (nee WHITE), RCN
94 in Ottawa 19/12/18. Jn'd RCN as A/S/Lt(NS) 10/49 and later prom S/Lt(MN) same date. Prom Lt(MN) 06/52. Srv'd *Naden* and *Stadacona*. Rls'd 02/56. (*Citizen*)

S/Lt Reginald Harris HALLAM, RCN(R)(Ret'd)
91 in NS 11/18. Jn'd UNTD as OS (Officer Candidate) at *Scotian* in 1946, designated Cdt 12/48 and prom S/Lt 02/50. To Ret'd List in '52. (WC)

Surg Lt George Nathaniel Campbell HOBSON, RCN(R) (Ret'd)
88 in Powell river, BC 08/12/18. Jn'd UNTD as Cdt at *Chippawa* 13/02/49, later redesignated as Surg Cdt, prom A/Surg S/Lt 01/51, tsf'd to *Discovery* 10/51 and prom Surg Lt 06/52. Tsf'd to Ret'd List in '56. (WC)

CPO1 Samuel Alfred JENNINGS, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
92 in Halifax 02/11/18. Srv'd RAF in WWII. Jn'd RCN as PO2 06/50 and prom PO1 06/52, CPO2 10/55 and CPO1 12/64. Srv'd RN (for trg.in S/M's incl *HMS Sidon*), *Bonaventure*, *Ojibwa*, *Okanagan* and SUBRON ONE. Ret'd 03/76. (*Toronto Star*)

Cdt John Dillon JEROME, UNTD
85 in Ottawa 06/12/18. Jn'd UNTD as Surg Cdt 01/54 at *Cataraqui* and later redesignated Cdt. Rls'd 05/57. (*Citizen*)

Lt(N)(CIC) Cynthia Ann LAWLESS
46 in Victoria 22/11/18. CPO sea cadet in her youth. Enrolled as CIC officer in 1991 and subsequently commanded RCSCC's Admiral Budge, Admiral Waller and Beacon Hill. (RNDM)

LCdr Derek Charles LESTER, MiD, RN(Ret'd)
Former Calgary Br., 97 in Calgary 26/12/18. Srv'd WWII. (MB)

LCdr(P) Joseph James MacBRIEN, DSC(US), CD, RCN(Ret'd)
93 in Toronto 18/11/18. Jn'd RCN as Cdt at *Royal Roads* in '42, prom Mid 06/43, A/S/Lt 04/45, S/Lt same date, Lt 01/46, qual "P" in '47 and prom LCdr(P) 01/54. Srv'd *Naden*, Royal Navy, *Stadacona*, *Niobe* (RN for Plt Trg.), *Shearwater*, *Niagara* (USN Exch. USS Oriskany Korea), *Magnificen*t, RN Staff College and *Bytown*. Ret'd in '56. (FMcK, Canada's Naval Aviators)

Continued on page 44

Last Post

Cdr(Ret'd) Charles Lauchlin MacKINNON, CD**
64 in Calgary 05/12/18. Jn'd 06/79 as direct Entry NCdt, prom A/S/Lt 12/79, S/Lt 09/80, Lt 04/82, LCdr 08/93 and Cdr 12/01. Srv'd *Protecteur*, *Fraser*, CFB Lahr, NDHQ (TRUMP Project, CNS Staff), CFCSC, NATO (Brunssum Netherlands) and NATO (Norfolk Virginia). Ret'd 07/14. (WM)

LCdr Lorne Percy MILLAR, RCNVR(Ret'd)
Former Toronto Br., 100 in Guelph, ON 16/08/18. Jn'd as a Prob S/Lt in 1941 at Toronto Division, prom S.Lt 08/41 and Lt 08/42. Srv'd *Kings*, *Prince Henry*, *Dawson*, *Prince Rupert*, *La-Malbaie* and *Cornwallis*. Prom LCdr on transfer to Ret'd List in '45. (WC, *Toronto Star*)

CPO Robert Ernest MOREHOUSE, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
91 in Halifax 23/11/18. Srv'd *Naden*, *Stadacona*, *Cornwallis*, Albro Lake, *Portage*, *Iroquois*, *Skeena*, *Nipigon*, *Huron* and *Bonaventure*. (SR, *Chronicle Herald*)

