

Volume VII, No. 76, Autumn 2016

# Starshell

**'A little light on what's going on!'**



"Who's going to blink first? An unidentified member of the RCN's City Class Patrol Frigates with a 'trifle more' than a bone in her teeth!

Royal Canadian Navy Photograph

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# Starshell

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
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NAC is now sending out naval news of interest on a weekly or better basis but doesn't reach a large part of our membership simply because we don't have your email addresses. Should anyone have an email address and not be receiving these news items from me, Jim Carruthers, please drop me an email and I'll add you to the list. Don't delay ...

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## From the editor

George A. Moore, Editor, [starshell@shaw.ca](mailto:starshell@shaw.ca)



Well, it's been awhile since I donned my editor's cap so thought it was time to throw in my two-bits. This has been a year of revolution for our venerable 'ol *Starshell* ... having morphed from an 18 to 20 page or so newsletter into a 44 page magazine. Whether it has retained its quality of content along the way is for you the reader to judge. These changes come at a time when our venerable organization has successfully navigated a sea change from an 'elbows on the bar' fraternal brother and sisterhood into a determined organization with the main purpose of supporting an effective and well equipped three-ocean naval service for Canada. These past few years have shown that the Naval Association of Canada is blessed with an effective, able and purpose-driven leadership and is well underway toward achieving these worthy goals.

It goes without saying that one of the most popular and frequently praised additions to *Starshell* during my tenure has been the serialized publication of the personal memoirs of several remarkable Canadian naval personages, including our current subject, the late Rear Admiral Bob Welland. I have one more of these priceless memoirs 'on deck,' but would welcome further contributions for future use. If anything has served as a disappointment during the past couple of years, it is the lack of Branch news for publication in *Starshell*. With a couple of exceptions, I rarely receive anything from our many branches describing various social or other happenings. In these days of omnipresent cellphones, there is no shortage of excellent quality photos of various social and other events of interest taking place across Canada at our many branches ... please keep *Starshell* in mind and share

your experiences with the rest of us! Better still If your branch newsletter is electronic, please add me to your distribution list at [starshell@shaw.ca](mailto:starshell@shaw.ca).

One of the other sections of interest has been our book reviews, thanks to a very small number of dedicated readers who continue to handle the task as new books become available to your editor. If you would like to join them to assist in the task, simply drop me a line at the above email address and I'll add you to our first-come, first-served new book reviewer distribution list.

Whoops ... there goes my better-half tugging at my sleeve ... it's time to extract myself from the old iMac for a breath of that ultra-fresh southern British Columbia fruit and wine harvest air and head for lunch at our all-time favourite restaurant in Salmon Arm! ... Do you know which one? Until next time!

*Yours aye, George*



## The front desk

Ken Lait, Executive Director, [executivedirector-nac@outlook.com](mailto:executivedirector-nac@outlook.com)



The NAC Conference and Annual General Meeting has just completed as I write this. You will see in this issue a wrap-up of the Conference by Howie Smith, President of the hosting Branch in Ottawa and a variety of pictures by our official photographer, Richard Archer. [see centre-fold. Ed.] The many volunteers from the Ottawa

Branch, under Howie's leadership, put on a first-class event which has resulted in many congratulatory messages from sponsors, attendees from industry, government, our military and the UNTDA which was piggy-backed on our events and of course our own membership.

I would like to advise you that the AGM was well attended and, with the many

proxies submitted, we easily ensured that a quorum for conducting business was confirmed. Thank you to the many members who, although unable to attend, did send in proxy forms so that our attendance was almost 10% for voting purposes. I will attempt to have draft minutes of the proceedings available on the NAC website shortly after

you receive this edition of *Starshell*.

With the approval of the 2015 Minutes and the 2015 Financial Statement, our next order of business was to elect new Directors to the National Board. With seven excellent candidates but only five open positions, this was a first time event for NAC. Ballots cast by the members present and proxy votes from proxy holders were combined and, as already announced in the NAC News issue 173 published 23 October 2016, the following five new Directors were elected: William (Bill) Conconi, David Coulson, Jeff Gilmour, John Pickford and William Thomas (re-elected). My congratulations to all the successful candidates and I am sure they will serve our Association well over their following three year term.

Daniel Sing, our Director of Naval Affairs gave an excellent presentation of the current initiatives and achievements of the Naval Affairs Committee, including but not limited to a special NAC edition of the *Canadian Naval Review* this spring and numerous appearances before the Senate Defence Committee by Vice-Admiral (Ret'd) Drew Robertson, a member of NAC-O, and before the Commons Defence Committee by Admiral Robertson and himself just two days prior to the Conference and AGM. He also spoke to the importance of the OUTREACH presentation and emphasized it was not a tool for preaching to the converted such as ourselves, but rather that it was a tool to educate the Canadian public and as such needed support from the membership to get the word out. All in all a very inspiring discussion.

Ed Williams gave a briefing on the current issues surrounding membership and the slow decline that has occurred over the last six years. There was considerable discussion about recruiting and providing a valued service to members and it was determined that personal contact was the best recruiting tool. It was also noted that our improved website was a good start at making our Association more relevant to the younger generations we are reaching out to. Watch for some changes to the website as the Montréal Branch has volun-

teered to take on the task of translating the National pages. Other possibilities are expanded participation by Branches to allow for joining and renewing memberships on line and for making electronic payments of dues and donations. Work still needs to be done but I would encourage you to visit the pages of Branches that now offer this capability to see what we hope to achieve for all Branches.

And a final note out of our AGM — NLNAC in St. John's, Newfoundland has volunteered to host our 2017 events from 20-22 October. This will coincide with 75th Anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Crow's Nest. More details will follow in this and subsequent *Starshell* issues.

The National Board of Directors held their meeting Friday afternoon and the main item of business was the acclamation of Jim Carruthers as President of the Association and Chair of the Board of Directors. The Chairs of all committees except OUTREACH remain the same as do the offices of Treasurer (King Wan) and Executive Director (myself). Richard Archer has resigned his long held position as Director of the OUTREACH Committee and we are now looking for a replacement. If you are interested in leading this initiative, please contact Daniel Sing at [ddcc4@sympatico.ca](mailto:ddcc4@sympatico.ca)

The NAC events concluded Friday evening with a thoroughly enjoyable Awards Reception where Bronze Medallions were presented to Paul Baiden, Bill Conconi and David Soule, and Silver Medallions were presented to Murray Bialek, Richard Guitar and Bill Dziadyk. Not in attendance but also awarded Bronze were Jeff Gilmour, Chris Read and Bruno Champeval. Likewise for Silver were Felicity Hanington and Bernie Derible. These medallions have been passed to the respective Branches for presentation at an appropriate time. Photos of the six presentations held at the Reception are included in this issue of *Starshell* for your enjoyment. [See pages 23 to 25, Ed.]

*Yours aye, Ken*



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## NAVAL AFFAIRS

# WE ARE MAKING WAY

Some of you may remember the Venn Diagram where circles representing different variables—alumni, professional development and naval affairs in our case—are overlaid. For NAC such a diagram illustrates how our different initiatives might appeal to different members in different ways—some may be interested in only one such as alumni, others two and some members, all three.

Our recent two days of meetings in Ottawa, organized by NAC-O, covered all three. Branch President Howie Smith reports in this newsletter [see page 16, Ed.] on our very successful 5<sup>th</sup> annual conference which provided real value in terms of professional development and naval affairs. However, the conference was also an alumni meeting and the AGM plus receptions focussed on alumni interests. Over the space of two days we hopefully filled in all three circles and met all expectations.

On 18 October, almost coincident with our meetings, members Drew Robertson and Daniel Sing appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. This was the last in a string of events running over several months where our dedicated group of volunteers worked to put forward our ideas to various groups involved with conduct of the defence review. Whether it was local meetings of the government or opposition members and ministers, Senate or House committee meetings, NAC members presented thoughtful reasoned arguments which caught the attention of the parliamentarians. From reports, NAC presentations stood out as being of the highest quality.

Following this note you will find copies of the briefing material we presented to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. Copies of these papers were also sent to the Minister of National Defence, Chief of the Defence Staff and Commander RCN. Their publication

here (*beginning on the next page*) most importantly keeps you up to date on Association positions but also provides a permanent record of our thinking that can be referenced in our ongoing work. The documents are:

- Opening remarks by Vice Admiral Drew Robertson (Ret'd) dealing with the strategic question of what navy Canada will have on our present course;
- A 5-page paper by Commodore Daniel Sing (Ret'd) explains, amongst other things why Canada will continue to need a balanced, multi-purpose, flexible, combat-capable navy;
- A letter intended to respond to the request of the Chair that the NAC provide its assessment of extant maritime capability gaps.

*“...NAC presentations stood out as being of the highest quality.”*

Although the bulk of the work was done by Drew and Dan, these positions were discussed at some length by a naval affairs working group. Work continues in part inspired by the conference speakers, but also to expand this discussion. For example, I think as a next priority we should do some serious work on submarines with the result—I hope—that we submit further testimony making the case for more submarines as an example.

Please take the time to read these submissions in detail. What do you think? Is our approach on the mark? What should we pursue as a next priority? Opinions?

Contact either Dan [ [ddcc4@sympatico.ca](mailto:ddcc4@sympatico.ca) ], our Director, Maritime Affairs, or myself [ [jimc@rruthers.com](mailto:jimc@rruthers.com) ].

*Yours aye, Jim*

## HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

Notes for Opening Remarks by VAdm Drew Robertson (Ret'd), 18 October 2016

- Many thanks for the opportunity for the Naval Association of Canada to appear at the start of your consideration of the maritime defence of Canada.
- I'll deal with the strategic question of what navy Canada will have on our present course and then turn it over to my colleagues.

### Defence of Canada – Introduction

- For all navies, there is no legal and little operational difference between the high seas that start just 22 km off our coastline and those same international waters thousands of kilometers away in the approaches to a foreign coastline on another continent.
- The RCN responds to and deters other powers in our home waters, but the Government has also repeatedly used the RCN to respond wherever our national interests are challenged, rather than wait for the challenge to arrive off our coasts.
- For the past few years that has meant ships, submarines and aircraft operating in the Eastern Atlantic and the Black, Mediterranean or Baltic seas to deter Russian aggression—using capabilities at sea to demonstrate the Alliance's will to defend our allies and ourselves.
- Governments have ordered such deployments because supporting the international order has produced the peace and security on which our trade and prosperity depend. Such operations have been the core business on which our Governments have dispatched the RCN abroad, amounting to dozens of deployments globally by our ships, submarines and aircraft, and task groups in the last 20 years even while the fleet at home secured our sovereignty.
- Notwithstanding an unbroken record of success on operations at home and worldwide, the RCN's capabilities and capacities have eroded steadily over the past 20 years, incrementally but increasingly compromising its ability to defend Canada or to act as a force for good abroad.
- I'd like now to describe where this could lead and the strategic risks governments and the country will face.

### Policy, Resources & Strategic Risks Today

- There has been progress recently. The frigates, now well past mid-life, have been successfully modernized and our submarines are operational.
- Further, the National Shipbuilding Strategy is an important undertaking of considerable promise. The question isn't whether Canada will successfully build warships; we always have. The question is whether their numbers and capabilities will be adequate to the rising challenges.
- But for the Naval Association, the regrettable observation is that over the last 20 years, a succession of previous governments and parliaments have been unable to sustainably resource

defence. The most clear sign of this has been that this G7 nation—with all its maritime interests at home and abroad—has seen its replenishment ships and its destroyers age into their mid-forties before being forced out of commission—not merely without relief, but without governments having even entered into contracts to build their replacements.

- The RCN's successes of the last 20 years were due to investments in the fighting fleets that defend Canada made decades before. Here I include our submarines, frigates, destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft—the youngest of which is already over 20 years of age. But the ability of this government and those that follow to live off these legacy investments is rapidly coming to a close, even as the strategic risks it has had to assume deepens.
- What are those risks? Beyond having fewer ships for our defence:
  - Canada no longer has the ability to independently control events at sea due to the loss of its task group air defence capability.
  - Canada no longer has the ability to independently sustain deployed task group operations and must rely on others for at-sea refuelling and logistics support, even in home waters.
  - Consequently, Canada is unlikely to be able to conduct a prolonged multi-rotation response to international events, nor is it likely to be offered the significant international leadership opportunities at sea that such a response enables, particularly in complex operations, of the kind we've undertaken repeatedly, including after 9/11 supporting our American allies for several years.

### Looking Ahead

- Looking ahead, on the present course, future governments face greater reductions and rising risks.
- Today's RCN fighting fleet of submarines and surface combatants is already smaller than research has shown required to meet enduring policy outcomes—such as maintaining our sovereignty and contributing to international peace and security.
- Yet, as the PBO and others have noted, the CAF is unsustainable over the coming decade, likely to an amount in the tens of billions of dollars. So, plans aimed at restoring the fighting fleet's capacity, including those to extend the life of Canada's four highly capable Victoria-class submarines into the mid-2030s and replace them with a new submarine capability, as well as to replace our Aurora Maritime Patrol aircraft, are not just in jeopardy, they are headed hard aground.
- At current budget levels, you can anticipate the RCN's fighting fleet being further reduced over the coming 15 years.
  - Reduced eventually toward a figure in the press of just 9 surface combatants (a 40% cut from the 15 of just two years ago).
  - While the submarines and the RCAF's maritime patrol

aircraft will not likely be affordable and will not be replaced. (See "Preserve Canada's Strategic Surveillance Capability" on page 41, Ed.)

- Such changes would each compound the risks I cited earlier by significantly eroding the maritime capabilities and capacities required to contribute meaningfully to continental or international operations.
  - While for decades the government has often had major warships deployed in two separate theatres, that would no longer be sustainable with a smaller fleet.
  - But most importantly, such a force would not be suitable or adequate for the vast challenge of defending our three-ocean home waters.
- The Naval Association of Canada believes that this much smaller and unbalanced future force would consequently not be adequate to national need, especially given the rapid changes underway in the global maritime order:
  - As nations throughout the world, but especially Russia and China, continue to narrow or close the technological gaps that western navies have enjoyed for decades and make significant and disproportionate investments in maritime forces, particularly in the Asia-Pacific.
  - As great state cooperation continues to give way to competition and confrontation at the expense of the rules-based international order, especially at sea and most notably in the South and East China Seas, and finally,
  - As Canada's third and largest, but least accessible and most fragile, ocean space, opens to commercial

shipping and resource extraction, and as the RCN secures our sovereignty in a time of significant nation-building in the Arctic.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

- For the Naval Association, the success of the Defence Policy Review depends on bringing spending levels into balance over the medium-long term with the defence outcomes governments expect. That will require fundamental adjustments upwards or downwards to either or both. The Naval Association would argue, as I have, that the new strategic environment will require increased investment in defence to achieve what governments expect of the CAF, rather than less.
- In making such investments, the Naval Association would observe that in addition to securing Canada's defence, there is no better insurance against risk and unforeseen global shocks than a balanced, multi-purpose and combat-capable maritime force.
- But the Naval Association also believes that this Defence Policy Review presents a moment of strategic opportunity—an opportunity to not only bring defence outcomes and resources into an urgently needed balance—but to allow the CAF to be restructured for the challenges of this century. The force structure of the 20th century should be reshaped for the challenges of the decades ahead.
- Such strategy-driven measures will take vision, courage and commitment, and effort over many years. But the result will be a CAF better prepared to defend Canada at home and act as a force for good abroad.
- Thank you for your interest and support for the RCN and the CAF more broadly.