BGen(Ret'd) Bendt Alexander O'Neil OXHOLM, CMM, CD*
Former NOABC, 88 in Vancouver 19/01/19. Jn'd RCN as Mid(SSA) 22/08/49, prom A/S/Lt 12/50, S/Lt(P) same date and Lt(P) 12/52. Selected for permanent commission and prom LCdr 12/60, Cdr 07/66, Col(PLT) 01/74 and BGen 08/78. Srv'd *Chippawa*, RCAF Centralia, *Niobe* (RN for Trg.), *Shearwater*, *Magnificent*, VF-870, VF-871, *Cornwallis*, *Micmac*, *Victoriaville* (XO), VS-880, *York* (RCAF Staff Cse.), NDHQ, CFB Baden Sollingen (CO 421 Strike & Attack Sqn.), CFSC (Syndicate Dir., fll'd by CFSC Dir.), CFB Shearwater (Base Cdr.), MARPAC(COS) and CFB Trenton (Cdr CF Trg. Systems). Ret'd in 1981. (PB, Canada's Naval Aviators)

CPO1 Roy Albert ROBERTSON, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
93 in Dartmouth, NS 30/11/18. Srv'd RCNVR WWII. Jn'd RCN as OS 06/49, prom LS 11/51, PO2 95/52, PO1 05/55, CPO2 06/61 and CPO1 11/66. Srv'd, inter alia, *Saskachewan*, CFFS(Hfx) and NDHQ (Command Chief Petty Officer). Ret'd 12/74. (SR, *Chronicle Herald*)

Lt Bruce Woodmen ROBINSON, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
Former NACVI, 88 in Victoria 20/11/18. Jn'd RCN as OS 05/10/50, qual Clearance Diver, CFR'd as CMD O 15/04/65 and prom Lt 07/67. Srv'd, inter alia, *Yukon*, CFB Halifax, CFFS Halifax, FDU(A), *Protecteur* and MARPAC HQ. Ret'd 07/80. (MM)

LCdr the Rev Alan SAGAR, CD, RCN(Ret'd)
92 in Halifax 23/12/18. Naval service WWII. Jn'd RCN 09/55 as SSA Lt (sen. 08/52), later made RCN Lt (sen. 10/55) and prom LCdr 01/65. Srv'd *Stadacona*, *Granby*, NRS Churchill and DRB (Institute for Aviation Medicine – Diving Research). Ret'd in '70. (SR, *Chronicle Herald*)

LCdr Robert Leslie SAVAGE, CD, RCN(Ret'd)
Former NACVI, 93 in Victoria 27/11/18. Jn'd RN as Boy Seaman WWII. Jn'd RCN(R) 08/52 as Lt (sen. 01/02/48), tsf'd to RCN as Lt (sen. 03/06/50) and prom LCdr 06/58. Qual P&RT. Srv'd *Cornwallis*, *Niobe* (P&RT Cse.), *Toronto*, *Stadacona*, FOPC, *Bytown* and CFB Esquimalt. Ret'd in '72. Bronze Medallion ('86). (MM)

CPO2 David Albert SMITH, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
81 in Greenwich, NS. 29/12/18. Srv'd *Cornwallis*, *Lanark*, *Crescent*, *Saguenay*, *Cape Scott*, *Columbia*, *Chaudiere*, *Saskatchewan*, *Skeena*, *Itoquois*, *Stadacona*, Albro Lake and Mill Cove. (SR, *Chronicle Herald*)

LCdr Donald Howard TAIT, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
91 in Ottawa 05/01/19. Jn'd UNTD as Cdt at *Scotian* 26/10/48, prom RCN(R) A/S/Lt 06/02/51 and S/Lt same day Tsf'd to RCN (SSA) at *Cornwallis* in '53 as A/INST Lt (sen. 06/02/53) thence RCN INST Lt same date and prom LCdr 06/02/61. Srv'd *Naden*, *Stadacona*, *Bytown*. CDLS(L) (RN Exchange) and Canadian Forces College. Ret'd 03/12/74. (*Citizen*)

Lt Charles Brian THOMSON, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
81 in Smith;s Falls, ON 13/12/18. Jn'd Medical Br. as OS 02/56, prom LS 05/57, PO2 09/61, PO1 06/65, CPO2 08/70 and CPO1 12/76. CFR'd as Lt 05/80. Srv'd, inter alia, NDMC, CFB Lahr (313 FD HOSP), CFLS Ottawa, CFB Kingston and CFMSS. Ret'd 25/05/82. (*Citizen*)