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## NAVAL ASSOCIATION OF CANADA (NAC)

Presentation to the House of Commons National Defence Committee – Tuesday 18 October 2016

Prepared by the NAC's Director of Naval Affairs, Daniel Sing

### INTRODUCTION:

The Naval Association of Canada (NAC) appreciates this opportunity to discuss its perspective on the state of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). It is understood that this issue is being examined against the backdrop of a larger study of (Canada and) the Defence of North America and the role and readiness of the RCN in this regard. Before continuing, however, and as intimated by Vice-Admiral Robertson, the NAC feels it is important to affirm that it is very difficult to examine the state of the RCN solely from the perspective of the defence of North America, as the RCN has an important and complimentary role to play beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial seas which surround North America. The NAC also feels it is important to provide you with a quick perspective on the kind of Navy Canada needs. Like our country and its large ocean estate, the underlying issues are vast. These scene-setting remarks will only skim the surface of many considerations. In the interest of time, I will only read the grey-highlighted portions of the information provided in the paper before you.

### WHY CANADA NEEDS A NAVY

The Naval Association of Canada (NAC) believes:

- The principal purpose of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is to defend Canada and its people against external military aggression; and
- The ultimate goal of the CAF and the RCN is to ensure Canadians live and prosper at home in peace and security.

To satisfy both the principal purpose and the associated ultimate goal, the NAC believes the CAF and the RCN must be combat capable. If military forces are adequately combat-capable, they normally have little difficulty performing less demanding tasks in the realms of defence, security and safety.<sup>1</sup>

The Naval Association of Canada believes Canada needs a combat capable and effective navy, for the following eleven reasons:

- (1) Canada's national interests of peace and security and economic prosperity are intertwined;

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<sup>1</sup> Such as sovereignty patrols, support to other government departments, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

- (2) Canada possesses a vast, resource-rich ocean estate;
- (3) Canada is an increasingly global, sea trading nation;
- (4) beyond its sovereign waters, Canada values and is an ardent advocate of the rule of law at sea and of international peace and security;
- (5) there are threats to elements of Canada's national interests;
- (6) future threats to our national interests are difficult to predict;
- (7) Canada must not rely exclusively on others to protect and further its national interests;
- (8) Canada's peace and security contributions to the United Nations, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to other defence and security arrangements, especially those with the United States in the defence of North America,<sup>2</sup> must be meaningful;
- (9) future Canadian governments will likely one day need to send Canadian naval and maritime air forces into harm's way;
- (10) without the establishment and continuous maintenance of ready-to-deploy, ready-to-act, capable and effective Canadian naval and maritime forces which are purposely designed to operate against current and future threats in Canadian, international and far-away waters, the maritime-related elements of Canada's intertwined national interests of peace and security and economic prosperity will be at risk; and,
- (11) a capable and effective Navy is ultimately all about avoiding, preventing and deterring costly conflict and war;

### How Big and What Kind of Navy?

The number of naval platforms and crews (which speaks to quantity) and their characteristics (which speaks to quality) are principally a function of five factors:

- (1) the threat or risk to the nation's defence, security and economic prosperity, as affected by the country's size, geography, climate, ocean estate, trade dependencies, adversaries and allies;
- (2) the maritime defence and security outputs desired by the government<sup>3</sup>. There are two key elements in this regard:
  - (a) the non-routine (or surge) output desired or expected in times of tension, crisis or war;<sup>4</sup>
  - (b) the routine output desired or expected in times of relative peace;<sup>5</sup>
- (3) the maintenance requirements of the platforms and their equipment;
- (4) the personnel tempo (or Quality of Life) considerations of the platforms' crews; and,
- (5) the financial resources available both for acquisition and through-life operations, training and maintenance of maritime defence capabilities.

### Future Threat is Difficult to Predict

A nation's defence policy should be based on a clear assessment of the threat of military aggression, at home and abroad, both present and future. The NAC agrees with the North American threat assessment which was captured in the Committee's September 2016 Report on *NORAD and Aerial Readiness*.

The most important threat to assess is the future one; unfortunately,

it is the most difficult to predict. An unclear or debatable assessment of future threats does not facilitate difficult military capability and equipment choices.<sup>6</sup>

Optimum military forces, which take years and in some instances decades to design and procure, can only be properly identified if the future threat has been correctly predicted.

### Evolving Threats

Unfortunately, there appears to be no end to mankind's motivation and ability to discover, develop and/or deploy new threat weapons and launch platforms.<sup>7</sup> Threat weapons are increasingly faster, stealthier, longer-range and/or more effective.

The proliferation and improvements in submarines, mines, anti-ship torpedoes, anti-ship missiles,<sup>8</sup> cruise and ballistic missiles, in particular, represent increasing potential to do harm, directly or indirectly to North America. Such evolving threats should not be discounted,<sup>9</sup> and preventive and/or protective defence measures need to be considered and implemented. The Naval Association of Canada believes the Royal Canadian Navy, subject to difficult equipment choices, has an important role to play against all these evolving threats.

### Availability of Naval Ships and Submarines

Unfortunately, an individual ship or submarine is not available for use all of the time, owing principally to maintenance, planned or unplanned.<sup>10</sup>

When ships (and submarines) are available, they essentially do one of three activities (in order of importance):

- they conduct operations in support of defence, security and safety objectives;<sup>11</sup>
- they conduct individual and collective training, to get ready to conduct operations; or
- they conduct exercises, once trained and not otherwise conducting operations, in order to maintain crew proficiencies.<sup>12</sup>

The need to conduct maintenance, trials and individual and collective training adds sea-day requirements and non-availability

<sup>6</sup> The government will eventually need to espouse, publicly or privately, its own assessment of future threats and weave the implications into both defence and foreign policy. Several significant and negative security environment changes have occurred since the publication of Canada's last defence policy document, the Canada First Defence Strategy in 2008. These need to be taken into account. For example, what are the Government's positions on: Russia's recent extra-territorial activities? Russia's future intentions? China's recent activities in the South China Sea? North Korea's long-range missile and nuclear weapons intentions? Can we exclude the possibility that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) might one day be directed to respond to any of these, or other issues?

<sup>7</sup> This is a cat-and-mouse game that has been around since the beginning of time and is unlikely to disappear in the next century.

<sup>8</sup> It was recently reported that on Sunday 9 October 2016, shore-launched anti-ship missiles, possibly Chinese-made C802s, were fired towards United States Navy (USN) ships in international waters off Yemen's west coast; while no ships were hit, the USN apparently deployed countermeasures consisting of Standard missiles (SM-2) and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) and NULKAS off-board jammers. The 9 October incident was preceded by a successful 1 October C-802 missile attack against a United Arab Emirates high-speed catamaran which was transiting the Bab Al Mandeb Strait.

<sup>9</sup> Because something has yet to happen does not mean it won't. History shows we have great difficulty in correctly predicting what might happen tomorrow. Was the threat of suicide plane attacks on the World Trade Centre considered the greatest threat to the United States in 2001? Was the threat of interference by Russia in Ukraine considered the greatest threat to NATO in 2015?

<sup>10</sup> Such periods of unavailability also include allowances for post-maintenance set-to-work trials and crew training.

<sup>11</sup> In times of tension, crisis or war, this activity would override the third activity.

<sup>12</sup> In times of peace, this activity dwarfs the first activity.

<sup>2</sup> As described at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-canada-u-s-defence-relationship/hob7hd8s> (accessed 13 October 2016).

<sup>3</sup> Sometimes referred to as levels of ambition or levels of effort.

<sup>4</sup> How much of an insurance policy is desired?

<sup>5</sup> To conduct Sovereignty Patrols and provide Support to Other Government Departments (such as fishery patrols, drug interdictions and illegal migrant interceptions.).

periods to naval platforms. While these activities ensure equipment and personnel readiness for operations, they add to the overall number of platforms required to generate a given set of naval outputs, as determined by the Government.

### Building and Maintaining a Navy

Given the difficulty of correctly predicting the future, acquiring and maintaining balanced, multi-purpose, flexible, combat-capable, military capabilities, on land, on and below the seas, and in the air, seems prudent.

Combat-capable naval ships and submarines and maritime aircraft and their sophisticated sensors, weapons and communications equipment are not inexpensive.

The costly nature of fully integrated, combat capable platforms is a function of several factors, the most significant of which is the platform's desired degree of survivability. Survivability speaks to the military concept of being able to go into harm's way and retaining a reasonable chance of operational success and survival; this is all about ensuring young Canadian sailors and aircrew come back from their missions safe and sound.

In the Canadian experience:

- it takes a very long time before a modern, combat-capable and effective ship, submarine or aircraft can be delivered to the CAF;
- naval platforms and equipment:
  - must take into account a varied and challenging operating and threat environment;
  - are produced in small numbers (which do not benefit from economies of scale); and,
  - are often required to perform long after their best-before date expires.

A navy cannot operate in a high threat environment if it is comprised of less capable ships. High-end warfare skill-sets take years to develop and sustain.

A capable Navy cannot be stood up quickly when a need arises. For it to be of use when needed, it must exist before a difficult-to-predict threat (or crisis) manifests itself.

### At What Cost?

How much should a country spend on its defence? How much is enough? The only sure way to determine whether or not enough is being spent on defence is when the country's defence is actually put to the test. Spending on defence (and the RCN) is like buying insurance: (1) you have to pay for it up front; (2) you don't know when you will ever need to use its full capacity; and (3) you can't readily acquire some or more when a crisis suddenly emerges.

### Whole-of-Government Security in the Maritime Domain

Post 9/11, the 2004 National Security Policy directed responsible departments and agencies to improve the way in which national maritime security is coordinated and delivered.

"Transport Canada (TC) was designated as the lead for coordinating marine security policy in Canada, working in collaboration with other federal government departments and agencies with marine security

responsibilities."

"[The] Department of National Defence (DND) (particularly the [N]avy) was recognized as] the lead department for overall coordination of on-water response to a threat or crisis in Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone and along our coast; [and routinely] monitors and controls military activities within Canada's territory, airspace and marine areas.

"Within weeks of 11 September 2001, the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (IMSWG) was established under the leadership of Transport Canada. The working group was created to coordinate federal marine security efforts by identifying requirements and coordinating initiatives across the federal government."

"The International Maritime Organization (IMO), an agency of the United Nations that sets global safety and security standards for the maritime sector, developed the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in 2002."

"The IMSWG ... developed the fundamental concepts under which Canada's marine security framework has developed."

"With these concepts in place and with the Marine transportation Security Act as legal authority, Canada ... respond[ed] to the ISPS Code requirements. The Marine Transportation Security Regulations (MTSR) proclaimed under the MTSA came into force 1 July 2004 to meet Canada's international commitment."

"[ISPS Code] Marine security threat Levels One, Two and Three and associated responses are standard across the globe."

Other post-9/11 IMSWG-coordinated, whole-of-government initiatives include the implementation of "Marine Security Operations Centres, National Port Enforcement Teams, Marine Security Enforcement Teams, Marine Security Emergency Response Teams and the "Shiprider Project."

With significant input from the RCN and other concerned departments and agencies, the IMSWG also produced two reference documents, namely *Canada's Maritime Security Strategic Framework* and *Canada's Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy*.

### Role of the RCN

The RCN is principally responsible for:

- monitoring Canada's ocean estate and approaches;
- when necessary, asserting and defending Canada's maritime sovereignty; and
- as directed by the government, contributing to international peace and security.

In a whole-of-government fashion, the RCN, as part of the CAF, collaborates with and provides support to Other Government Departments and Agencies in achieving separate but interconnected mandates and objectives.

While it provides assistance at times in the following areas, the RCN is not responsible for:

- law and regulation enforcement;
- safety of navigation at sea, vessel traffic management, ice breaking and marine search and rescue;
- marine transportation safety;
- pollution monitoring and control;
- border monitoring and control; and
- migrant monitoring and control.

These responsibilities belong to other government departments and agencies.

The CAF and the RCN constitute Canada's last force-of-law-resort at sea.

## Maritime Domain Awareness

In order to exercise sovereignty, a nation must:

- first, know what is going on in, near, and at times far away from its sovereign territory, be it on land, on and below the seas and in the air; this is normally achieved through surveillance; and then,
- be able to respond normally with mobile assets, to safety, security and defence incidents or challenges, potential or actual, in a timely fashion.

Surveillance leads to awareness, which leads to effective whole-of-government decision making.

In Canada and the United States, there are many departments, agencies and institutions that are involved in providing various aspects of safety, security and defence in the maritime domain.

Surveillance responsibilities and contributions differ in each country, depending on the issue.

In Canada, several departments and agencies are interested in different aspects of maritime surveillance. The nature and degree of surveillance required and generated by each of Canada's federal departments and agencies varies. While Department of National Defence is interested in all elements of Maritime Domain Awareness, it focusses a significant amount of effort and resources into those which support the defence and security of Canada and North America.

Defence-oriented surveillance concepts, methods and technologies can be grouped into three types of categories:

- Strategic-level or large-area surveillance;
- Operational-level or medium-area surveillance;
- Tactical-level or small-area surveillance.

The purpose, nature (including size and mobility), cost and effectiveness of the surveillance technologies vary widely. It is not easy to optimize a single solution for multiple purposes.

At sea, above water surveillance technologies are mostly electromagnetic in nature whereas below water surveillance technologies are mostly acoustic in nature.

A comprehensive surveillance strategy is a function of several factors, including but not limited to:

- The extent and nature of the territory (land, sea [on and below the surface] air and space) to be covered;
- The meteorological conditions under which surveillance is to be carried out;
- The refresh rate of detections and subsequent tracking; and,
- The degree to which a detection is positively identified.

Often, multiple types of surveillance methods and technologies are required to generate an actionable surveillance picture.

Beyond the increasing potential threat posed by missiles, amongst other weapons, which can be launched from submerged submarines, the need to conduct undersea surveillance must not be overlooked.

While the RCN is very much interested in strategic and operational level surveillance, on, above and below the oceans, it has focussed most of its efforts and limited resources on developing and maintaining mobile response assets, which are equipped for conducting tactical-level surveillance but are able to draw from and contribute to the surveillance picture generated by operational and strategic

level systems.

## Maritime Response

Once an actionable surveillance picture has been generated, a mobile response asset or assets can be deployed. If not already deployed, to further refine the picture and/or to take whatever action might be warranted.

Response assets for the maritime domain come in many types. Some are military and some are non-military.

Most of the more capable response assets are mobile, some more so than others.

Some such as military fighter and maritime patrol aircraft can travel significant distances rather quickly, can deploy with no or little support to far-away places and remain on site for significant periods of time.

In the case of mobile naval assets, response can take one or two forms. Either the assets are called into action from their home base, as in the case of the RCN's Ready Duty Ship, or they are already at sea, conducting sovereignty patrols, or conducting training or exercises, and are therefore able to respond more quickly.

## Sea Control

The CAF and the RCN need to be able to exercise a reasonable degree of sea control on, above and below the ocean surface, wherever they are tasked to operate, be it in the open ocean (i.e., far from land), or in the littorals (i.e., near land), and be it near or far away from Canadian territory.

Because of the costs involved, the CAF and the RCN cannot possess all elements of modern sea power.

Ideally, the CAF and the RCN should be able to exercise sea control without the assistance of allies when operating in Canadian waters.

Because it is difficult to predict future threats and situations, care must be taken to acquire and maintain the right number, mix and quality of sea-going platforms and supporting services so as to preserve the ability to ensure adequate sea control.

## An Example of the RCN at Work

The submarine threat is particularly challenging.<sup>13</sup> Submarines are stealthy and lethal. It is very challenging and costly to detect and track a submerged submarine. Authorities become anxious when a foreign submarine strays from its home waters and/or cannot be accounted for. When it comes to submarines, intelligence gathering and surveillance starts long before a potential incursion into sovereign waters. Allies collaborate and cooperate in developing and maintaining the best possible undersea surveillance picture. Information is shared between Allies, especially between those nations which operate submarines. As the situation dictates, allies, including Canada, deploy mobile surveillance and/or response assets to assist in developing, refining and maintaining the picture, and if necessary, stand ready to contain the situation. In the case of Canada, this may involve deploying one or more maritime patrol aircraft thousands of miles away from Canada. Subsequently, an appropriately-configured naval task group, of one or more ships and/or submarines, may be dispatched well before the foreign submarine approaches North American waters.

<sup>13</sup> Submarines can carry anti-ship torpedoes, mines, anti-ship missiles, cruise and ballistic missiles. While nuclear-tipped ballistic missile submarines saw their zenith during the Cold War, they still exist.

## Greater than the Sum of its Parts

A naval task group “is a group of naval and air units optimally suited to the full range of expected tasks associated with their mission. It is capable of self-sustained operations for a fixed time in any accessible maritime region of the world. The number and type of units attached to a deployed Task Group would depend on the particular mission...”

In a task group, “various ships, submarines and aircraft with unique capabilities act in combination, depending upon the mission, to create a synergistic effect multiplying their individual effectiveness.”

A naval task group is self-sufficient, modular, adaptable and capable of easily integrating with other national or international forces that are likely to be involved in a joint and/or combined operation.

The naval task group works well for Canada in providing adequate sea control both at home and abroad.

Looking forward, a Canadian naval task group should consist of up to five combatants (surface and sub-surface) and one combat support ship, and appropriate maritime aircraft.

## Maritime Force Structure

So that future Governments will continue to be able to make the meaningful contributions expected of Canada in times of tension, crisis or war, the Naval Association of Canada believes it is in the national interest to acquire and maintain a modern, balanced, multi-purpose, flexible, combat-capable, maritime fleet consisting of, as a minimum:

- 16 surface combatants;
- 4 sub-surface combatants (i.e., submarines);
- 4 combat support ships (i.e., underway replenishment ships);
- 28 maritime helicopters;
- 16 maritime patrol aircraft;
- 12 coastal patrol ships with mine countermeasure capabilities, and,
- 6 Arctic and offshore patrol ships.

Such a force structure is predicated on numerous factors, including, but not limited to, the nature of the future security environment, which remains difficult to predict.

## Operating at Home versus Operating Abroad

Previous Canadian defence policies have generally espoused three recurring objectives: (1) Defend Canada; (2) Defend North America; and, (3) Contribute to international peace and security.

For decades, pundits and observers have debated the degree to which the Canadian Armed Forces should focus its efforts and resources on staying at home in the defence of Canada or going abroad to contribute to international peace and security.

Most previous policies have generally avoided the temptation to weigh or prioritize these objectives. This is wise in the NAC’s opinion. Not weighing or prioritizing these objectives, which flows from the fact that it is extremely difficult to predict the future, allows for policy flexibility.

In the case of operations in the maritime domain:

- ♦ there will be times when surveillance and response to potential threats to sovereignty will need to take place beyond Canadian waters.
- ♦ there are few differences in naval doctrine, support,



platforms and equipment between operating in Canadian waters and operating abroad; and

- ♦ the only differences concern the degree of support to be provided to operations ashore when called upon to operate in the littorals of foreign lands.

Unless a nation is engaged in an existential conflict, its military forces can and should be used in pursuit of peace and security and prosperity interests away from national territory. In the case of the Royal Canadian Navy, these away-from-home interests begin in international waters, just beyond Canada’s 12 nautical mile territorial sea.

## Conclusion

Oceans and navies have played key roles in the prosperity, security and defence of most, if not all, states, especially coastal ones. Looking forward, the oceans will likely continue to play an important role in Canada’s prosperity, security and defence. Canada will continue to need a balanced, multi-purpose, flexible, combat-capable navy. A capable and effective navy cannot be easily and quickly created when a need arises. For it to be of use when needed, it must exist before difficult situations manifest themselves.



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## NAVAL ASSOCIATION OF CANADA (NAC)

### Follow-up Letter to the Standing Committee on National Defence of 24 October 2015

By the President of NAC, Jim Carruthers

24 October 2016

Standing Committee on National Defence  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0A4

#### Re: Naval Association of Canada Supplemental Input to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.

The following input is submitted as a follow-up to the Naval Association of Canada's presentations by Vice-Admiral (Retired) Robertson and Commodore (Retired) Sing to the Committee's hearing of Tuesday, 18 October 2016.

#### Maritime Capability Gaps

At the conclusion of the 18 October session, the Committee Chair asked the NAC to provide its assessment of extant maritime capability gaps. While a seemingly simple request, a response is not at all simple.

There are numerous factors to consider. Only four will be mentioned here. Firstly, there is a doctrinal distinction in the military between capability (or the ability to perform a particular task) and capacity (the number of capabilities in question). In the case of navies and air forces, insufficient numbers of platforms can constitute a capability gap. Secondly, the concept of balance has many aspects. Balance is required on one hand between capability, quality and capacity and numbers. In the case of naval forces, balance is on another hand, required on, below and above the seas. In the case of the defence of Canada and North America, balance is also required between surveillance and response. Balance does not mean equal, and is as much about professional judgement as it is about science. Thirdly, the likelihood and the impact or consequence of a potential threat and the amount of funding likely to be available to insure against such threats, colour the identification, categorization, prioritization and weighting of capability gaps and their possible solutions. Fourthly, it is important to distinguish between needs and desires, especially in regards to distinct defence, security and safety tasks and associated gaps, and their relative importance in a resource-limited world.

As set out in Admiral Robertson's opening statement, the NAC assesses that the maritime capability gaps that exist today will only be compounded by the significant capabilities that are likely to be gapped or lost in the decade to come at current Defence funding. The inadequate state of the expected future maritime force, as described in the next section, must be combined with the gaps of the current force in order to provide a complete view of the challenge facing Defence today.

The present capability gaps, the bulk of which relate, directly or indirectly, to the defence of Canada, include, but are not limited to the following (*list is not prioritized*):

- ◆ no ability to generate remote, wide-area, persistent, real-time undersea surveillance of Canadian waters and approaches;
- ◆ waning ability to generate focussed, local-area, 24/7, real-time undersea surveillance, at home and abroad;

- ◆ no ability to exercise sea control under the ice;
- ◆ waning ability of surface combatants to conduct effective undersea control;
- ◆ lost ability to independently provide adequate local air-defence of naval ships deployed near or into harm's way, owing to the forced de-commissioning of old air-defence destroyers;
- ◆ waning ability to be a meaningful NATO and US partner in a tense or crisis situation at sea;
- ◆ waning ability to provide meaningful leadership of allied naval operations in a tense or crisis situation;
- ◆ lost ability to independently support naval combatants deployed far from home base, be it in Canadian, international or far-away waters, owing to the forced de-commissioning of old underway replenishment ships;
- ◆ no ability to defend against ballistic missiles which could target North America, especially those which might be fired from submarines;
- ◆ lack of capacity to survey and/or clear port approaches if threatened by mines;
- ◆ lost ability to conduct deep sea-bed diving and recovery operations (HMCS *Cormorant* was retired in 1997);
- ◆ lost ability to conduct forward-looking, at-sea, defence-related research and experimentation (defence research vessel *Endeavour* was retired in 1999 and the last research vessel, *Quest*, has just recently been retired. [See page 26, Ed.]
- ◆ inadequate ability to operate in the littorals, especially in a threat environment abroad; and
- ◆ little ability to support operations ashore from the sea.

#### Strategic Assessment in Support of the Defence Policy Review

It is clear from Admiral Robertson's opening statement that there are significant capability gaps still to come, since the Naval Association of Canada assesses that at current budget levels and without significant restructuring overall, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are unsustainable and that the maritime fighting fleets of surface combatants, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, will continue to decline over the coming 15 years to leave the country without submarines or patrol aircraft and fewer surface combatants than we have today. Any force that sees the termination of submarines or patrol aircraft, both of which provide crucial capabilities, capabilities that are more important than those on the list of gaps above, while also reducing overall capacity would be smaller and unbalanced to a degree that it would not be able to defend Canada at home or defend our interests abroad.

The NAC argues that the evolving strategic environment requires

increased investment in defence to secure governments' enduring expectations of defence outcomes, rather than less. In addition to securing Canada's defence, the NAC believes there is no better insurance against strategic risk and unforeseeable global shocks than modern, balanced, multi-purpose, flexible and combat-capable maritime forces.

The NAC assesses that the priority for any Defence policy must be to maintain the confidence of Canadians in the protection of the country, and the confidence of our American allies in our contribution to continental defence. Consequently, maintaining the naval and air forces that safeguard our continental approaches above, on and under our three surrounding oceans is crucial.

The NAC consequently recommends that, while there needs to be an increase in defence spending, if the defence budget does not increase there must be a transfer of resources within Defence to fund the capital acquisitions necessary to recapitalize the naval and air force fighting fleets that defend Canada and contribute to North American defence, especially the surface combatants, submarines and patrol aircraft. The Naval Association of Canada further notes that what must be spent to defend Canada and contribute to the defence of North America will also serve the country well abroad, since for maritime forces there is little difference—strategically, operationally or tactically—between operating at home or on the far side of the world.

### Fleet Renewal

Fleet renewal will not be possible without the measures set out above. Those measures, coupled with pursuance of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) as the most assured 21<sup>st</sup> century approach for recapitalizing the fleet on a sustainable, ongoing basis, would enable the Government to:

- Continue to maintain the combat capabilities of the modernized fleet, especially, but not exclusively, in undersea warfare;
- Continue the procurement of the Queenston-class Joint Support Ships; the Harry DeWolf-class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the Canadian Surface Combatants;
- Extend the life of the Victoria-class submarines into the mid-2030s as a bridge toward an eventual submarine replacement.
- Extend the life of the Kingston-class Coastal Defence Ships so as to retain much needed fleet capacity for domestic and continental security missions, especially when the RCN undergoes the transition from the modernized Halifax-class frigates

to the Canadian Surface Combatants from the mid-2020s through the mid-2030s; and

- Fund the recapitalization of the Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft, the Kingston-class coastal defence vessels and the Victoria-class submarines.

### Maritime Force Structure

Governments have repeatedly responded to international events by ordering a naval task group to deploy and contribute to international peace and security missions, while the fleet at home secured our sovereignty. Looking forward, a naval task group should consist of up to five combatants (surface and sub-surface), one combat support ship, and requisite maritime aircraft.

So that future Governments will continue to be able to make the meaningful contributions expected of Canada in times of tension, crises or war, the Naval Association of Canada believes it is in the national interest to acquire and maintain a modern, balanced, multi-purpose, flexible, combat-capable, maritime fleet consisting of, as a minimum:

- ♦ 16 surface combatants;
- ♦ 4 sub-surface combatants (i.e., submarines);
- ♦ 4 combat support ships (i.e., underway replenishment ships);
- ♦ 28 maritime helicopters;
- ♦ 16 maritime patrol aircraft;
- ♦ 12 coastal patrol ships, with mine countermeasures capabilities; and
- ♦ 6 Arctic and offshore patrol ships.

Such a force structure is predicated on numerous factors, including, but not limited to, the nature of the future security environment, which remains difficult to predict.

The NAC appreciates once again, the opportunity it was afforded by the Committee to contribute to this most important review of defence policy.

Yours aye

**Jim Carruthers**

President

Naval Association of Canada



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# Naval Association of Canada Conference Ottawa, Ontario, October 20th, 2016

By H. R. Smith

Ottawa Branch President and Conference Coordinator

 On Thursday, October 20th, 2016 in Ottawa, as part of the Naval Association of Canada Annual General Meeting and Board of Directors Elections and Meetings, the Ottawa Branch was pleased to host the NAC's Annual Conference. The theme this year was **"Recapitalizing the Fleets of the Government of Canada - What Next for Canada's Shipbuilding Strategy"** and the event was held in Ottawa's Westin Hotel.

Given such a timely and highly relevant topic, combined with a most prominent and eclectic group of speakers and panelists, the conference drew over 250 persons to an all-day event. Participants included the NAC membership from across Canada plus key leaders and staff of the Government of Canada, academia, defence and security industries. On the Government side, conference attendees hailed from all federal departments engaged in the shipbuilding file and strategy, as well as representatives of provincial and regional development agencies. Most prominent were representatives from the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Global Affairs, Innovation, Science and Economic Development, Public Services and Procurement (PSPC) and several parliamentarians and their staff. Interestingly, participating this year was a small contingent of naval cadets who were up to Ottawa from The Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston and included two United States Navy (USN) Midshipmen.

The Conference embraced three separate sessions with sub-themes and each included a moderated panel where questions were posed by the conference attendees. This format led to lively interaction and a wide examination of the challenges and opportunities inherent within Canada's Shipbuilding Strategy. Ideas and recommendations for moving forward were bold and innovative, and in no small way will help inform and influence the current debate surrounding Canada's new defence policy.

The conference owes a significant note of gratitude to the many corporate sponsors. As a Not-for-Profit entity, the Naval Association of Canada benefits from the outstanding support of these firms who through their generosity, help to defer the costs of organizing and staging a conference such

as was held this year.

Within the first session, focussing on the basis for investing in the recapitalization of Government Fleets, the conference heard from three speakers: Dr. Elinor Sloan of Carleton University, Dr. Darrell Bricker, the CEO of Ipsos Research, and Deputy Commissioner Jeffrey Hutchison the Director-General Strategy and Shipbuilding of the CCG. Elinor Sloan began with a detailed elaboration of the maritime security threats facing Canada resulting from the competition between major powers, lawlessness in the littorals and challenges to our Arctic interests. She was followed by Darrell Bricker who introduced and reinforced the dramatically changing Canadian demographic and the likely impact this will have on public perceptions of the RCN and the CCG. Canada's population is aging rapidly, particularly Atlantic Canada, where overall population decline is evident. This is being offset by successful immigration to Canada. However, this growth through immigration is concentrated primarily in urban areas and sees significant inflow from Pacific nations. He offered that increasingly, Canada is becoming a Pacific nation. Finally, DComm Hutchison addressed the current challenges faced by the CCG. He outlined an institution that is now engaged in explaining its need for more personnel and increased government funding given the challenges off all our coasts. DComm Hutchison also outlined the CCG's diplomatic role in engaging states, such as Russia, with soft power initiatives.

Session two dealt with the strategy by offering an historical view and reiterated the how and why the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) was created. The two speakers were Dr. Michael Hennessy of the Royal Military College of Canada and Mr. Tom Ring, the former Assistant Deputy Minister, Acquisitions in the then-Department of Public Works and Government Services.

Prof. Hennessy addressed Canada's shipbuilding history in an engrossing and highly relevant presentation. He stressed that the RCN had in the past, suffered politically damaging cost overruns as a result of either cutting steel before the design was established or as a result of frequent changes to the requirements. Tom Ring provided a briefing that was rich in insight on the NSS. He made it clear that the successful establishment of the East and West coast shipyards rested on a

highly committed team of officials and experts within industry and many different departments within Government working in sustained close collaboration. He offered that this degree of collaboration and emphasis on communications must continue for the NSS to succeed, and he strongly posited the need for a form of “relational contracting” to achieve this.

Over the lunch hour the conference was treated to a keynote address provided by Rear-Admiral (Ret’d) Pat Finn, the Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiel at DND, who covered the origins of the NSS, its current accomplishments and what was needed to ensure its sustainability. He stressed that in developing the NSS the requirement was not just for ships but rather to coordinate Navy and Coast Guard future demands in the most efficient and cost effective manner, and to develop and sustain a Canadian industrial capacity.

The final session looked to what is needed next with an examination as to what are the future projects, infrastructure changes and necessary investments. Four speakers participated in this session commencing with Vice-Admiral (Ret’d) USN Kevin McCoy, currently President of Irving Shipbuilding, Dr. Michael Byers of the University of British Columbia, RCN Captain Jason Boyd, the Director New Capability Introduction, and Dr. Dave Perry from Canadian Global Affairs Institute.

Kevin McCoy opened with a passionate brief that argued that Canada, by international measure, had only half the naval fleet required to fulfill its mandate and is currently facing some significant capability gaps. He argued that presently the NSS is an unqualified success, which is now building ships in the most modern shipyards in North America. Moreover, it was clear the shipyards would not have made investments of over \$500 million unless they had confidence in long-term work resulting from the NSS. He closed by advocating that there needs to be a deeper examination as to what Canada needs to ensure a sustainable strategy. Michael Byers mounted a sustained challenge on the current RCN subma-

rine fleet arguing that the principle of ‘sunk costs’ has prevented moving on to a more cost effective approach. While this view was disputed by others, his point that the RCN must start communicating more effectively on the need for submarine replacement now and in preparing itself for a vigorous public debate.