LCdr(P) John Patrick WHITBY, CD*, RCN(Ret'd)
94 in Ottawa 15/12/18. Srv'd RCAF WWII and qual Plt. Tsf'd to RNVR 04/45 as A/S/Lt (sen. 09/45), tsf'd to RCNR 09/45 as Lt(P) (sen. 11/09/45), tsf'd to RCN as Lt(P) (sen. 11/06/45) and prom LCdr(P) 11/06/53. Srv'd *Stadacona* (RCN Stn Dartmouth), *Warrior*, *Niobe*, *Magnificent*, *Shearwater*, *Haida*, *Huron*, *York*, *Bytown*, RN Staff Cse., NSHQ, CFHQ and *Hochelaga* Ret'd 01/06/68. (*Citizen*, Canada's Naval Aviators)

NAC's past advocacy to be proud of

By Richard Archer

As the NAC looks to bolster its membership and be a valuable resource for our navy and our members, it is worthwhile remembering one particular initiative of national significance to remind us that our advocacy efforts matter.

A big issue back in the late 1990s was the cause for justice for Canadian Merchant Navy war veterans. During World War II, the Canadian Merchant Navy was the fourth arm of the Canadian Fighting Services (Order in Council P.C.14/3550). These seafarers faced the same enemy and endured the same hardships at sea as the Royal Canadian Navy personnel, but suffered proportionally far higher loss of life. It follows that compensation and recognition for these services for Canada and the allied cause should be equal to those for Canadian Naval personnel. Unfortunately, this had not been the case.

During and after World War II, various appeals were launched to rectify this situation, but up to the time that the Naval Officers Association had engaged in this issue, nothing had been achieved. As early as 1946, the government had closed the Merchant Navy and ordered the Department of Transport to destroy all the seamen's service and medical records, thus denying them veterans' benefits and medical care for more than half a century.

The initial Naval Officers Association action, led by the Ottawa Branch, was to host and chair meetings for the involved groups at HMCS Bytown. These groups included The Royal Canadian Legion; the Canadian Merchant Navy Veterans Association Inc.; the Army, Navy and Air Force Veterans in Canada; the National Council of Veterans Associations in Canada; the Company of Master Mariners of Canada; and the Merchant Navy Coalition for Equality (later recognized by the Naval Officers Association as the legitimate representative group for Merchant Navy Veterans).

The discussions at these meetings for Merchant Navy recognition and compensation resulted in a direct appeal for help by our then-NOAC National President Ed Williams to Senator Michael Forrestall. At the senator's suggestion, the requests for recognition and compensation were separated and together the concerned groups drafted a Senate Bill for Recognition, which was never passed but may have helped the House of Commons pass a similar bill (Bill C-61), which received royal assent on March 25, 1999.

Two unidentified survivors of a torpedoed merchant ship find refuge in St. John's, September 1942. Photo: Library and Archives Canada –PA116455

NOAC Branch Member and Secretary, the late David Code, a former assistant deputy minister, provided wise counsel as we navigated these uncharted waters. It should be noted that these various Merchant Navy associations involved in the task for compensation found it very difficult to come to agreement. Fortunately, the new Deputy Minister for Veteran Affairs, Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Larry Murray, became a strong proponent of the issue. He convinced his minister, the Honourable George Baker, of the justice of the cause.

Adm Murray met with the Merchant Navy Associations in the summer of 1999 and convinced them of the necessity to quickly come to a joint agreement with what the veterans department was proposing. Largely thanks to Adm Murray's intervention, the Bill for Merchant Navy Compensation was proclaimed on Feb. 1, 2000. Merchant Navy veterans and their families received financial grants.

By F. R. (Hamish) Berchem CSMA



R.C.M.P.V. ST. ROCH

NORTHWEST PASSAGE

1940-1942

The historic schooner is preserved as a museum vessel, becoming part of the Vancouver Maritime Museum in 1960. It was the first ship to completely circumnavigate North America, and the second sailing vessel to complete a voyage through the Northwest Passage. Crew member Sgt. Fred S. Farrar wrote a book about the ship entitled "Arctic Assignment: The Story of the St. Roch". which was published posthumously in 1955. The Stan Rogers song "Take It From Day To Day" is the lament of a crew member on St. Roch.

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