Captain Boyd spoke on the drive for innovation with the RCN. A large part of this was the extensive concept development and experimentation that has underlined and continues to shape the Navy’s future capability requirements. Dave Perry, in a wide-ranging and effective brief, covered the current political environment, the evolving Defence Policy Review, and what he thought lies ahead for the RCN. He argued that today there are indications that the Canadian economy may be approaching recession—potentially further limiting defence spending at a time when the DND capital plan had a \$57 billion demand but only previews \$17 billion in available funding. Dave Perry was encouraged, however, by the fact the current government has taken ownership of the NSS and is initiating steps to keep projects on schedule.

The conference concluded with a summation provided by Commodore (Ret’d) Dr. Eric Lerhe who adeptly pondered the many views offered over the course of the day, emphasized that continuing success is predicated on effective internal and external communications with all Canadians, and by offering that new and compelling arguments will be necessary to ensure that the degree of investment and funding support can be maintained.

The established aim of the conference was to inform and stimulate conference attendees to consider the basis for recapitalization of Canadian Government Fleets, what comprises an appropriate investment, and which elements need to be changed or reinforced. In each of these areas, the conference succeeded in enhancing everyone’s knowledge and expanding their minds to consider how this strategy should best proceed.



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# Schober's Quiz #73

By George S. Schober | NAC-Victoria

The naval history of the Second World War proved conclusively that the era of the battleship as the principal arbiter of naval warfare was over. Henceforth, except on rare occasions, the main role of battleships was to protect aircraft carriers, whose aircraft constituted the offensive—or defensive— power of the Fleet.

Question: Name the first six battleships sunk by air attack.

Answer on page 43.

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## The mail bag

Letters to the editor...



### Front cover photograph, HMCS *Ontario*, Summer 2016, No. 75 issue of *Starshell* -- MIDSHIPMEN'S HI-JINKS

The photo on the cover of the Summer 2016 edition of *Starshell* brought back memories of my three brief periods under training aboard the "Big O", once as a Cadet, again as a Midshipman and finally as a Sub-Lieutenant. The most memorable occurred in the summer of 1948 as a Mid when I was joined in *Ontario*'s gunroom by all of my RCNC term mates (class 1945-47) who were either attending university in Canada as I was, or attending sub's courses in the UK with the RN. As a result, the gunroom where we lived, took our meals and slung our hammocks in the gunroom flats, was a very lively place. Having honed our skills as cadets in the fine art of practical jokes at the expense of those in authority, they were put to the test on the occasion of a visit to Esquimalt of the Royal Navy cruiser, HMS *Sheffield*, carrying the Commander-in-Chief of the America and West Indies Station, Vice-Admiral Sir William Tennant. This was probably his farewell cruise for he retired shortly thereafter as a full Admiral at the end of a memorable career including as Captain of the battle cruiser, HMS *Repulse*, surviving her sinking by the Japanese.

The *Sheffield* was berthed nearby and provided an irresistible target for a 'traditional' midshipman's raid. In the dead of night a group from the gunroom managed to sneak on board, make it

undetected up to the flag deck, lower the Admiral's flag and bring it back to *Ontario*. There it was quickly hidden away, all hands back in their hammocks, lights out and not a sound to be heard. But not for long. Very soon the lights came on, we were roused from our 'sleep' by *Ontario*'s OOD, accompanied by a more than somewhat indignant delegation from *Sheffield* and summarily told to hand over the Admiral's flag. When we all pleaded total ignorance of the whole affair we were ordered back to our 'micks' and threatened with dire consequences on the morrow. However, *Sheffield* sailed the next day with a replacement flag flying and not much could be done in the face of our claim of complete innocence.

There is, however, a sequel to the story. It being the weekend, I took leave and, together with a couple of my fellow shipmates, headed for Vancouver to spend it at home with my parents. On discovering that *Sheffield* was now alongside in Vancouver, we could not resist rubbing salt in the wound with a telephone call to the ship. Passing ourselves off as representing the Straits Towing and Salvage Company, a well-known outfit on the west coast, we advised the Officer-of-the-Day that one of the company's tug boats had picked up a strange flag bearing a red cross with a large red ball in one corner, the symbols of an Admiral's flag. We gave them the company's office address and were assured that the Flag Lieutenant to the Admiral would come right down to pick it up. I have often wondered what kind of a reception he got.

We didn't hear a further word from our Captain about this little caper and the Wardroom was clearly pleased with the initiative shown by the Gunroom. Nor was there any follow-up from *Sheffield*. I'm sure the Admiral had had plenty of experience with the hi-jinks of midshipmen and took it all in good spirit. His flag graced our gunroom table on party nights but I have no idea what became of it after we all went our separate ways. Who knows—it may still be someone's treasured souvenir of those carefree days.

That was also the summer in which I acquired my first car—at least a 10% interest in the car. Ten of us in the gunroom bought a 1924 McLaughlin Buick for the grand sum of \$100 or \$10 apiece. It was a huge 'tourer,' in which the whole roof folded back and came complete with wooden spoked wheels, leather upholstery and a bar built into the back of the front seat. It also suffered from certain handling idiosyncrasies, chief of which was that when cornering it tended to list to the point where the fenders contacted the tires.

We soon learned how to correct for this by the driver calling out "port" or "starboard" as he entered a corner at which all passengers were obliged to lean to the appropriate side in order to keep the vehicle on an even keel. This together with poor brakes, kept the driver on his mettle. We were able to scavenge sufficient paint from ship's stores to give it a stunning cruiser light blue-grey finish with fire engine red wheel spokes and black trim. Needless to say, we created quite a splash—when attending the wedding of one of the ship's officers, with all ten of us midshipmen in the car in full uniform—three in the front seat, four in the rear seat and three perched high on the back of the rear seat, all leaning in unison on command as we took the corners. The local Victoria police were so astonished, and I suppose tolerant of young naval officers in those days, that they gave us no bother. I doubt if it would be the same in this age of compulsory seat belts. Regrettably, this fine old car was wrecked when we loaned it to a friend when *Ontario* sailed. My overall recollection of that summer is of a totally carefree existence only an unattached, young midshipman with no real responsibilities can experience. Not long after returning to UBC in the fall,

my promotion to the dizzy heights of Acting Sub-Lieutenant came through and with it a considerable increase in pay. But the real change was the removal of the midshipman's white collar tabs and their replacement with the first gold stripe on the uniform sleeve. Life was never so carefree again.

Although not related to *Ontario*, but still on the subject of Midshipmen's high-jinks, the most daring that I am aware of was also perpetrated by the RCNC class of 1945-47, this time in the UK and involving a battleship. At the end of a long career, HMS *Nelson* was by this time reduced to a training role and soon to be sold for demolition. The group of Canadian midshipmen, while attending sub's courses, managed to get on board undetected and one of them (George 'Feezer' Emerson?) climbed onto a 16-inch turret and shinnied out to the end of a very long barrel. Once there, and thoughtfully equipped with screwdriver and rope, he was able to separate the massive solid brass tampion cover from its parent tampion and lower it to his mates waiting on the deck below. There it was strapped to the back of the biggest and strongest (Dave 'Creeper' Steele?), covered with his burberry and smuggled undetected off the ship. I never did hear if there were any repercussions arising from the acquisition of this trophy but it was ultimately brought back to Canada and was highly valued by the class of 1945-47. It was a beautiful work of art—a solid and very heavy brass disc 16-inches in diameter bearing an equally solid brass bas-relief of Admiral Nelson. I last saw it in the late 1960s when I was commander of the Naval Technical School in Esquimalt. At that time it was in the care of my term mate, Steve 'Si' Ker, then living in Victoria, from whom I borrowed it and, as a challenging project at the school (!), had a mould made and a duplicate cast of the Nelson bas-relief. As I write, it occupies a place of honour in my home in Chelsea, Québec, almost 70 years after the events I have described. There must be somebody out there who knows the whereabouts, or the fate, of Admiral Tennant's flag and HMS *Nelson*'s tampion cover. I would love to hear from them...

**J. G. R. (Rod) Hutcheson, Captain(L) RCN (Ret'd).**



## The briefing room

All that's news and then some...



### Mark your calendars now for St. John's, Nfld.

The Newfoundland and Labrador Branch of the Naval Association of Canada has offered to host the **2017 NAC Annual Meeting** in St. John's, Nfld. This event will take place from October 20th to 22nd, 2017 in conjunction with events celebrating the 75<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Crow's Nest Officers' Club. A program that includes the NAC AGM and

Board meeting together with joint NAC/Crow's Nest activities supported by CFS St. John's and HMCS *Cabot* with the ambience of old St. John's, should make for an interesting gathering.

Some members may recall that the NL Branch first hosted the National Annual Meeting in 1992. This meeting was notable for the large number of delegates who also helped celebrate the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Crow's

Nest. The NL Branch also hosted in 1997 on the 500<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the discovery of Newfoundland by John Cabot.

Next year will see Canada celebrate its 150<sup>th</sup> Anniversary and this will give NAC and all segments of the Royal Canadian Navy the opportunity to promote naval history and the important role our maritime forces play in maintaining national security.

Further details about the 2017 meeting will be communicated as they become known. If you plan to attend or need further information, please do not hesitate to contact Ed Williams at [edgarwilliams@nl.rogers.com](mailto:edgarwilliams@nl.rogers.com)

## Remembering & Supporting HMCS Sackville



**H**alifax – the volunteer **Canadian Naval Memorial Trust** that maintains and operates the iconic WWII Flower-class corvette, HMCS *Sackville*, is one naval support organization that ably demonstrates that family ties and remembrance run deep in the naval community.

The Trust's mission is to preserve **Canada's Naval Memorial** in perpetuity to ensure that future generations of Canadians can have a tangible link to the significant achievements of the Royal Canadian Navy. In this regard the Trust relies on new members (Trustees) and donor contributions to support ship operations and numerous naval and community events. Plans call for the 75 year old veteran of the Battle of the Atlantic to be housed in the innovative, architecturally-striking **Battle of the Atlantic Place** on the historic Halifax waterfront.

The current 1,000 plus membership represents a cross-section of Canadian society and includes annual and life members. It is the latter category that has generated considerable interest among annual members who wish to 'upgrade' and those considering joining the Trust. In many cases, it's a family connection with HMCS *Sackville* and other naval ships

and establishments that is a primary reason for becoming a 'lifer.'

Meredith Westlake of Ottawa, who comes from a naval family, is representative of annual members who have become life members. Her father, the late-Lieutenant Commander Murray Knowles, served during the Battle of the Atlantic including commanding the corvette HMCS *Louisbourg*, and was an early supporter of the CNMT and restoration of *Sackville*. Following her father's passing, Meredith acquired his Trust membership number and joined her brother Stephen Knowles and husband Commander (Ret'd) John Westlake in continuing LCdr Knowles' support of the Trust and ship.

Capt(N) John Pickford (Ret'd) of Hammonds Plains, NS, held a number of appointments during his career including Commanding Officer of HMCS *Athabaskan*, flagship of Canada's Naval Task Force contributing to the UN coalition to liberate Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991, and project manager of Canada's Naval Centennial. He became a Life Member on assuming the life membership of his father, the late Rear Admiral R. J. (Jack) Pickford of Ottawa who commanded the corvette HMCS *Rimouski* (1942-43) as a young lieutenant and would go on to serve as Deputy Maritime Commander and Commander Maritime Forces Pacific.

"When I'm aboard *Sackville*, I think of my father and all those who served in corvettes during the Battle of the Atlantic and the hardships they endured but also the success they achieved in the most trying conditions. It's an honour to assume his Life Membership number," he explains.

Commander Richard Oland of Halifax, another life member, served as commanding officer of HMCS *Goose Bay* and HMCS *Scotian*. He comes from a family with a lengthy record of military service including his late great uncle Captain(N) J. E. W. (Eric) Oland who served as Naval-Officer-in-Charge Saint John, NB, during WWII and commissioned *Sackville* in Saint John in 1941 and his father, the late Commodore Bruce Oland, who served as commanding officer of HMCS *Scotian* and Senior Naval Reserve Advisor.

Not all Life Members are advanced in years and careers, but have abiding interest in HMCS *Sackville* and Canada's rich naval heritage. David Harrison of Halifax, whose grandfather the late-William Thomas Harrison served in the minesweeper HMCS *Georgian* 1944-45, says he grew up in a household where history was a popular topic.

David, in his 20s and active in a reenactment group said, "...after meeting with CNMT Executive Director Doug Thomas and *Sackville*'s captain Jim Ready on New Year's Day 2014, I decided to become a life member to preserve my grandfather's memory and to support *Sackville* by volunteering

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Continued on page 26

# National Award Recipients

## The Naval Association of Canada Conference

### Ottawa, Ontario, October 20th, 2016



Murray Bialek, Calgary Branch  
Silver Medallion



Bill Dziadyk, Ottawa Branch  
Silver Medallion



Richard Guitar, Ottawa Branch  
Silver Medallion



Bill Conconi, Vancouver Is. Branch  
Bronze Medallion



David Soule, Ottawa Branch  
Bronze Medallion



Paul Baiden, Ottawa Branch  
Bronze Medallion



Keynote speaker, RAdm (Ret'd) Pat Finn addressing the Conference.



A view of some of the NAC Conference audience enthralled by the conference speakers.



The Deputy Commander of the RCN, RAdm Gilles Couturier posing with the NAC National President Capt(N) (Ret'd) Jim Carruthers, RAdm (Ret'd) Ed Healey, Lt(N) Joseph Stewart (RMC Escort Officer) and Cadets of the Royal Military College.



LEFT: Senator Colin Kenny, Commodore (retired) Daniel Sing, conference Master of Ceremonies, Dr. Elinor Sloan, and Vice-Admiral (retired) Drew Robertson, former Commander RCN, in conversation during a break at the NAC Conference.

## The Naval Association Ottawa, Ontario





ed with RADm Art McDonald, MARPAC and Comd. JTF Pacific, posing a question to the Session Two panel.



NAC National President Captain(N) (Ret'd) Jim Carruthers closing the 2016 NAC National Conference.

# tion of Canada Conference rio, October 20th, 2016



Fraser McKee of Toronto Branch posing a question to Panel One while an RMC cadet waits his turn as next in the breach.



Dr. Gord Fleming moderating questions received by Panel One with DComm Hutchison, Dr. Darrell Bricker and Dr. Elinor Sloan.

## "The Briefing Room" continued from page 22...

as a guide. It's been a great experience and helped me to improve my RCN living history background."

Commander (Ret'd) Patrick Charlton, co-chair of CNMT's membership committee says "the Trust has been able to operate for more than 30 years due to the generosity and financial support of trustees and others from across the country and the corporate community. For many, it is a deeply personal remembrance that motivates them to have a connection with the Trust and to maintain HMCS *Sackville* as the Canada's Naval Memorial."

Remembrance and support can take several forms including a memorial membership to honour a relative who has passed away, including memberships for children and grandchildren in memory of a deceased family member. A Life Membership is available for a one-time donation of \$1,000, while an annual membership requires a yearly contribution of \$75.00. An *In Memoriam* donation honours the life of someone special with their name placed in HMCS *Sackville*'s **Book of Remembrance**. In addition there are a number of Donor categories (covering individuals, military units, civilian groups or companies) with appropriate recognition. For more information check out: [membership@canadasnavalmemorial.ca](mailto:membership@canadasnavalmemorial.ca) or contact: [execdir@canadasnavalmemorial.ca](mailto:execdir@canadasnavalmemorial.ca) telephone (902) 721-1206.

## Correction to NAC Endowment Fund Update

Please see page 39 of the Summer edition of *Starshell* and specifically the "NAC Endowment Fund Update." The donation shown as "HMCS Bytown Officers Mess" should have read NAC Ottawa Branch. The Mess was incorrectly shown as the recipient.

The Starshell Editor

## Battle of the Atlantic 'Loonie'



The Royal Canadian Mint unveiled on October 20th aboard HMCS *Sackville* a new 'Loonie' commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic. They can be ordered on line by going to the Mint's website at [Mint.ca](http://Mint.ca)

## CFAV *Quest* to be "divested"



CFAV *Quest*

By David Pugliese, OTTAWA CITIZEN – September 2, 2016:

The Canadian Navy's last research vessel, CFAV *Quest*, an oceanographic research vessel, will be decommissioned, leaving the country's defence scientists without their own ship to conduct research in the Arctic and other locations, according to documents leaked to *Postmedia*.

The Canadian Forces Auxiliary Vessel *Quest*, an oceanographic research ship used by the Navy and Defence Research and Development Canada, was sidelined in 2014 as a result of cost-cutting measures by the Conservative government.

But on Friday afternoon an internal Department of National Defence email announced that the ship was being decommissioned. In the email, CFB Halifax commander Capt(N) Chris Sutherland confirmed he had received a letter from the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, VAdm Mark Norman, about the fate of the ship. "I am now able to share with you the decision from the VCDS that CFAV *Quest* will be divested," Sutherland wrote. A disposal plan will be developed but Sutherland's message did not contain details on the timing of that process.

The ship has a 55-member civilian crew which includes defence scientists. John MacLennan, national president of the Union of National Defence Employees, said his organization has been trying for two years to get an answer from the Canadian military and the DND about the future of the ship. "They've refused to tell us anything and then on a Friday afternoon, just before the long weekend, they spring this on their employees," said MacLennan. "It's par for the course

on the way DND treats its workers."

The ship has conducted valuable research in the Arctic and in testing sonar and other specialized equipment as well as contributing to NATO testing, said MacLennan, whose union represents some of the crew.

The ship was commissioned in 1969 but underwent an upgrade in 1999. In a 2012 article in the *Canadian Naval Review*, Mark Tunnicliffe, a retired navy officer, noted the vessel has a mandate of not only contributing to acoustic systems development, but an "entire range of technologies and concepts needed to support the requirement specifications for the next generation of Canadian warships."

During a 2012 Arctic mission for instance, the vessel supported testing for unmanned air, surface and subsurface vehicles and an experimental Arctic surveillance system, Tuinnicliffe wrote.

Sutherland said in his email message that he wants to meet next week with union representatives as well as hold a town hall with

the crew of CFAV Quest. "We are committed to working with them and supporting them through this transition," he wrote Friday. "My biggest concern is for the crew's welfare, and I believe we need to work together to monitor the health of the workforce and ensure individuals received the support that they need."

MacLennan said Vice-Admiral Norman was at meetings when he asked about the fate of the ship and how the military planned to do the research job in the future. At one point he was told by Norman's staff that the Canadian researchers could install their equipment on board US vessels.

"The navy procrastinated and then they mismanaged the situation," said MacLennan. "I don't think they have a plan B on how to fill this capability gap."

MacLennan said for the last two years, the crew has been taking care of the ship, painting it and doing other minor jobs.



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## This will have to do!

The serialized naval memoirs of the late RAdm Robert Philip 'Bob' Welland DSC & Bar, MiD, psc, Officer of the Legion of Merit (USA), RCN.

### Part 13 ~ A fond farewell to 'old bones!'

**Part 13** finds the author in command of HMCS Assiniboine as a member of group EG.12, patrolling with HMCS Restigouche and other Canadian destroyers in the English Channel post-D Day. On what the author described as a "...calm sunny day in September 1944, Restigouche came up with a highly suspicious echo which had every appearance of a U-boat; one that had possibly been attacking ships in the Channel post-invasion. The offending submarine was sitting on the bottom at 246 feet. As Restigouche was six months senior to him, commanded by Dave Groos who he knew well, she began the attack while Welland stood off and held onto the contact.

This was a smart tactic; if the submarine decided to attack my ship, Dave would detect it moving before I would. I spoke with Chris Smith my XO, explaining that I wanted him to take charge of the quarterdeck and control the release of the depth charges. I told him to prepare to fire up to twenty, at ten second intervals, all set to explode at 500 feet, and to stay on the phone for firing instructions. (If the charges were set at 500 feet they would sink to the bottom, at 246 feet, and not explode for about three minutes. This would prevent them counter-mining each other before those descending reached the submarine. It would also let us get further away, in the event they all counter-mined. I was pleased with my innovative scheme.)

I approached the submarine steering up-tide at 12 knots; the Asdic operator held the target easily, my target was good. As we passed over the U-boat, the echo-sounder again traced out its shape. Gordie Welch, the navigator,


counted down with a stop watch. When he reached zero I said over the phone to Smith, "Fire one, and keep on firing."

Smith had eight depth-charges flung from the throwers and sixteen released from the rails before I told him to stop. We had 8,000 pounds of TNT in the water.

Then the charges began cooking-off, powerful thumps that rattled the ship over her length. Then there came an almighty "...whoomph!" Water deluged the bridge, the ship whipped and knocked us off our feet. Black smoke poured from the funnels, then silence. We were stopped. Water drained out the bridge scuppers, tinkling to the deck below, it was that quiet. All power was off the instruments, no alarm bells rang. Then a sound-powered telephone rang, the phone that someone had invented for just this occasion. I picked it off its hook, "Engineroom here, main steam line broken." It was Pat Patterson, the engineering officer talking. "It'll take awhile to fix it ... nobody's hurt." He gave a chuckle and hung up.

Restigouche, who was half a mile away flashed: "You look bad. Coming alongside." Then Dave sent another message, "We are still holding the submarine on our Asdic, he has not moved." I had assumed we had been torpedoed and was expecting the ship to begin heeling. It didn't.

An hour later, Pat Patterson and his engine room crew had power on both turbines, one generator was running, the bilge pumps were working. Our ship was coming to life. Soon we could use the engines but couldn't steer; the main steering motor that turned the rudder was off its mounting, its complex gearing in bits. Beside it lay the emergency motor in even worse shape, it had caught fire. The rudder was



The battleship HMS *Warspite*, 1944 off Normandy firing her forward battery.

Maritime Quest

jammed 15 degrees over which made steering with the engines out of the question. In another hour, Patterson and his engineers had it amidships; they had forced it using a dozen chain-blocks.

A few hours later I brought *Assiniboine* into Portsmouth Harbour and alongside, using only the engines. It would have been too easy to ask for a tug! I had Chief Mackie flash a message to the Harbour Master: *"Regret our slovenly appearance, but we have been blown up!"* All four yardarms on the mainmast had broken and hung down trailing a tangle of antenna wires.

The Portsmouth operational-command grilled me thoroughly. The next day they sent a mine-hunting ship equipped with advanced echo-sounders to our 'wreck.' The end result was that it was a submarine; it had been sunk a day before by an aircraft that could not confirm a kill. And the explosion that rocked us was caused by our depth charges counter-mining the load of torpedoes in the submarine. They reached that conclusion because the whole bow section had been torn away. I was not congratulated for blowing ourselves up, but we did get a week off before going back to the Brest patrol! It would have been nice to play golf during this little holiday but nobody played golf in England or Scotland anymore. As I described earlier, all the courses had been converted to grain fields or vegetable gardens and had telephone poles erected along the fairways to discourage

German aircraft from landing. But at this time the fear of invasion that had dominated everyone's thoughts in 1940 and 1941, had gone. At last we were winning. The rationing of food was being eased; once a month the people could have an orange and just maybe a banana. They had been four years without such imports.

Our armies had fought their way free of the beaches in Normandy and were advancing through France ... it was the autumn of 1944. A British and Canadian force had reached inland toward Brest and were engaged in violent tank and infantry warfare. To add to their troubles, they got into the range of the Lochrist 11-inch gun-battery. The high command decided to knock out Lochrist. The means were to be 500 bombers and the

battleship HMS *Warspite*. Five destroyers were chosen to guard *Warspite* from submarine and air attack. *Assiniboine* was one of them, the others were British. The whole thing was to be accomplished in one day, the 25th of August 1944.

*Warspite* glided out of Portsmouth at 0300; we destroyers had gone a bit earlier and had 'pinged' around the entrance for U-boats. Soon we were steering for the Brest peninsula. Just after it had got light, with us zig-zagging at 22 knots two miles off *Warspite's* starboard bow, a signalman yelled *"Periscope Astern!"* He pointed at it. I saw it, half a dozen people saw it, and saw it disappear. It was about 500 yards away. I gave a heap of orders, including: *"Port 30, 240 Revs, Standby depth charges. Tell Warspite submarine sighted and turn away."*


I slewed the ship toward where I guessed the U-boat would now be; I told the sailor manning the phone to tell the depth charge crew to *"Set pattern E."* *"All 14 charges to 100 feet"*. He did it. I was steering to the point where I guessed the submarine would be when we arrived at that unmarked spot in the ocean. Maybe the Asdic crew would get contact to remove the guess work. They did not. As we approached the moment I said to the phone-man, *"Tell depth charge to stand by;"* the phone man did it.

*"Fire,"* I said. The phone man just stared at me, he was frozen. He made not a sound. The ship was racing on. Chief Yeoman Mackie leapt across the bridge, he flew like Peter

Pan. He grabbed the phone, "Fire" he yelled.

The depth charges flew from the throwers, the sea erupted in great columns of black spray. I took off some revs to give the Asdic a chance. This was a submarine we could get, and quickly. The Chief Yeoman interrupted my quest. "*Warspite orders you to rejoin immediately.*" I never did like battleships. I knew I had to abandon that submarine, and without delay.

If that phone-man had not frozen would we have nailed the submarine? I still think about it. I remember his name too.



## BOMBARD LOCHRIST

**W**arspite eased her 30,000 tons toward the coast and dropped an anchor half a mile off the rocky shore; she was 34,000 yards, 16 miles, from Lochrist Battery. We destroyers pinged for submarines and had all guns ready for an air attack. We avoided getting between the 'flat-iron's' 15-inch guns and her target! Six Spitfire and Tempest fighters patrolled overhead.

*Warspite* opened fire without delay. First she fired ranging shots; they took forever to land. Each threw up a column of dust and smoke. Then she got to it with all eight guns firing together. It was my first ring-side seat of a battle-wagon doing what it did best, belch clouds of orange flame and yellow smoke. The 3,000-pound shells could easily be seen mounting into the sky and disappearing. Before those landed, another salvo followed, and another. No thunder could ever approach the horrendous noise. The recoil of the guns rocked the big ship. The site of the German battery became a cloud of dust with flashes embedded as the shells exploded. *Warspite* fired 400 rounds, 600 tons of ammunition.

"Take station, speed 22," signalled the battleship. The assault was over. We were on her side closest to the shore when a high-pitched scream startled me. A moment later, *Warspite* was deluged with water, then came the sharp crack of exploding heavy ammunition. I looked toward the Lochrist battery; four puffs of orange smoke were clearly visible. "Let's get out of here," said Gordie Welch.

The battleship had not hurt Lochrist. Mission not accomplished. Sadly, one German shell hit *Warspite* killing the chief engineer and five sailors. 500 bombers had not been

HMCS *Assiniboine*, making chemical and funnel smoke to shield *Warspite* from Lochrist's 11-inch guns. Photo of the author's ship was taken from *Warspite*.

Author's collection.

able to defeat the German battery, nor had the battleship.

It turned out that there was another way to skin the Lochrist cat. A few days after the 500 bombers and battleship had failed, six British Royal Marines blew up Lochrist. A submarine put them ashore; they carried cans of explosive-mix through sixteen miles of enemy territory to the very parapet of the battery. They poured it down the shaft and set the fuse. They were 'all clear' as Lochrist blew up in a fearful explosion. And all six made it back to the submarine and to England!

I was particularly interested in Lochrist as my young brother, Doug, was fighting his tank through France toward Germany.

Following that operation our destroyer group was taken off the Brest patrol and sent to Iceland. The Germans had begun moving the U-boats back into the North Atlantic; they were suffering disastrous losses in the Channel without achieving much. We were four ships and our job was to deliberately hunt-down submarines, not escort convoys. I welcomed the change; the pressure of operating inshore was getting a bit exhausting, mainly through not having enough sleep.

We arrived at Reykjavik in late October; the winter storms were beginning, the days had already got shorter and the winter darkness coming. We fuelled and were about to set out on the first hunt, but the bottom fell out of the barometer. Our group commander, 'Chummy' Prentice, decided to wait out the approaching storm in the shelter of the harbour.



HMCS *Skeena* dragged ashore in Reykjavik harbour. She was scrapped.  
 Author's Collection

That night the wind began to blow, reaching 60 knots, with the barometer still falling. Reykjavik is a poor anchorage; it faces the west wind, it is shallow and the holding-ground is poor, anchors drag. Prentice sent a message to us captains saying: 'Act independently.' This was a good old naval practice; it gave each captain freedom and cleared the air; act independently until you are told otherwise.

There were a dozen merchant ships and warships anchored in the confined harbour. I was afraid of someone dragging into us, as well as dragging ourselves. The wind continued to increase, the barometer kept plunging. When the gusts reached 80 knots around ten that night, I decided to head for the open ocean. Chris Smith was my XO. I told him to get both anchors up and that I'd be on the bridge with the engines ready. Chris phoned me through the gale and slashing rain; one anchor had come up with a heavy steel hawser hooked into it. On the phone, in the roaring wind, Smith said he could buoy the anchor, separate the cable, and leave the anchor there. That bit of seamanship was difficult enough in broad daylight and no wind. But Chris Smith was big and tough and cadet-trained from the time he was eighteen. I believed him and it was a good solution. I could hold the ship with the engines to take any strain off the anchor cables.

Smith managed to do what he said he would do, he left both anchors on the bottom of the harbour with a buoy marking each one. I clawed past the break-water and out the harbour entrance. The wind was gusting to 90 knots, the rain felt like shotgun pellets, the night was dark as stink.

In a few minutes we lifted to the Atlantic swells; I added revs to get steering-control. We were safe in the big ocean. An even safer and far less violent spot was a few miles south

in a sheltered fjord. I guided her between the towering mountains and into the calm. I had a good night's rest while the watch-keeping officers cruised to and fro in the fjord. At dawn the wind had abated and I returned to Reykjavik. It was October 30th, 1944.

I was shocked to see our destroyer *Skeena* lying on her side on a rocky beach with waves pounding over her. Sixteen had drowned while trying to get ashore onto a rocky island.

Commander Prentice ordered Pat Nixon, captain of *Chaudière* and I to conduct a Board of Inquiry. Our findings would decide whether there would be a court-martial and if so, on whom. We got to it within the hour.

The survivors from *Skeena* were put into a local army barracks to await transport to Halifax. A British army chaplain conducted a burial service for our sixteen comrades. This was a sad end to a splendid ship that had been in the war for five

years.'

Nixon and I conducted our inquiry, calling over thirty witnesses. We recommended court-martial action against two officers. That took place in Halifax a few weeks later. The captain, Pat Russell and the XO, Bill Kidd were judged to have been negligent and punished.

This tragic affair added fuel to a long-running and fractious argument the destroyer captains had between themselves. The disagreements usually came alive in out-of-the-way places as we lay-over waiting for the next operation. I remember contributing my opinionated views in the Faeroe Islands, in Scapa Floe, and at Polyarno in Russia. Those were places where there was nothing to do ashore except hike. The arguments concerned the personal conduct of the captain. If one wanted to get the discussion going a sure-fire question was: "Which of those present is likely to lose his ship because of his personal behaviour? It was the opinion of some of us that two ships of our Group, over a period of three years, had been lost because of the behaviour of the captains. They had died in the Atlantic with 90 of their crew.

Some of us were prepared to take bets (when the arguments became hot) on those present most likely to take a lethal fall. Sample assertion; made late-at-night after playing poker, six captains present. "I stay up all night and sleep in the daytime. I do it to keep the watchkeepers alert. Who dares slack-off when I'm prowling about?" Dave Groos, captain of *Restigouche* and I were inflexible about this. So was Pat Nixon, captain of *Chaudière*. Not everybody was; "Absolute crap; how can you expect your officers to be responsible if the captain is breathing down their necks, not trusting them? Sleep when you're designed to ... at night."

Sleep was not the only subject; the captain had a day cabin near the stern, far removed from the bridge operations. Assertion: *"I never go aft once we're at sea, I live in the bridge hut, my steward feeds me, I never have my clothes off."* Dave Groos, Bill Willson and I were inflexible on this. If anything happened the captain should be instantly ready, not taking a bath or a meal a hundred yards away and three decks down. This was not unanimous: *"Complete bull: what kind of life was that, never washing for two weeks, eating out of your hands. You have qualified watchkeepers, trust them!"* On the subject of crew readiness, me talking, *"I go to action stations twice a day, at dawn and at six in the evening, I test a gun, fire a depth charge, that toughens the electrics."* That opinion was not shared by all. *"It's hard enough for the crew to get enough rest, so why stir them up twice a day, rehearsing things they know backwards; you just piss them off."*

At the end of the war after years of fighting U-boats and aeroplanes, dodging shore batteries, avoiding collisions with one's own ships on dark nights, surviving the storms and ice, and judging the holding-ground in anchorages, I knew which of us had the right ideas. The destroyers commanded by Nixon, the two Groos brothers, Bill Willson, Prentice and I,

never lost a man or a fight. Some captains didn't want to hear this 'personal conduct' stuff. "If the Navy wants us to behave like that, let them make regulations" Most of us who got command had come a long way since 1940, when the German bomber jumped the *St. Laurent* and not a shot was fired. Others had not and were no longer around, nor were their crews.

Following the loss of *Skeena* our Group hounded the U-boats off Iceland for two weeks; we rendered their operations against the convoys useless. Times had changed; we were on the offensive, hunting them down in the open ocean. If they approached a convoy their odds of being sunk as about 50 percent!

Then we went to Londonderry for a rest. I was looking forward to getting the train to Dublin to visit a real city where the street lights were still on, the pubs never closed, and live-theatre performed at the famous 'Abbey.'

My plans were dashed. Mr. McLeod in London sent a message: I was to report to him in London. I had been appointed captain of the destroyer *Haida*, and was to fly to Canada.

**TO BE CONTINUED**



My station on the bridge.  
Never get ten steps away, eat  
out of your hands, sleep in  
your clothes. Party ashore!

Author's Collection

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
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
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
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
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# Bill's Corner

By Bill Clearihue | NAC Toronto



## Drake's Legacy...



In 2008, 'Forbes Magazine' came out with their list of the "20 Top-Earning Pirates of all Time." Sir Frances Drake (1540-1596) was No. 2 on that list with lifetime earnings of US \$115 million in 2008 dollars. He was edged out by "Black Sam" Bellamy at \$120 million. Eighteen of the twenty pirates listed were British and most were technically 'Privateers,' or legal pirates, although virtually all, including Drake, did a lot of freelancing as well.

If Forbes had taken into account his time off for more honourable pursuits, Drake would certainly have topped the list.

A global circumnavigation in THE GOLDEN HINDE (1577 to 1580) and the defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588) did not cut into Drake's earnings, although he made money on those occasions as well. During his stints ashore he was also a Mayor of Plymouth (1581) and MP for Plymouth (1593).

He was the only one on the List to be Knighted (1581) and the only one to reach Flag Rank (Vice-Admiral 1588) in the Elizabethan Navy.

A full-size working replica of THE GOLDEN HINDE has pride of place on the south bank of The Thames in downtown London. That replica was launched in 1973 and made a number of transatlantic trips, notably to San Francisco and Vancouver. She has been moored at her present location since 1996.

You can also see The Golden Hind on Vancouver Island, not in the form of a ship but as the mountain (49° 39' 45"N, 125° 44' 49"W) of the same name. It is fittingly the tallest peak on the Island at 7,102 ft. and near the Island's geographic centre. It was named as such in 1939 in recognition that Drake may well have made a landfall on, or at least sighted the island in 1579, 360 years earlier. The timing of the naming was coin-

cident with King George VI's visit to Victoria on May 30, 1939.

Drake is inexorably linked to Queen Elizabeth I, who sponsored or was a shareholder in all his major adventures. Mount Sir Francis Drake (50° 47' 29"N, 124° 47' 09"W, 8,875 ft.) on the BC mainland, was named in 1935. Nearby is Mt. Queen Bess (51° 16' 17"N, 124° 34' 05"W - 10,820 ft) also named in 1935.


Walter Raleigh, Martin Frobisher and John Davis were three of Drake's closest comrades-in-arms, serving with him on both sides of the Atlantic.

They are also commemorated in North America by the City of Raleigh, North Carolina, Frobisher Bay, the town having been renamed Iqaluit in 1987, and of course Davis Strait and Inlet. They also had piratical careers, but did not make the Forbes Top 20 List.

The most famous Drake legacy is probably Drake Passage, which separates South America from Antarctica and connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The current HMS DRAKE is a shore establishment that now includes all the RN facilities including the dockyard at Devonport, Plymouth, which was Drake's home base for virtually all of his career.

When James Cook landed in Nootka Sound two centuries after Drake's visit to the neighborhood, his ship, the RESOLUTION had been originally named DRAKE. The name was changed so as not to offend Spain during Cook's 2nd and 3rd voyages.

RCSCC DRAKE in Oshawa, Ontario, has been extant since 1931, predating the name of the mountains in BC. The Corps Badge is the same as that of the current HMS DRAKE. Its main device is the Red Wyvern, long associated with the Drake's of Devon.



## The French Navy in World War II

By: RAdm Paul Auphan & Jacques Mordal

US Naval Institute Press (2016) <http://www.nip.org>,  
456 pages, paperback, 45 illustrations, 34 b/w photos,  
11 maps US\$27.95 (USNI member discount), Special  
Holiday 2016 price US\$13.98. ISBN-10 159114560,  
ISBN-13 9781591145660.

### A Starshell Review by Gordon Forbes

When this book was first being considered for review, someone made the comment that it must be a very short book. In my mind, this reflects a mindset of most of us who have been brought up on the history of the war from the British and US points of view. We tend to know nothing of the French Navy's history except for the British bombardment of the French ships at Mers-el-Kabir during WWII and perhaps the scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon. But that is far from the whole story. This book certainly filled in a lot of World War II naval history for me.

At the beginning of the war, France had the fourth largest navy in the world including seven battleships plus two more under construction. The French and British navies had a close working relationship. They had agreed to divide responsibility in the Mediterranean with the British in the east and the French in the west close to the French territories in North Africa. In addition, the French Navy cooperated in convoy escort duties with the British. In fact, the first troop convoy of a Canadian Army division from Halifax and Britain was escorted by the French battleship *Dunkerque* in early 1940. The French also played a significant role in the Norway campaign, losing several warships in the process. In addition to their role in the European war, the French had a number of colonies around the world to protect and supply.

All that, of course, changed at the end of June 1940 when the armistice agreement with Germany was signed. This was followed by the setting up of the so-called Vichy government which was the government of the 'Free Zone.' Unlike the French Army which virtually ceased to exist under the agreement, the French Navy did not, and it had important

work to continue. Under wartime conditions, the French merchant marine came under navy control. Therefore the most important role of the navy was to continue to supply France with food and oil. France was not self-sufficient in either. This supply role also applied to the French territories and colonies.

The armistice was administered by an Armistice Commission and the Germans, until November 1942, were very strict in sticking with the agreement. This actually gave France a fair amount of say over their own governance. After all, the Vichy government still had the political and civil responsibility for the orderly functioning of every-day life. As is well explained in this book, the French government had a very fine line to balance their freedom within the agreement against the threat of more sanctions or further occupation. For the Navy this meant living within the armistice limits and still carrying out their responsibilities under the control of the Vichy government, which was, after all, the legitimate government of France. This led the Allied powers to regard Vichy France as almost an enemy. And this was the tragedy under which France struggled during the war. There was much more death and destruction heaped on the French Navy by the Allies than by Germany. And this is what led to Mers-el-Kabir in which the Royal Navy, under the mistaken assumption that the French Navy was about to be turned over to Germany, bombarded the French units in that port in North Africa. The result was that most of the surviving ships from North African ports fled to Toulon. As it turned out, the Germans showed no inkling to take over the French fleet and it was one of the terms written into the armistice agreement.

The French Navy was allowed to continue its agreed role until November 1942. On November 7, 1942, the Allies invaded North Africa including Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. The title of this chapter in the book that describes those events is rather fittingly, "Landing in North Africa—Tragedy." For the French military in North Africa, it did turn out to be a tragedy. The French were treated like the enemy in most places and the French did in fact fight back in most places. The presence of Admiral Darlan, head of the French Navy under the Vichy government who was in Algiers on an inspection tour, ultimately resulted in a cease fire by both the French and Allies and saved many lives. The Allied invasion led two weeks later to the German occupation of the rest of France. In their determination to not turn over their ships to

the Germans, the French Fleet scuttled all of their ships in Toulon and some in other metropolitan naval ports. The bulk of the destruction took place in Toulon where a total of 77 warships were scuttled including three battleships, seven cruisers and thirty-two destroyers.

The next part of the story revolves around the struggle between the Vichy French and the Free French under Charles de Gaulle. This internecine affair did not end until the liberation of Paris and the assumption of power by the Gaullists. After that, there set in a period of reprisals against a lot of people associated with the Vichy regime, both true collaborationist and those that just tried to hold things together under the strictures of the armistice agreements. This purge significantly affected the leaders of the French Navy and many of them were tried, found guilty and incarcerated. In some cases, such as that of one of the authors, Rear Admiral Auphan, loyal service was recognized by not pursuing them after their guilty verdict and allowing them to live in relative peace.

This is a recent reprint of this book originally written in 1959 when most of these events were still fresh in the authors' and contributors' minds, and many of the schisms of the war were still evident. The book could be accused of some bias in seeking to explain the events and decisions made by the leaders of Vichy, but overall, it gives a very complete picture of the French Navy activities. Its 385 pages of text provide a lot of information about what, for many of us, is a very little known aspect of World War II. <http://uboat.net/media/books/covers/english/184832118X.jpg>



### U-Boat Attack Logs: A complete Record of Warship Sinkings from Original Sources - 1939~1945

By: Daniel Morgan and Bruce Taylor

Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley, Yorks (2011), 450 + xxxvii pp., Oversize 12" x 10" illustrated, end paper charts, gazetteer, bibliography, index. Originally £45.00; available from Naval & Military Press for £27.85 (\$49.37 via Pay Pal), [order.dept@mmpbooks.com](mailto:order.dept@mmpbooks.com) ISBN 978.1.84832.118.2

## A Starshell Review by Fraser McKee

I am always suspicious of titles that include the words "A Complete Record..." because they very rarely are. However, despite being five years old and "on sale" this spectacular large volume is both well worth its cost and worth hunting for. And the authors have indeed hunted up, after massive research, all the available records of U-boat sinkings of Allied warships and military vessels such as CAM-ships and ocean boarding vessels that were available, as they carefully de-

scribe in the text. In fact the 25 page Introduction makes almost as interesting reading as do the entries. It includes how the Allies in the last months of WWII, deliberately went hunting for the Kriegsmarine BdU HQ war diaries, U-boat plans, surviving log books (Kriegstagebüchen), with Cdr Ian Fleming's commando group's help. They were found, just by chance, in a small castle at Tambach in Thuringen in East Germany on April 25th, 1945—a story in itself. It took several months of work to get them packed and sent back to the Admiralty's historical section. For many attacks, especially late in the war, there are no significant German records apart from the BdU admin HQ daily log records and signal traffic, for the U-boats involved didn't survive for various reasons, or their logbooks have simply disappeared. Those losses are covered in the Gazetteer table at the end with brief notes; about 137 cases. But where the German view of the sinking is available, in 113 cases, the detail is astounding. Also the index is very complete, not only referring to the warships and men that were sunk by these boats, but any crew that were mentioned in the text, rescuing ships, merchantmen involved in both attacks during the event or in rescues, those in the Gazetteer, and so forth. Of the RCN's losses to U-boats (14) only eight are covered in detail—*Levis, Spikenard, Charlottetown, Ottawa, St. Croix, Valleyfield, Alberni* and *Shawinigan*.

The losses are listed in date order of the sinking, so the index is crucial for locating the stories. These run from about three pages to eight and one-half pages, always with a photo of the ship involved, supplemented by German photos of crew, U-boats, even of the event itself, or of the logbook pages on occasion.

The authors explain some of their difficulties, as, for instance, the records kept were in eight different time zone arrangements in the U-boats and BdU in the 5-1/2 years of the war, and times quoted in U-boat logs didn't necessarily agree with time formats used in BdU, or even between the CO's later report and the torpedo firing log kept at the time; some logs had supplemental notes or amendments and it wasn't always clear who added them—the CO, other log writers, BdU or even postwar researchers in the UK. But the writers tell the story in an erudite yet cheerful style making for easy reading. And the German tendency to record fully and in detail all significant actions is reflected in the direct log narratives: "...0603: From about 3,000m I fire a spread of four aimed at a large tanker of about 8-10,000 GRT sailing in 5th place in the column together with an overlapping steamer of about 6-7,000 GRT. While turning I then fire a stern shot at foremost destroyer of port-side escort...". This, it develops, was HMCS *Mayflower*. Another two arrangements I particularly like in this volume is that these supplemental notes (re: *Mayflower*, etc.) are included on a page with the log entries, and the source references for each tale are included at the

end of its section. Saves many page turning cross-checks. I wish more academics did the same.


Each story consists of a heading with basic details—name of the ship sunk and its CO, U-boat involved, date of sinking and general location. A ship photo and the details of its building, size, fatalities and surviving members. Then a general paragraph of introduction to the situation (in earlier stories this includes comments on the Navies and on the class of ships in the first case of a loss, not repeated), a paragraph or so of its career to the date. Then a direct reproduction quoted from the *kriegstagebücher*—time and source of signals, narrative entries concerning the attack, immediately before and after. Then sub-paragraphs: The Sinking, Fate of the Crew, the U-boat story and its CO, followed by an extensive list of sourced (In HMCS *Levis*' case, 27 entries [14 Canadian]—books, websites and official files).

It makes for a quite different perspective on these very detailed actions, as seen from the attacker. Apart from the Canadian cases, they cover 72 RN losses, plus 15 USN of various types, including troop transports and 17 'other'—Russian, Dutch, Free French, etc.

Lessons learned? The attacking U-boats frequently knew not a lot of what was happening above them, but daring attacks tended to produce results; our asdic was vital, and a missed contact or even chance often cost a ship; the AMC's ocean boarding vessels, CAM-ships and other ex-merchantmen suffered disproportionate losses due to their large open spaces and lack of asdic even ... easy targets if encountered.

A book well worth hunting for.


*Fraser is the author of several books on Canadian naval subjects and a former Editor of Starshell.*



## 21st Century Sims Innovation, Education & Leadership for the Modern Era

Edited by Benjamin F. Armstrong

Naval Institute Press (2015), 161 pp, soft cover, ISBN 13 978-1-61251-810-7



## 21st Century Ellis Operational Art & Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era

Edited by B. A. Friedman

Naval Institute Press (2015), 151 pp, illustrated, soft cover, ISBN 13 978-1-61251-807-7

### Both books reviewed by Commander George Forward, RCN

Because they are part of a series entitled the *21st Century Foundations*, I have taken the unorthodox decision to review both of these books at once. Under the guidance of editor-in-chief Benjamin Armstrong, the series began with a review of Mahan in *21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era*. Following on with his review of US Naval innovator Admiral Sims and B. A. Friedman's review of USMC hero of amphibious thinking, Colonel 'Pete' Ellis, the series seeks to give "modern perspectives to the great strategists and military philosophers of the past, placing their writings, principles and theories within modern discussions and debates ... the series informs the present by collecting and offering strategists and thinkers of the past."<sup>1</sup> As such, it is essentially a reprinting of previous works by military thinkers of the past with modern day commentary.

While this re-presentation of historical thinkers is an admirable pursuit and one well worth the effort, after all, the old adage that 'the more things change the more they stay the same' is a popular one, it leaves a book reviewer in a conundrum. What should be the target of the review? Should the review concentrate on the indisputable value of the writings of these military thinkers of yore, or the commentary of the editors which essentially speaks to the context within which the works first appeared and how the modern-day student can still benefit from them?

William Sowden Sims was an American Admiral who may be thought of as the American 'Jacky Fisher.' His ideas were counter to Mahan's thinking at the time and were considered quite radical. When it came to the often passionate debate over all-big-gun, one-caliber battleships and his vocal criticism of American gunnery, Sims was loved by some, detested by more but his contributions to the USN brought the force into modernity. Once pegged an insurgent by rivals, it took the personal intervention of President Teddy Roosevelt to save his career and cement him as the naval intellectual of his day. His appointment as President of the Naval War College allowed him to influence countless young officers and set the stage for his Pulitzer Prize-winning publication of *Victory at Sea*, an account of the USN in the Great War. Indeed, he is believed to be the only serving Armed Forces member to have ever won the prize. He was not without controversy however, and he earned such powerful enemies as Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy amongst others.

Armstrong's treatment of Sims and his writings is nothing short of reverent. He does a good job of laying out Sims' life and highlights of his career as he sets up for the various speeches and articles he reproduces. Although not surprisingly, he omits the fact that Sims was born in Ontario! He masterfully related century-old thinking to modern-day problems and when the relation is not evident such as in the battleship debate, he argues it is but a template for the modern-day carrier versus submarine arguments.

Earl Hancock 'Pete' Ellis was one of the most colourful of a long

<sup>1</sup> Benjamin Armstrong, *21st Century Sims, Innovation, Education and Leadership for the Modern Era*, Naval Institute Press (2015), Intro.

list of colourful US Marines. That his accurate prediction of the Pacific War was uncanny and much-lauded is well-known but his mysterious death and life-long alcoholism adds a degree of mysticism to his life. Born practically as far away from ocean as is possible in Kentucky, Ellis has emerged as one of the great strategists of littoral operations and amphibious tactics.

Like Armstrong with Sims, Friedman's treatment of Ellis borders on hero worship. Nevertheless, Friedman cuts through the myth and concentrates on Ellis' essays on naval and amphibious operations that the USN and Marine Corps would use to win the war against Imperial Japan, as well as his articles about counterinsurgency and conventional war based on his experiences in the Philippines and in Europe during the Great War. I particularly appreciated Friedman's account of Ellis' education. I felt it is worth quoting in its entirety:

"...it is interesting to note that his potential was only unlocked when a senior leader in his organization recognized it and then sent him to a course of study designed for officers far more senior to Ellis' rank of captain ... Such episodes are rare in today's military, and even when they do occur, officers who seek higher education too early can cause their careers to stall or even grind to a halt. Then, like today, the military personnel system was designed not to make the most of the

<sup>2</sup> B. A. Friedman, 21st Century Ellis, Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era, Naval Institute Press (2015), p.4.

potential of individual service members, but to fill line numbers in unit rosters with anyone available."<sup>2</sup>

How true! Nevertheless, Ellis' *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* essentially transformed the United States Marine Corps and was the genesis for the present expeditionary model and how a force gets ashore intact, equipped, armed and ready to fight.

The two books of this series made for an interesting and enjoyable read. The conventional commentary helps to situate the context of the articles and papers but does little to help relate the century-old writing to today. Rather, the writings stand as they always have as important and oft-studied examples of strategic prophecy and visionary innovation without the need for additional 'editing.' One is left wondering, however, where is the 21st Century Tony Law or the 21st Century Harry DeWolf, and why are not *their* writings and spectacular after-action reports widely distributed throughout Canada's military training system?

Nevertheless, the value of these books lies in their highly-readable format which presents essentially a 'best of' collection of both Sims' and Ellis' work. Recommended for the military historian at heart but more so, for all junior Naval officers.

*Commander E. G. Forward, RCN, currently serves with the Strategic J4 of Strategic Joint Staff. He is the author of several historical novels of Newfoundland and Labrador.*

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*Some parting thoughts for our Starshell readers...*

# Preserve Canada's Strategic Surveillance Capability

By Brigadier General (Ret'd) R. D. Daly ~ and ~ Colonel (Ret'd) E. S. C. Cable

## BACKGROUND:

Canada's geography has insulated our nation from conflicts on our soil; however, our geography also represents a massive three-ocean frontier consisting of the world's longest coastline and a massive Arctic archipelago to defend. For the past 65 years, Canada has maintained a credible maritime surveillance capability, which has significantly extended our awareness of domestic and military activities beyond our shores and has safeguarded our sovereignty.

Canada acquired a fleet of 33 Argus maritime surveillance aircraft in the late-1950s to conduct anti-submarine (ASW) patrols over the Atlantic and Pacific with periodic sovereignty forays to the Arctic. Designed and built in Canada by Canadair (now Bombardier) the Argus was the most capable ASW aircraft of its era. In the early 1980s, the obsolete Argus fleet was replaced by 18 CP-140 Aurora ASW patrol aircraft and three CP-140A Arcturus Arctic and Maritime Surveillance

Aircraft. However, Canada's surveillance capability has now been reduced to an alarming level. Canada has already disposed of two Arcturus and turned the third into a permanent maintenance trainer; and is in the process of updating and extending the life of only 14 of the 18 Auroras with the intention to operate only ten aircraft in a rotatable pool of 14 to achieve a life expectancy to 2030 at a reduced pace of operations. Four Auroras are to be scrapped.

During **RIMPAC 2015**, a multi-national exercise in the Pacific, the US Navy publicly stated that the systems in the updated Aurora are performing at a level they hope to attain with their new P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft in ten years. During the current **Operation Impact** in Syria and Iraq, the updated Aurora is acknowledged as one of the most successful and capable ASW and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft in the world.

## THE NEED:

Fleet sizing studies for the Aurora procurement indicated that 24 aircraft were required to deal with the two-ocean sub-surface threat posed by the Warsaw Pact nations and their satellites. The government unilaterally reduced the number of aircraft to 18 Auroras without a commensurate reduction in tasking. The current fleet of 14 updated and life-extended Auroras to produce 10 Auroras for operations is insufficient to fulfill the surveillance requirements for a country with the world's longest coastline and largest Arctic Archipelago. In addition to the two ocean commitment, global warming has expanded the requirement for Arctic ISR to monitor shipping activity, search and rescue, communications relay and ASW. There is also a growing need to provide ISR support for international expeditionary missions such as Libya, Syria and Iraq. Despite this increased demand for overland and maritime surveillance, the RCAF is being forced to scrap the remaining four Auroras because of budget and associated manning constraints.

Operations in Libya, Syria and Iraq have demonstrated the requirement for persistent surveillance with a stand-off weapons capability. The RCAF and Canadian industry have the capability to modify and equip the Auroras to carry any weapon currently certified on the US Navy's P-3C aircraft, including air-to-ground stand-off weapons. An Aurora stand-off, ground attack weapons capability would provide an alternative to the contentious use of armed unmanned air vehicles (UAV) against fleeing targets for the foreseeable future. Moreover, with the increasing use of surveillance UAVs, the Aurora's communication and data management systems can be readily configured as an airborne UAV controller to provide line-of-sight, operator control of UAVs in theatre.

## THE OPPORTUNITY

There is an urgent requirement to allocate incremental funding to the RCAF to take advantage of the narrowing window of opportunity to update and life-extend the four Auroras currently to be scrapped. This will restore the Aurora fleet to its original size of 18 aircraft. A decision is urgent because Lockheed-Martin will likely close the wing and horizontal tail production line necessary to life extend the four remaining Auroras if there are no follow-on orders. Also, restoring the fleet to 18 aircraft will require additional RCAF manning and funding to operate the last four Auroras.

As an alternative to acquiring armed UAVs, a modification program, already implemented by the US Navy, should be considered to provide the Aurora a stand-off ground attack capability. Any future program to acquire surveillance UAVs should include the modification to the Aurora software to provide line-of-sight software control of in-theatre UAVs.

The enhanced life expectancy of the updated Aurora will enable operations to at least 2030 when the Aurora will require replacement. The Boeing P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft would be a viable replacement candidate. However, liaison with industry is recommended to assess if a maritime version of the Bombardier C-Series airline could be a home-grown option in much the same manner as Canadair developed the Argus from the Bristol Britannia airliner.

## CONCLUSION

The Government of Canada is rightly concerned about the opening up of the Arctic due to global warming. A full fleet of 18 updated and life-extended Auroras would provide an extensive capability to meet that requirement in the near term with minimal investment. It would also provide a viable counter to the ever growing submarine threat in the Atlantic and Pacific.

Canadian defence industry innovation and partnership with the Government of Canada has delivered a state-of-the-art alternative to the more expensive Boeing P-8. The Aurora update solution is sufficiently scalable and flexible to garner the attention of foreign governments, particularly with the Canadian capability to life-extend hundreds of foreign P-3C aircraft as part of a systems upgrade. This represents an immediate export opportunity, which could create and maintain high paying jobs in Canada.

Modifying the Auroras to carry air-to-ground stand-off weapons and to provide a near-term solution to the debate over the acquisition and use of weapon-capable UAVs.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- It is recommended that update and life extension modifications be completed on all 18 Aurora aircraft before the window of opportunity closes.
- It is recommended that RCAF manpower and associated funding be increased to restore the Aurora fleet to its full 18 aircraft capability.
- It is strongly recommended that planning be initiated now to replace the 18 aircraft Aurora fleet by 2030 with a fully ASW/ISR capable aircraft with sufficient range and endurance to meet Canadian strategic (sub-surface and overland) surveillance requirements. Such planning should consider the possible development of a maritime version of the Bombardier C-Series airliner in the same manner that Canadair developed the Argus from the Bristol Britannia airliner.

**R. D. Daly, Brigadier General (Ret'd)**

President

Maritime Air Veterans Association

**E. S. C. Cable, Colonel (Ret'd)**

Strategic Studies Coordinator

Maritime Air Veterans Association



# Answers to Schober's Quiz #73 on page 20

## ANSWERS (in chronological order):

(1) The former **SMS<sup>1</sup> Ostfriesland** of the Imperial German Navy, sunk 21<sup>st</sup> July 1921. Commissioned on 1 August 1911, she displaced 22,448 tons. Main armament: 12 x 12 inch guns. *Ostfriesland* had served throughout WWI in the German High Seas Fleet. Postwar she was ceded to the USA. In July 1921, she was one of several warships expended as targets off Cape Hatteras, in joint US Navy—US Army Air Service trials, under the overall command of the controversial Brig. Gen. W. L. Mitchell, to study the effectiveness of aerial bombing against warships. The tests were hardly realistic, considering that *Ostfriesland* was a stationary 'sitting duck.' Moreover, she was, of course, without a crew—no anti-aircraft fire to interfere with the air-attack. Nor any damage-control. Still, it took the army bombers six waves of attacks over two days to cause the ship to founder. The proponents of "victory through air-power" had a lot to learn.


(2) The Italian battleship **Littorio**, sunk on 11 November 1940. She was almost brand new, having been commissioned on 6 May of that year. Standard displacement 40,723 tons; 128,000 SHP. Maximum speed 30 knots. Main armament 9 x 15 inch guns. On the night of 11/12 November 1940, Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm 'Swordfish' (aka, "Stringbag") aircraft attacked Italian Fleet units at their moorings in Taranto Harbour, sinking or damaging three battleships, one heavy-cruiser and two destroyers. Badly damaged by three 18 inch torpedo hits and sinking, *Littorio* was beached in shallow water. Subsequently raised, repaired and returned to service, she survived the war, to be scrapped in 1952.

(3) The Italian battleship **Caio Duilio**, also sunk at Taranto on 11 November 1940. (For details of sinking, see above, under *Littorio*.) *Caio Duilio* was of WW1-vintage, having been modernized during 1937-40. Displacing 23,622 tons, she mounted a main armament of 10 x 12.6 inch guns. She, too, was beached in shallow water to prevent foundering after one torpedo hit. Salvaged, repaired and returned to active service she survived WWII. She remained in commission in the post-war Italian Navy until 1953, being scrapped in 1957.

(4) The Italian battleship **Conte di Cavour**, also sunk at Taranto on 11 November 1940. (For details of sinking, see above, under *Littorio*.) *Conte di Cavour* was a sister-ship of *Caio Duilio*, identical in all respects. (For particulars, see above, under *Caio Duilio*.) Damaged by one torpedo hit, she too was beached in shallow water and subsequently raised and repaired. However, *Conte di Cavour's* repairs were not completed at the time Italy surrendered in September 1943. Consequently she saw no further service prior to her scrapping in 1946.

(5) The Greek battleship **Lemnos**, sunk on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 1941 at her moorings in the Salamis Naval Base, by German Luftwaffe Junkers-87 (Stuka) dive bombers. She was the former USS *Idaho* (BB-24), purchased by Greece on 30 June 1914. Particulars: Displacement: 13,000 tons; Length: 382 feet. Her main armament consisted of 4 x 12 inch and 8 x 8 inch guns. Throughout her long service in the Greek Navy, *Lemnos* experienced a turbulent career, reflecting the troubled history of the Greek nation during most of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

(6) The Greek battleship **Kilkis**, also sunk on 23 April 1941 at her moorings in the Salamis Naval Base, by German Luftwaffe Junkers-87 (Stuka) dive bombers. A sister ship of *Lemnos*, she was the former USS *Mississippi* (BB-23). The two ships were purchased together on 30 June 1914. Their particulars were identical. (See above, under *Lemnos*.)



ABOVE: SMS *Ostfriesland* and RIGHT: foundering off Cape Hatteras after numerous air attacks by US Army bombers.



ABOVE: The Italian battleship *Littorio*.




RIGHT: The Italian battleship *Conte Di Cavour*.



ABOVE: The Greek battleship *Kilkis*.

RIGHT: Greek battleship *Lemnos* awash at Salamis after dive-bombing. Sister-ship *Kilkis* in background—likewise sunk.



<sup>1</sup> SMS = Seiner Majestät Schiff = HMS



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*Editor mea culpa...*

**CORRECTION** TO NOAC Endowment Fund Update on page 39 of the Summer 2016 issue of *Starshell*.

The item under 'REMEMBER THE PAST' which reads:

"HMCS *Bytown* Officers Mess - \$1,000 to provide HMCS *Haida* prints to six museums"

~ should have read ~

"**NAC Ottawa Branch** - \$1,000 to provide HMCS *Haida*/Athabaskan prints for presentations to Naval Museums."

With humble apologies to Ottawa Branch...

**The *Starshell* Editor**

(Who solemnly vows to someday learn how to read!)



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## Felicity Margot Hanington

July 16, 1956–October 29, 2016

In Victoria, British Columbia, our dear wife, mother, sister, aunt, godmother and devoted friend Felicity Margot Hanington slipped away today after long years of spirited refusal to let cancer take her down. She was the youngest child of Rear Admiral Daniel Lionel Hanington and Margot Rita Wallace. Felicity lived in Halifax, Virginia Beach, Ottawa, Victoria & Texada Island.

At the of age sixty, alas, metastatic breast cancer ended her life. Grateful for the time she was given (longer than expected), she harboured no regrets about dying but for the pain it might cause her family. She is survived by her profoundly loved and respected husband Lawrence Carl Dawe, her talented daughter Charlotte Emily, her thinker and mimic of a son Mathew Lionel, her band of adored and adoring siblings Gillian, Mark & Brian, and a host of charming and devoted in-laws and cousins.

With her immediate family as her steadfast central focus, Felicity was known for kindness, practicality, and devotion to the welfare of those around her. Much revered for her trademark combination of grace and grit, she tackled the obstacles life threw at her with sensible disregard.

Long and productive careers in finance and publishing were among her great pleasures. With a love of the Navy inspired by a father she called *'the most darling man in the Canadian Navy'*, she served for many years as editor of Canada's naval newspaper, *Maritime Command Trident*, chief speech writer for Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty and, until last month, as editor of *Lead & Line*, the regular newsletter of the Naval Association of Canada, Vancouver Island.

Only days before she passed away, Felicity declared that she had received so much love and kindness from her friends that she couldn't believe she had been *'this lucky in life'*. Endlessly grateful for the support she received from others, she gave back to her community for three happy years through *The Mustard Seed*, and lately with the *St Vincent de Paul Society*. She had intended to make community service the focus of her retirement years.

Not always a fan of the Old Testament, Felicity loved and lived by Micah 6:8 *"And what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?"* She worked hard to do all three.

Felicity's funeral will be held at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, November 8, 2016 at St Andrew's Cathedral in Victoria. In lieu of flowers, please send chocolate. (Just kidding; Felicity, who dictated most of this obituary five weeks ago, intended that her friends remember her with a smile.) She then insisted on one final line...

*"Thanks to all for the truly fabulous journey."*

We're all sadly going to miss your company in our 'world of letters' Felicity, RIP. 'Starshell' Ed.



# Obituaries

Compiled by Pat D. C. Barnhouse

'Starshell' Obituaries Editor  
pat.barnhouse@sympatico.ca

"All these were honoured in their generations,  
and were the glory of their times.  
There be of them, that have left a name behind them,  
that their praises might be reported."

Apocrypha, Ecclesiasticus 44

## ♦ LCdr George Alfred KEARNEY, CD, RCN(R) Ret'd.

Thunder Bay Branch, 93 in Thunder Bay 17/08/16. Bronze Medallion ('77), Silver ('90) and Gold (2013) Medallions. Branch Pres. 1982-83 and 2000-09, Srv'd. RCNVR WWII. Jn'd. RCN(R) through UNTD 01/48 at *Chippawa*, prom. SLt 02/50 and Lt 12/51. Tsf'd. to *Griffon* 03/53 and prom. LCdr 12/59. To Emergency List in '63. Civ. career as high school teacher. [AZ, TB, *Chronicle Herald*].

## ♦ Cdr(NR)(Ret'd) David Michael LEIGH, CD\*

Edmonton Br., 77 in Switzerland 29/06/16. Bronze (2000) Medallion. Jn'd. RCN as Cdt at *Venture* 09/57, prom. A/SLt 09/59 thence *Stadacona* 09/59. Prom. SLt 09/60 fl'd. by *Huron* 11/60. Resigned in '62. Jn'd. Naval Reserve as Lt at *Nonsuch* in '75, srv'd. as Div.O, Trg.O and XO. Ret'd. as Cdr in 1993. [BRC, *Edmonton Journal*]

## ♦ Cdr Allison Hugh MacLEOD, CD\*, RCN Ret'd.

NSNAC, 89 in Halifax 12/07/16. Srv'd. Army WWII. Jn'd. UNTD in '46. Jn'd. RCN as A/S/Lt 06/50, thence *Naden* 05/51. Prom. SLt(S) 05/51, fl'd. by *Quebec* 01/53. Prom. Lt(S) 10/53 thence *Scotian* 09/55 and *Hochelaga* 06/58. Prom. LCdr 12/60 fl'd. by *Ottawa* 04/62, *Niagara* (USN Exchange) 07/63 and MARCOM HQ 09/69. Prom. Cdr 08/70 thence CFB Hfx. Ret'd. in '76. Civ. career in real estate and federal government, (A/Superintendent CFAD Bedford). [RD, SR, *Chronicle Herald*]

## ♦ LCdr(S) William James MAGEE, CD\*, RCN Ret'd.

London Br., 98 in London, ON 18/08/16. Bronze ('90) and Silver (2004) Medallions. Srv'd. as Branch President. Jn'd. RCNVR as Pay SLt 09/40 fl'd. by *Stadacona* 01/41 and *Brunswick* 05/41. Prom. Pay Lt 09/42 thence *Niobe* 11/43. Redesignated Lt(S) (sen. 09/41) fl'd. by *Stadacona* 03/46 and released. Jn'd. RCN in '49 as Lt(S) (sen. 11/43), fl'd. by *Cornwallis* (on staff) 05/49. Prom. LCdr(S) 11/51, thence *Bytown* 07/51, *Huron* 02/54, *Bytown* 09/54, *Algonquin* 07/57, *Shearwater* 08/59, *Prevost* 05/61, *Patriot* (COND Staff) 03/64 and *York* 11/64. Ret'd. in '65. Civ. career in insurance and with board of education. [KL, *London Free Press*].

## ♦ Leslie J. H. PRESSEY

London Br., 87 in St. Thomas, ON 31/07/16. Navy veteran, police officer and security supervisor. [AS, *St. Thomas Times Journal*]

## ♦ SLt William James QUALTROUGH, RCN(R)

Toronto Br., 86 in Toronto 08/09/16. Jn'd. RCN(R) as A/SLt 04/54 at *Nonsuch* and prom. SLt same date. To Ret'd. list in '58. Srv'd. as a Sea Cadet, CO of Navy League Cadet Corps in Edmonton and National President of the Navy League. Civ. career with railroads, employee benefits and Ontario Pension Commission. [GM, *Toronto Star*]

## ♦ Cmdre James Nixon SPALDING, CD\*\*, RCN (Ret'd)

NAC-O, 77 in Ottawa 10/08/16. Jn'd. as RCN Cdt(S) 09/55 at *Venture*. Prom. Mid(S) 09/57, fl'd. by *Bonaventure* 09/57. Prom. A/SLt(S) 05/58, thence *Patriot* 04/59. Prom. SLt(S) 05/59, fl'd. by FOPC 06/60. Prom. Lt 03/61, thence *Assiniboine* 04/61, *Stadacona* (Ops Cse.) 07/63, *Crescent* 08/64 and *Nipigon* 02/65. Prom. LCdr 03/68 fl'd. by MARCOM HQ 07/70 and CDLS(W) (Exchange USN) 06/74. Prom. Cdr 06/74 thence *Kootenay* (i/c) 06/74, MARPAC HQ 05/78 and *Huron* (i/c) 05/78. Prom. Capt 08/81, fl'd. by CFLS (Japanese Trg.) 08/81, Defence Attaché Japan 07/82, 1st Canadian Destroyer Squadron (i/c) 08/85, CFMWC 08/87 and MARPAC HQ 10/87. Prom. Cmdre 06/89 thence NDHQ (DGRET). Ret'd. in '94. [Ottawa Citizen]

## ♦ LCdr(NR) (Ret'd) William STEWART, CD

Montreal Br., 86 in Montreal 13/09/16. Bronze ('93) and Silver ('98) Medallions. Srv'd. as President Montreal Br. Jn'd. RNVR as Mid. post WWII. Later joined RCN(R), prom. LCdr and ret'd. in '95. Civ. career with Air Canada. [KL]

## In Memoriam (non-members)

## ♦ Lt Philip Gilbert Martin ANTONSEN, RCN (Ret'd)

In Kingston 29/07/16. Jn'd. RMC as RCN Cdt 09/57, prom. SLt 05/61 and Lt 05/63. Srv'd. *Tecumseh* (Plt Trg with RCAF), *Shearwater*, VU 32 and VS 880. Rls'd. in '65. [NI, *Canada's Naval Aviators*].

## ♦ Lt Harold Fulton BAILEY, CD\*, RCN (RET'D)

92 in Comox, BC 12/06/16. Jn'd. RCN 11/48, srv'd. Korea, CFR'd as CMD O 04/63 and prom. Lt 01/66. Srv'd. *Lanark*, *Bonaventure* and MARCOM HQ. Ret'd. 06/74. [Chronicle Herald]

◆ **Const LCdr Ian MacDonald BAYLY, CD**

89 in Montreal 13/07/16. Jn'd. *Royal Roads* as RCN Cdt 08/45, prom. Mid(E) 07/47, A/SLt(E) 03/49, Const SLt (sen. 06/48) and Const LCdr 11/58. Srv'd. RN for Trg. *Niobe* (standby *Bonaventure*), *Ontario*, *Naden*, *Bytown* and *Niagara*. Ret'd. in '69. [JGRH, *Citizen*]

◆ **LCdr Ronald Stuart BINNIE, CD\*, RCN (Ret'd)**

79 in York Region, ON, 12/05/16. Jn'd. RCN as *Royal Roads* Cdt 09/53, prom. Mid 09/56, SLt 09/57, Lt. 09/59 and LCdr 01/79. Srv'd. *Haida*, RN for trg., *Nootka*, *Iroquois*, *Discovery*, *Niobe* and CDLS(W) (Operational Software Trg.). Ret'd 01/79. [*Toronto Star*, *e-Veritas*]

◆ **LCdr Reginald Arthur George COOMBES, CD\*, RCN (Ret'd)**

86 in Dartmouth, NS 15/06/16. Jn'd. RCN 04/54 as SLt (sen. 04/54), prom. Lt 04/56 and LCdr 01/65. Srv'd. *Toronto*, *Stadacona*, *Lanark*, *Crescent*, *Restigouche*, *Bytown* and CFFS Hfx. Mbr 1<sup>st</sup> Wpns Cse. Ret'd. 12/76. [SR, *Chronicle Herald*]

◆ **Lt(MN) Betty-June COWAN (nee BALLANTYNE), RCN (Ret'd)**

90 in North Bay, ON 06/09/16. Jn'd. RCN(R) at York as A/SLt(NS) 10/49, tsf'd. RCN as SLt(NS) (sen. 10/49), and prom. Lt(MN) 05/52. Srv'd. *Naden*, *Stadacona* and *Shearwater*. Rls. in '57. [*Citizen*]

◆ **Charles Frederick DONKIN, CD\*\*, RCN (Ret'd)**

84 in Dartmouth, NS, 17/07/16. Jn'd. RCN 05/49, srv'd. Korea, CFR'd as CMD O 04/66 and prom. Lt 04/69. Srv'd. CFFS Hfx., CFSRU(A), *Iroquois*, *Huron*, *Algonquin* and NEU(A). Ret'd. 12/80. [SR, *Chronicle Herald*]

◆ **Cdr Brian Patrick DUGGAN, CD\*, RCN(R) (Ret'd.)**

Former Winnipeg Br., 77 in Victoria 07/08/16. Jn'd. UNTD as Cdt(S) at *Chippawa* 01/57, prom. RCN(R) SLt(S) 07/59, tsf'd. to *Prevost* 10/60, prom. Lt 07/61, tsf'd. *York* 06/53 and later tsf'd. back to *Chippawa*. Later prom. LCdr and Cdr CO *Chippawa*. 1981-85. [RS, WC]

◆ **SLt Douglas Ray DYMENT, RCN(R)(Ret'd)**

89 in Orangeville, ON 04/09/16. Jn'd. *Royal Roads* as RCN Cdt 09/44. Tsf'd. to RCN(R) at *York* as Mid 07/46 and prom. SLt 07/47. To Ret'd. List in '50. [*e-Veritas*]

**ERRATA (Starshell Editor's error):**

**Page 42, Issue #75, Summer 2015:**

Captain Neil Roland BOIVIN CD\*\* RCNVR (Ret'd) should read:  
Captain Neil Roland BOIVIN CD\*\* RCN (Ret;d)

◆ **PO2 Stewart GRAEFNER, CD\*, RCN**

55 in Halifax 08/09/16. Srv'd in fourteen ships and did a tour in Afghanistan. [*Toronto Star*]

◆ **Cdr(NR)(Ret'd) Derek W. S. HAMILTON**

72 in Ottawa 03/08/16. UNTD Cdt at *Carleton* in '63. Jn'd *Brunswick* as RCN(R) A/SLt 09/64 and later prom. LCdr and Cdr. CO *Brunswick* 1979-82. [*Citizen*]

◆ **LCdr John Edward HOBBS, CD, RCN (Ret'd)**

90 in Kelowna, BC 13/06/16. Srv'd. RCNVR WWII. Jn'd. UNTD at *Star* in '46, prom. RCN(R) A/SLt 02/49, tsf'd. to RCN as A/SLt 09/50, Lt 07/51 and LCdr 07/59. Srv'd *Carleton*, *Naden*, RN for trg., *New Glasgow*, *Cornwallis*, *Stadacona*, *Chaleur* (XO), *James Bay* (i/c), *Discovery* (ROTP Supervisor and CO *Quadra* and *Athabaskan* (XO). Ret'd. in '68. [WC]

◆ **CPO Edmund Alexander JANUSAS, CD\***

96 in Hamilton, ON 08/08/16. Jn'd. RCN in '48 and srv'd. *Shearwater*, *Magnificent*, *Bonaventure* and *Ottawa*. Ret'd in '73. [PB, *Hamilton Spectator*]

◆ **LCdr Carl Fathergill PERRY, CD, RCN(R) (Ret'd)**

83 in Halifax 26/07/16. Jn'd. UNTD as Cdt in *Scotian* 01/53, prom. RCN(R) A/Inst SLt 09/55, Inst. Lt 09/57 and LCdr 09/65. [SR, *Chronicle Herald*]

◆ **Cdr [LCol(PLT)] Charles Frederick POIRIER, CD\*\*, RCN (Ret'd)**

In Kelowna, BC 08/06/16. Jn'd RCN as Cdt at *Royal Roads* 09/52, prom. Mid 09/55, A/SLt 01/57, SLt '58, Maj(PLT) 01/67 and LCol(PLT) 01/78. Srv'd. *Magnificent*, RN for Trg., *Niagara* (USN PLT Trg), *Bonaventure*, CFB Summerside, CFB Comox and NDHQ. Ret'd in '85. [PB, "Canada's Naval Aviators"]

◆ **LCdr (CIL) (Ret'd) Frank Harold SAIES-JONES, CD**

Former Calgary Br., 92 in High River, AB 17/09/16. Bronze Medallion ('83). Branch President 1976 and 1992. Jn'd. RN as Boy Seaman in '40 and discharged in '48. Srv'd. as CO of Sea Cadet Corps *Undaunted* retiring in '84. Founding President, General Manager and Curator of the Naval Museum of Alberta. [NR]


◆ **Lt Dalton McFarlane WALLER, RCNVR (Ret'd)**

Former Toronto Br., 94 in Toronto 05/03/16. Jn'd. RCNVR as Prob. SLt at *Cataraqui* in '43, prom. SLt 07/43 and Lt 07/44. Srv'd Thetford Mines. Tsf'd. to Ret'd List in '45. [*Queen's Alumni Review*]

Kindly forward all obituaries to Pat D. C. Barnhouse,  
Starshell Obituaries Editor,  
555 Kenwood Avenue, Ottawa, ON K1A 0L7 or  
by email to [pat.barnhouse@sympatico.ca](mailto:pat.barnhouse@sympatico.ca)

# 'Our Navy'

By F. R. (Hamish) Berchem CSMA



## "The Crowsnest Club, Water Street, St. John's, Nfld."

The Club was started in 1942 by Captain, later Vice-Admiral, E. R. Mainguy, OBE, RCN and was open to any officer who wore "an Allied uniform" and served in a "fighting ship." The name was apt, because the Club was reached by a steep climb up fifty-nine steps of a rickety iron ladder. The periscope from the German U-boat U-190 was overhauled sometime around the year 2000 by the boat's former Engineer Officer, Oberleutenant (Ing) Werner Hirschmann, who became a life member in HMCS ESQUIMALT Memorial Association.

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